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The rst paper studies how poor quality of institution, such as corruption in public
procurement auction, could hurt welfare. We show how competition e¤ect could
improve the cost-e¢ ciency but not the quality of a public procurement auction
with corruption. In fact, no incentive mechanism can be e¢ cient in this auction
if qualities are non-contractible. An empirical study suggests that increasing the
number of bidders does increase the percentage cost e¢ ciency albeit at a decreasing
rate and decreases the percentage cost e¢ ciency after it reaches a certain number
of bidders.
In the second paper, we study how endogeneity between welfare and institu-
tions might make institutional reforms more subtle. We use evidence from an
in-depth eld study conducted in ve districts in Indonesia and build a model
that illustrates how initial socioeconomic conditions as well as past institutions
generate institutional complexes, including the degree of local capture, local lead-
ership, and participation level. By endogenizing the degree of local capture, we
show how cooperation between local leaders and local elites could positively or
negatively a¤ect welfare depending on the initial socioeconomic conditions. These
institutional complexes that evolve with welfare create self-reinforcing progresses
in the long-run. In the context of Indonesia in the post-decentralization period,
exogenous shocks, such as an introduction of central governments enforcements
on both strengthening local institutions and increasing welfare are needed.
In the third paper, we study how economic institutions intertwine with polit-
ical institutions. A theoretical study of a simple strategic complementary game
with private and public information among partially informed agents such as cen-
tral banks shows that initial fundamentals might give rise to di¤erent levels of
transparency. An empirical study shows that both economic fundamentals such as
the reserve ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves and non-economic
fundamentals such as an occurrence of crisis and the level of democracy do a¤ect
transparency of central banks. We apply this analysis to study the coordination
e¤ect of information on the progress towards regional nancial integration among
East Asian countries. We nd that the progress towards regional nancial integra-
tion might rely more on polity rather than on economic fundamentals.
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CHAPTER 1
CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS:
POSITIVE EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS, INCENTIVE MECHANISM
DESIGN, AND EMPIRICAL STUDY
1.1 Introduction
In this paper, we provide a positive equilibrium analysis for a two-dimensional pub-
lic procurement auction with corruption, when the type space is two-dimensional
in cost and quality, independently distributed. First, we show the case with-
out corruption in an N-bidder auction. We discuss the e¢ ciency of this auction,
comparative static analysis, and the convergence results as the number of bidders
increase. This paper contributes to the literatures on auctions and corruption by
introducing incompleteness of information in auctions with two-dimensional-type
bidders and extending a two-bidder auction into an N-bidder auction.
With corruption, we analyze the equilibrium bidding and bribing strategies in
an incomplete information setting with a nite type space and an innite strategy
space. Burguet and Che (2004) analyze a similar model of a rst-price, sealed-
bid procurement auction with a corrupt public o¢ cial in a complete information
setting. We impose two conditions on the incomplete information auction game
with corruption that we analyze. First, to simplify the model, we assume that both
the public o¢ cial and the central planner are non-strategic players. A strategic
public o¢ cial and a strategic central planner have dominant strategies. In the case
of a tie, a strategic public o¢ cial and a strategic central planner are indi¤erent
among a set of actions. A non-strategic public o¢ cial and a non-strategic central
planner play the same strategies as those of the strategic players. In the case
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of tie, however, the bidders have subjective beliefs about the actual strategies of
these non-strategic players that do not have to coincide with the actual strategies.
Second, in an N-bidder auction, we assume the probability of the bidders winning
is based on pair-wise instead of group-wise comparison. Other main contribution
of this paper to the literatures on auctions and corruption is to show that in this
subjective belief model, increasing the number of bidders decreases the equilibrium
bids and bribes although at the limit as the number of bidders get very large, there
are some types of bidders who o¤er positive bribes and whose equilibrium bids
never converge to the true cost.
The second section of this paper discusses the incentive mechanism design for
an unobservable and non-contractible quality. A public procurement auction with
multidimensional type in which the quality of each bidder is unobservable and
non-contractible falls into the class of games in which the impossibility result the-
orem applies even though biddersvaluations are private information. We discuss
the impossibility result and "constrained e¢ ciency" (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000;
Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001; Maskin, 1992) on this multidimensional-type-bidder
model.
The third section of this paper shows empirical evidence of the e¤ect of number
of bidders on the percentage cost e¢ ciency of the auctions. We took 1,404 Semi
Electronic public procurement auctions from Indonesias Department of Public
Work in 2006, and we showed a quadratic relationship between the number of bid-
ders and the percentage cost e¢ ciency, which suggests that increasing the number
of bidders increases the percentage cost e¢ ciency at a decreasing rate and it starts
to decrease the percentage cost e¢ ciency after some number of bidders. The gap
between the theoretical predictions and the empirical study may be due to factors,
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other than the competition e¤ect, such as ine¢ ciency of selection process with a
very large number of bidders, that are not captured in the theoretical model. With
too many bidders, the negative factors dominates the competition e¤ect. We for-
mulate policy recommendations based on the theoretical results and the empirical
study.
The following section reviews earlier literatures on the topic of public pro-
curement auctions and corruption, multidimensional-type model, existence of an
equilibrium in incomplete information game, competition and corruption, and in-
centive mechanism designs. Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium bidding function
without corruption. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium strategy with corruption.
The rst sub-section discusses the general property of an equilibrium in this model,
including the e¢ ciency of the auction. The second sub-section analyzes the model
in an incomplete information setting starting from a model with discrete type
and strategy space to a model with discrete type and innite strategy space. We
introduce subjective belief model. We consider bidders with di¤erent attitudes
towards uncertainties. The last sub-section states the main propositions. Section
5 discusses incentive mechanism designs in the class of multidimensional, common
value auctions. Section 6 shows empirical results of the e¤ect of the number of
bidders on cost e¢ ciency. Section 7 discusses briey the policy implication of the
results. Section 8 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Literature on corruption in rst-price, sealed-bid public procurement auctions that
is closest to our model is by Burguet and Che (2004). In our model, we study the
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N-bidder case while in their model there are only two bidders. Also, we study the
incompleteness of information model, while in their model information is complete.
Burguet and Perry (2007) study corruption and favoritism in a rst-price sealed
bid procurement auction between the auctioneer and the bidder, where right of
rst refusal is o¤ered by the auctioneer to the dishonest or favored bidder. Unlike
the multidimensional type of the bidders in cost and quality in this paper, the
type of the bidders is one-dimensional in cost. Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2005)
study corruption in a rst-price and second-price sealed-bid auction, where the
auctioneer is corrupt by either inviting the highest-bidding bidder to lower the bid
to the second highest bid and sharing the di¤erence between the two bids or by
proposing the second-highest bidder to increase the bid to the rst-highest bid and
sharing the di¤erence between the valuation and the bid. The bidderstype is one-
dimensional in valuation. Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2005) study corruption
in a rst-price auction where an agent, who does not care about the outcome of
the auction, runs the auction and makes an agreement with one of the bidders
who have one-dimensional valuations prior to the auction that he/she is allowed
to change his/her bid after the rivalsbids are revealed to him/her. Meneza and
Monteiro (2006) study corruption in an auction where the auctioneer approaches
the winner to lower his/her bid to the second highest bid and share the prot.
Bidders have one-dimensional private valuations. Auctioneer in this paper also
minimizes the probability of a punishment if getting caught by approaching only
one bidder. Esõ and Schummer (2004) study signalling in a second-price sealed bid
auction. Most of these literatures on auctions and corruption only study auctions
in the presence of corruption with one-dimensional-type bidders.
Asker and Cantillon (2008b) analyze the equilibrium of a scoring auction with-
out corruption when the type space is multidimensional. They show that the set
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of equilibria when bidders strategies depend only on their pseudotype is the
same as the set of equilibria when biddersstrategies depend on the multidimen-
sional type space. This study gives a result in the case of a multidimensional type
space that parallels the equilibrium result in Che (1993). They also show that
the other properties of equilibria of the standard IPV(Independent Private Value)
auction apply, including the e¢ ciency of the auction and the revenue equivalence
result in the case of multidimensional type bidders. In this paper, we also use the
concept of "pseudotype" for auctions without the presence of corruption. Athey
(2001) shows the existence of a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) in a non-
decreasing strategy in both nite and innite games satisfying the Single Crossing
Condition. The two literatures, Athey (1997) and Athey (2001), are important
for the purpose of this paper by giving general existence result for an incomplete
information game, in particular, the existence of an equilibrium strategy in step
functions in a game with discrete strategy space and continuum type space. In
section 4 of this paper, we will give an example of an equilibrium strategy in step
functions in an auction game with corruption with discrete strategy space and
continuum type space. In the sections that follow, we will use the denition of
e¢ ciency by Maskin and Dasgupta (2000). In particular, they dene an auction
to be e¢ cient in the case of common-value valuations with unidimensional signal,
if for all n-tuple signals for all n bidders, at the equilibrium, the bidder with the
highest valuation that is a function of the n-tuple signals wins. In this paper,
private signals are multidimensional but valuations are private, and an auction
is e¢ cient if the bidder with the highest valuation that is a function of his/her
multidimensional private signals wins. Celentani and Ganuza (2002) show that
increasing competition may in fact increase corruption. Bliss and Di Tella (1997)
shows that an increase in competition does not necessarily decrease corruption.
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In this paper, we show that increasing the number of bidders in an auction with
corruption decreases corruption.
Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) show that when signals are multidimensional and
valuations are common values where signals are independently distributed, then
there may be no e¢ cient auction. They introduce what is called "constrained
e¢ ciency" (the second-best). We show in this paper that with non-contractible
quality an auction is constrained e¢ cient in which cost is minimized but quality
is chosen randomly. There are at least two other literatures that analyze mul-
tidimensional signal model with common values and all these literatures conrm
the disappointing results of ine¢ ciency in the case of multidimensional - common
values problem. These are the literatures by Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and
Maskin(1992).
1.3 The Model Without Corruption
Each bidder i has a type that is private information: (qi,c0i )2 <2+, where qi is
the quality and c0i is the initial cost. We rst assume that F(qi)=F(c
0
i )=Uniform
[0,1] and later, generalize. In this model, we will specically focus on what is
called the scoring auction. In this auction, each bidder is evaluated by a score
that is a combination of the quality and the bid. An example of the score in a
procurement auction is a linear combination of the quality and the bid. In this
model, the central planner uses a scoring rule we denote by si=qi-ci, where ci is the
bid. Let ui=(ci-c0i )p(si s i). The strategy of each bidder is a mapping from his
or her type in a two-dimensional real number to his or her bid in a one-dimensional
real number: <2+ ! <+: We denote F(vi) as the cumulative distribution function
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of vi, where vi is the quality minus the cost, and si as a deviation from the scoring
rule at the equilibrium, si.
Proposition 1 gives an explicit equilibrium bidding function in the case of a
two-dimensional auction with two symmetric bidders and two-dimensional type of
cost and quality. We use a substitution method in our proof. We could also
use the method of a change variable used by Che (1993) that produces the same
result.
Proposition 1.1 Without corruption, the equilibrium bidding strategy is given
by:
c(vi,c
0
i )=c
0
i+
R vi
v
¯ i
F()d
F(vi)
(1.1)
where vi=qi-c0i .
Proof. (See Appendix I)
Proposition 1 generalizes to any Probability Distribution Functions of qi and
c0i : F(qi), F(c
0
i ).
Corollary 1.1 The auction is e¢ cient:
dsi
dvi
=1-
F(vi)
2-p(vi)
R (vi)
-1 F(i)di
F(vi)
2 >0 (1.2)
Proof. (See Appendix II)
Corollary 1 generalizes to any Probability Distribution Functions of qi and c0i ,
F(qi), F(c0i ).
Example 1.1 F(c0i )=F(qi)=Uniform [0,1]
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For F(qi)=F(c0i )=Uniform [0,1], F(vi) is given by:
F(vi)=
264 (vi+1)22 , -1  vi  0
1- (1-vi)
2
2 , 0<vi  1
375 :
The bidding function c(vi,c0i ) without corruption is given by:
c(vi,c
0
i ) = c
0
i+
R vi
-1
(+1)2
2 d
( (vi+1)2 )
, for -1  vi  0
c(vi,c
0
i ) = c
0
i+
R 0
-1
(+1)2
2 d +
R vi
0 (1-
(1-)2
2 )d
(1- (1-vi)
2
2 )
, for 0<v  1 (1.3)
c(vi,c
0
i ) = c
0
i+
1
6
v3i+
1
2
v2i+
1
2
vi+16
( (vi+1)
2
2 )
, for-1  vi  0 (1.4)
c(vi,c
0
i ) = c
0
i+
1
6
+(1
2
vi+12v
2
i -
1
6
v3i )
(1- (1-vi)
2
2 )
, for 0<vi  1 (1.5)
Note: for vi=-1, the second term of c(vi,c0i ) requires an application of the
LHôpitals rule twice:
Lim.vi->-1
d
dvi
( 1
6
v3i+
1
2
v2i+
1
2
vi+ 16 )
d
dvi
( (vi+1)
2
2 )
=
1
2
v2i+vi+
1
2
(vi+1)
=00 :
Lim.vi->-1
d
dvi
( 1
2
v2i+vi+
1
2
)
d
dvi
(vi+1)
=vi+11 =0.
Proposition 1.2 Without corruption, the equilibrium bid increases in quality in
the game with F(qi)=F(c0i )=Uniform [0,1].
Proof. (See Appendix III)
Proposition 2 states that without corruption, in the game with uniform [0,1]
distributions the equilibrium bid increases with the quality.
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Proposition 1.3 Without corruption, the bid increases with the bidders cost.
Proof. (See Appendix IV)
Proposition 3 generalizes to any Probability Distribution Functions of qi and
c0i : F(qi) and F(c
0
i ).
Proposition 1.4 Without corruption, the probability of the bidder winning de-
pends positively on the bidders quality.
Proof. (See Appendix V)
This generalizes to any Probability Distribution Functions of qi and c0i : F(qi)
and F(c0i ).
Proposition 1.5 Without corruption, the probability of the bidder winning de-
pends negatively on the bidders cost.
Proof. (See Appendix VI)
This generalizes to any Probability Distribution Functions of qi and c0i : F(qi)
and F(c0i ).
Corollary 1.2 (N-Symmetric Player Game) Without corruption, the equilibrium
bidding strategy in the N-symmetric player game is given by:
c(vi,c
0
i )=c
0
i+
R vi
v
¯ i
F()N 1d
F(vi)
N 1 (1.6)
where vi=qi-c0i .
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Proof. (See Appendix VII)
Corollary 1.3 Without corruption, the equilibrium bidding strategy in the N-
symmetric player game decreases in N and converges to the true cost.
Proof. (See Appendix VIII)
Example 1.2 For F(qi)=F(c0i )=Uniform [0,1], the bid in an N-player game is
given by:
c(vi,c
0
i ) = c
0
i+
R vi
-1 [
(+1)2
2 ]
N 1d
( (vi+1)2 )
N 1 , for -1  vi  0 (1.7)
c(vi,c
0
i ) = c
0
i+
R 0
-1 [
(+1)2
2 ]
N 1d +
R vi
0 [(1-
(1-)2
2 )]
N 1d
(1- (1-vi)
2
2 )
N 1 , for 0<vi  1 (1.8)
The following table shows that bids weakly decrease in N.
Table 1.1: Example 1.2
Nn(c0i ,qi) (0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
2 .333 1.167 1 1.333
4 .143 .65 1 1.143
5 .111 .576 1 1.111
10 .053 .401 1 1.053
20 .026 .282 1 1.025
50 .010 .177 1 1.010
Note that at vi=-1 (c0i=0,qi=1), the bid remains at 1. At vi=-1, the second
term of the ci function is zero after we apply LHopitals rule. Moreover, we notice
that as N increases the bids converge downwards to the true cost.
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1.4 The Model With Corruption
There are N+2 players in this game: the central planner, the public o¢ cial, and
the N bidders. The central planner is a non-strategic, virtual, dummy, or passive
player and chooses the winning bidder based on reported quality bids and cost bids.
The central planner may represent a government whose utility reects the social
welfare that is the quality minus the cost of the project. We also assume that
the public o¢ cial is a non-strategic player whose moves are determined by nature
and whose decision-making process is based on pair-wise comparison as explained
below. The strategies of the non-strategic central planner and the non-strategic
public o¢ cial are consistent with the dominant strategies of a strategic central
planner and a strategic public o¢ cial.
The main purpose of treating the central planner and the public o¢ cials as
non-strategic players is because it simplies the N+2-player game into an N-player
game enabling us to focus on the strategic behaviors of the bidder. Treating the
central planner and the public o¢ cial as non-strategic players does not change
how the central planner and the public o¢ cial move because a strategic central
planner and a strategic public o¢ cial have dominant strategies, and we assume
that non-strategic central planner and the non-strategic public o¢ cial will play
these dominant strategies. The only di¤erence between this model and the model
with a strategic public o¢ cial and a strategic central planner is that in the case
of a tie in which a strategic central planner and a strategic public o¢ cial are
indi¤erent among a set of actions, bidders may have subjective beliefs about what
actions are chosen by the central planner and the public o¢ cial that do not have
to coincide with the actual moves1. This is called the subjective belief model.
1We may think a horse race as an example of the subjective belief model in which bettors
have subjective beliefs about which horse is going to win.
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We start this section by stating an example with a strategic public o¢ cial and a
strategic central planner as a benchmark to the model with a non-strategic public
o¢ cial and a non-strategic central planner. In both models, the equilibrium bids
and bribes do show similar strategic behaviors of the bidders with respect to their
types.
Bidder
Each bidder i has a type denoted by ti that is two-dimensional in qi and c0i ,
where qi is the quality and c0i is the initial cost. The strategy of bidder i is denoted
by si that is a two-tuple strategy in ci and fi, where ci is the bid and fi is the bribe.
There are N player that is I={1, ...N}, and i denotes an individual player. Denote
qmi as the post-manipulated quality that is the quality that the public o¢ cial
reports to the central planner, and smi as the post-manipulated scoring rule that is
equal to the post-manipulated quality minus the bid. The two-bidder model can
be represented in the following game as follows:
 (N = 2) = fI = f1; 2g; fsi = (ci; fi)g8i2f1;2g; fui(c; f; qmj(c0i ; qi))g8i2f1;2g;
fti = (c0i ; qi)g8i2f1;2g; f(F (c0i ); F (qi))g8i2f1;2gg
where:
bidders are symmetric;
ti 2 Ti, where Ti is the type space of bidder i ;
si: Ti ! <2, where T is the type space of bidder i;
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u(c,f,qmj(c0i ,qi)):
u(c; f; qmjc0i ; qi) = (ci   c0i   fi)(p(smi  sm i)); (1.9)
p(smi  sm i) = p(qmi   ci  qm i   c ijfi  f i)p(fi  f i) +(1.10)
p(qmi   ci  qm i   c ijf i > fi)p(f i > fi);8i = 1; 2 (1.11)
Note that bribes are contingent on the bidders winning and the quality report
qm is the strategy of the public o¢ cial that is a function of bribes.
Public O¢ cial
The utility function of the public o¢ cial, A, is given by: uA=f1p1+f2p2, where
pi is the probability of bidder i winning. The strategy of the public o¢ cial is
a mapping from bribes o¤ered to quality reports, that can be written by: qm:
<2 ! <2
Central Planner
The utility function of the central planner, P, is given by: uP=(q1-c1)p1+(q2-
c2)p2, p2=1-p1. The strategy of the central planner is to choose a winning bidder
given the quality report and the cost bids by choosing a bidder with the highest
score, smi . The strategy of the central planner can be written as: p1 : <4 !
<. Note, that eventhough the central planner only gets the manipulated quality
reports, the central planner cares about the true quality. Suppose in this model
that the central planner is unaware of the bribery that takes place.
Time Line
The sequence of the game is as follows. At time 0, nature chooses the types of
bidders, {c0,q}, and the types of bidders are privately observed by all bidders. The
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central planner does not observe the cost nor quality of the bidders. The central
planner only observes the quality but not the cost. At time 1, the bid, ci, is
submitted to the central planner and (contingent) bribe, fi, is o¤ered to the public
o¢ cial simultaneously and privately by each bidder. At time 2, the public o¢ cial
observes q={q1,q2} and reports qm={qm1 (f1,f2), q
m
2 (f1,f2)} that is not necessarily
equal to q to the central planner without any information about c. At time 3, the
central planner evaluates each bidder by a scoring rule: smi =q
m
i -ci, and chooses the
winning bidder i, ij smi =Max. {sm1 ,sm2 }.
The immediate properties that can be derived from the utility functions of the
bidders, public o¢ cial, and central planner are the following.
Lemma 1.1 (Type-Relevant Strategy) Since the utility of the bidders is non-
trivially dependent on c0i and is trivially dependent on qi, then the only incom-
pleteness of the payo¤-relevant information is c0i and the equilibrium strategy will
be only non-trivially dependent on c0i .
Proof. (See Appendix IX)
Lemma 1 says that since the utility of the bidder is only c0i -dependent, i.e.
the incompleteness of payo¤-relevant information comes only from one element of
the bidders type, c0i , and qi does not a¤ect the utility of the bidder, then the
equilibrium strategy of the bidders will also be only dependent on c0i alone.
Proposition 1.6 (E¢ ciency - the Impossibility Result) An auction with the two-
dimensional bid and two-dimensional type space with corruption cannot be e¢ -
cient.
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Proof. (See Appendix X)
Before we move on and show examples of the subjective belief model, we would
like to see how the equilibrium might look like under the original game with a
strategic public o¢ cial and a strategic central planner in a nite game with dis-
crete type and discrete strategy type. We can show an example with symmetric
tie-breaking rule, discrete type and discrete strategy space in which there is a
multiplicity of equilibria with equilibrium bid that is constant over initial costs
and the equilibrium bribe that weakly decreases in initial costs. The intuition of
this example is that bribes that will give the high-cost bidder a strictly positive
prot if he/she wins, will also give the low-cost bidder a strictly positive prot if
he/she wins, given a certain bid. The low-cost bidder can therefore overbribe the
high-cost bidder slightly (in the limit, an innite small amount) and increase the
probability of winning without any signicant change in the utility if he/she wins.
This strategy of the low-cost bidder is preferable than to undercut the bid slightly
(in the limit, an innitely small amount) because undercutting the bid slightly does
not increase the probability of winning as much as overbribing slightly. Overbrib-
ing slightly will increase his/her score by 1 given the public o¢ cials strategy while
undercutting slightly will increase his/her score by only slightly. These strategic
moves of the bidders are similar to the strategic moves of the bidders under the
subjective belief model as we will see in the next sections.
1.4.1 Subjective Beliefs Model
In this section, we simplify the model by assuming the following two conditions: (1)
the public o¢ cial is a non-strategic or dummy player whose moves are determined
by nature and are consistent with the dominant strategy of a strategic public
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o¢ cial; the central planner is a non-strategic or dummy player whose moves are
determined by nature and are consistent with the dominant strategy of a strategic
player; (2) in an N-player game, the nonstrategic public o¢ cial moves according
to a pair-wise comparison instead of a group-wise comparison as we will explain
further below. Since both the public o¢ cial and the central planner are dummy
players, we allow the beliefs of the bidders on how the public o¢ cial and the central
planner move in the case of indi¤erences over possible actions to be subjective. In
other words, the bidders do not have to correctly predict the moves of the public
o¢ cial and the central planner at the equilibrium. The actual moves of the public
o¢ cial and the central planner may therefore be inconsistent with the bidders
subjective beliefs. Condition one therefore allows us to assume that bidders
beliefs about the move of the public o¢ cial and the central planner in the case
of a tie of bribes and scores in which the public o¢ cial and the central planner
are indi¤erent over actions to take to be subjective beliefs instead of the objective
beliefs. Subjective beliefs are common knowledge. We consider two examples
where bidders behave di¤erently under uncertainty. One is an example in which
both bidders make decisions based on the best possible scenario over a set of
probabilities. In this example, each bidder of the two or N bidders believes that in
the case of a tie of bribe and scores, he/she will be favored by the public o¢ cial and
the central planner with probability one. Second is an example of the opposite case
in which bidders make decisions over a set of actions based on the worst possible
scenario they can possibly get over a set of probabilities2. In this example, each
bidder believes that in the case of a tie of bribes and scores, the other bidder will
be favored by the public o¢ cial and the central planner with probability one3.
2This is what is also called the Maxmin decision rule (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989;
Knight,1921; Bewley, 1986).
3To axiomatize the di¤erent subjective beliefs of the bidders and represent it in a utility-
functional form, we may use Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) (CEG). These neo-
additive beliefs can be represented by the multiple priors form. The notion of Nash Equilibrium
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Condition two allows us to simplify our calculation on the powers and combina-
tions of the probabilities of the bidders winning in the case of an N-bidder auction.
The di¤erence between pair-wise and group-wise is essentially this: evaluating the
probability of winning of a bidder i over bidder j, group-wise comparison takes into
account the values (or parameters of interest) of all other bidders, while pair-wise
comparison only takes into account the values (or parameters of interest) of bidder
i and j.
The following Lemma will give a formal proof of how a strategic corrupt public
o¢ cial whose utility is only the bribe he/she receives will behave. This strategy
of a strategic public o¢ cial will underlie our assumption of how a non-strategic
public o¢ cial is expected to move.
Lemma 1.2 (Dominant Strategy of A Strategic Public O¢ cial) Suppose a public
o¢ cial has a utility function as follows: uA=
P
k2I fkpk, where fi 2 <1+ , 0pi 1,
and
PN
i=1pi=1. Then, the solution to the maximization problem of the public
o¢ cial, maxfpigi2I .uA, s.t. fi 2 <1+ , 0pi 1, and
PN
i=1pi=1, is given by the
following: pi[fi-maxk2I .fk]=0, 8i2 I.
Proof. (See Appendix XI)
Note that by "dominant strategy" here, we mean that regardless of what the
biddersbribes are, a strategic public o¢ cial will always play the above class of
strategies. These strategies themselves among this class of strategies are not
unique (in the case of a tie, the public o¢ cial is indi¤erent among a set of mixed
in the model under uncertainty aversion is weaker since perfect consistency between beliefs and
the actual plays fails. However, in our examples, since uncertainty is over the strategies of a
ctitious player (i.e. the public o¢ cial or the central planner) and not over the other strategic
biddersstrategies, we do not need to check for these inconsistencies.
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strategies). Hence, the above strategies are dominant only among classes of strate-
gies but not among strategies.
Similarly, the strategy that underlies the move of a non-strategic central planner
is the dominant strategy of a strategic central planner, which is given by the
following:
Lemma 1.3 (Dominant Strategy of A Strategic4 Central Planner) Suppose a cen-
tral planner has a utility function as follows: uP=(q1-c1)p1+(q2-c2)p2. Then,
the solution to the maximization problem of the central planner, maxp1;p2.uP , s.t.
0 p1; p2 1, is given by the following: pi[(qmi   ci)-maxk2f1;2g.qmk   ck]=0, 8i2 I.
Proof. (The proof is similar to the Lemma above. See Appendix XI)
Positive Bidders We are going to assume that there are two types of bidders
whom we are going to call the "positive" bidders and the "negative" bidders.
Positive bidders makes decisions based on the best possible scenario while negative
bidders makes decisions based on the worst possible scenario. The set of subjective
beliefs of the bidders in a two-player game can be illustrated as follows
ri = subjective belief of i on {1 wins, 2 loses} if {q
m
1 -c1=q
m
2 -c2}, ri 2 [0,1]
oi = subjective belief of i on {q
m
1 =1,q
m
2 =0} if {f1=f2}, oi 2 [0,1]
Note that the probability space of the prior beliefs of the bidders are the same that
is in the interval [0,1] for both ri and oi In the rst example of positive bidders,
we assume the following.
4"Strategic" here means maximizing social welfare, qi-ci, without considering di¤erent types
of auctions. The strategy space for a social planner is the probabilities of winning assigned to
bidder 1 and bidder 2.
18
Condition 1.1 Positive Bidders (2- player and N-player games)
1. The public o¢ cial is a non-strategic player or a dummy player. The uncer-
tainty over the public o¢ cials behavior is illustrated as follows:
qm=
0BBBBBBB@
0B@ (1,0), if f1>f2
(0,1), if f1<f2
1CA
(1,0) with probability oi, if f1=f2
(0,1) with probability (1-oi) if f1=f2
1CCCCCCCA
, oi 2[0,1],i=1,2. The subjective
probabilities of the bidders on the public o¢ cials behavior are as follows: bidder
1s subjective belief is o1=1 and bidder 2s subjective belief is o2=0.
2. The central planner is a non-strategic player or dummy player. The uncer-
tainty over the central planners moves can be illustrated as follows:
=
0BBBBBBB@
0B@ (1,0), if qm1 -c1>qm2 -c2
(0,1), if qm1 -c1<q
m
2 -c2
1CA
(1,0) with probability ri, if q
m
1 -c1=q
m
2 -c2
(0,1) with probability (1-ri) if q
m
1 -c1=q
m
2 -c2
1CCCCCCCA
, where ri 2 [0; 1], i=1,2,
=(1,2) is the probability of bidder 1 and bidder 2 winning respectively. Bidder
1s subjective belief is r1=1 and bidder 2s subjective belief is r2=0.
3. Probability of the bidders winning is based on pair-wise comparison and
not group-wise comparison. The di¤erence between a pair-wise comparison and a
group-wise comparison can be illustrated by the following tables.
Let for example, bribes are f=(50,50,100). Then, based on pair-wise compar-
ison, the probabilities of the bidders winning given that bidder 1 and 2 o¤er the
same bribe that is strictly smaller that bidder 3s bribe are given by the following
table.
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Table 1.2: Probability of Bidder Winning Based on Pair-wise Comparison
in   i 1 2 3 pi
1 1 p1(c2 c1 1) p1(c3 c1+1) p1(c2 c1 1)p1(c3 c1+1)
2 p2(c1 c2 1) 1 p2(c3 c2+1) p2(c1 c2 1)p2(c3 c2+1)
3 p3(c1 c3 1) p3(c2 c3 1) 1 p3(c1 c3 1)p3(c2 c3 1)
Each cell represents the probability of winning of a row-bidder against one other
column-bidder given only the bribes of these two bidders (pair-wise comparison).
The probability of bidder 1 winning, for example, is the product of the cells of row
1, p1(c2  c1   1)p1(c3  c1 + 1): Group-wise comparison table is given by the
following table:
Table 1.3: Probability of Bidder Winning Based on Group-Wise Comparison
in   i 1 2 3 pi
1 1 p1(c1  c2) p1(c3 c1+1) p1(c1 c2)p1(c3 c1+1)
2 p2(c2 c1) 1 p2(c3 c2+1) p2(c2 c1)p2(c3 c2+1)
3 p3(c1 c3 1) p3(c2 c3 1) 1 p3(c1 c3 1)p3(c2 c3 1)
Note that the di¤erence from the pair-wise comparison. Here, each cell repre-
sents the probability of winning of a row-bidder against one other column-bidder
given the bribes of all of the bidders (group-wise comparison). 
These two conditions essentially allow the utility function of the bidders to be
written as follows:
1. Two-player game:
u(c; f; qmjc0i ; oi; ri) = (ci   c0i   fi)(p(smi  sm i)); (1.12)
p(smi  sm i) = p(c i  ci   1)p(fi  f i) + (1.13)
p(c i  ci + 1)p(f i > fi);8i = 1; 2 (1.14)
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2. N-player game:
u(c; f; qmjc0i ; oi; ri) = (ci   c0i   fi)(p(c i  ci   1)N 1p(fi  f i)N 1 +
N 2X
j=1

N   1
j

p(c i  ci   1)N 1 jp(c i  ci + 1)jp(fi  f i)N 1 j (1.15)
p(fi < f i)j + p(c i  ci + 1)N 1p(fi < f i)N 1): (1.16)
Note that the utility of the bidders now depend on the subjective beliefs, (oi,ri).
Note that
 
N 1
j

= (N 1)!
(N 1 j)!(j)! is the formula for a combination without replacement
when order is not important.
The general structure of the game with positive bidders in which Condition 1
above holds given Lemma 1 can be written as follows:
 (N) = fI = f1; 2; :::Ng; fsi = (ci; fi)g8i2f1;2;::g;
fui(c; f jc0i ; oi; ri)g8i2f1;2;:::Ng; fc0i g8i2f1;2;::g; fF (c0i )g8i2f;1;2;:::gg;
u(c; f; qmjc0i ; oi; ri) = (ci   c0i   fi)(p(c i  ci   1)N 1p(fi  f i)N 1 +
N 2X
j=1

N   1
j

p(c i  ci   1)N 1 jp(c i  ci + 1)jp(fi  f i)N 1 jp(fi < f i)j +
p(c i  ci + 1)N 1p(fi < f i)N 1):
Subjective beliefs (r,o) are common knowledge among bidders.
First, we can show examples with continuum type space and discrete-action
strategy space (two-by-two and three-by-three) in which the equilibrium bids and
bribes exists in declining step functions. The following is an example of N-bidder
case with discrete type space and innite strategy space.
Example 1.3 Discrete Type Space and Innite Strategy Space with N players
(Multiplicity of Equilibria)
Let: i=1,2,...N, and 8i 2 I :
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Type space: c0i 2{0,1}, p(c0i )=12
Strategy and Strategy space: (ci,fi):{0,1}-><2+
u(c,f,qmjc0i ,oi,ri)=(ci-c0i -fi)Pi, where
Pi=(p(c i ci-1)N 1p(fi f i)N 1+
PN 2
j=1
 
N 1
j

p(c i ci-1)N 1 jp(c i ci+1)j
p(fi f i)N 1 jp(fi<f i)j+p(c i ci+1)N 1p(fi<f i)N 1).
 ={I={1,2},{si=(ci,fi)2 <2+}8i2f1;2g,{ui(c,fjc0i ,oi,ri)}8i2f1;2g,
{c0i }8i2f1;2g,{F(c
0
i ))}8i2f1;2g}
Equilibrium strategy prole: c(c0i=1)=c(c
0
i=0)-1, f(c
0
i=0)>f(c
0
i=1).
There exists a multiplicity of equilibria. The following table shows the equi-
librium bids and bribes that maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the bid-
ders (Pareto Dominant equilibrium bids and bribes) as N increases (numbers are
rounded up to 5 d.p.).(See Appendix XII).
We can show similar results for p (c0i )=
2
3
and p(c0i )=
3
4
and the following ob-
servations of Example 3 also apply to these examples. Example 3 with the nite
type space and innite strategy space shows the existence of an equilibrium in the
class of game with a nite, two-element {0,1} type space, and a strategy space in
<2+. There are multiple equilibria. Similar to the examples with continuum type
and discrete strategy space, the equilibrium bids and bribes we show in Example 3
take the form of: c(c0i=1)=c(c
0
i=0)-1, f(c
0
i=0)>f(c
0
i=1). We show the equilibrium
bids that maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the bidders in this example
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Table 1.4: Example 1.3
N c(c0i=0) c(c
0
i=1) f(c
0
i=0) f(c
0
i=1) u(c,f,q
mjc0i=0) u(c,f,qmjc0i=1)
2 6 5 2 0 4 3
3 4.28571 3.28571 2 0 2.28571 1.28571
4 3.72973 2.72973 2 0 1.72973 .72973
5 3.46286 2.46286 2 0 1.46286 .45202
6 3.31114 2.31114 2 0 1.31114 .31114
7 3.21651 2.21651 2 0 1.21651 .21651
8 3.15405 2.15405 2 0 1.15405 .15405
9 3.11125 2.11125 2 0 1.11125 .11125
10 3.08118 2.08118 2 0 1.08118 .08118
20 3.00425 2.00425 2 0 1.00425 .00425
30 3.00024 2.00024 2 0 1.00024 .00024
40 3.00001 2.00001 2 0 1.00001 .00013
50 3 2 2 0 1 Pi
75 3 2 2 0 1 Pi
76 2 1 1 0 1 0
100 2 1 1 0 1 0
1000 2 1 1 0 1 0
decreases as N increases. The Pareto Dominant equilibrium bids in this example
are equal to three and two for the low-cost bidder and the high-cost bidder re-
spectively for a relatively low N. The Pareto Dominant equilibrium bribes in this
example are equal to two and zero for the low-cost bidder and the high-cost bidder,
respectively, for a relatively low N. The equilibrium bid converges to two and one
for the low-cost bidder and the high-cost bidder, respectively. The equilibrium
bribe converges to one and zero for the low-cost bidder and the high-cost bidder
respectively. The equilibrium bid in this example decreases as cost increases while
the equilibrium bid without corruption increases as cost increases. This suggests
that the low-cost bidder who has the cost advantage to bribe more bid higher at
the cost of increased ine¢ ciency. This further suggests that once corruption is
allowed, the bidders compete in o¤ering the highest-possible bribes, or overbribe
each other, instead of o¤ering the highest-scored bids, or overbid each other, as
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how the bidders would have done in an auction without corruption.
Example 3 shows that the equilibrium bid converges downward as N increases.
This example predicts the size of the corruption and e¢ ciency of an N-bidder
auction. As N gets very large, the low-cost bidder o¤ers a bribe of one and the
high-cost bidder o¤ers a bribe of zero. Hence, only for the high-cost bidder does the
equilibrium bribe converges to zero, while for the low-cost bidder, the equilibrium
bribe converges to a positive number. The low-cost bidder bids two and the high-
cost bidder bids one. Hence, only for the high-cost bidder does the equilibrium
bid converges to the true cost, while for the low-cost bidder, the equilibrium bid
does not converge to the true cost. Note that in Example 3, the probabilities of
the high- and low-cost bidders win are equal. We can also show that the higher
the probability of c0i=0 is, the higher the number of bidders, N, needed for the
bids and the bribes to converge. Although the auction is more cost-e¢ cient as the
number of bidders increases, the auction is never more quality-e¢ cient. Similar
to the argument in Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), we face constrained e¢ ciency in
which quality choice is randomized because of the loss of information about the
biddersqualities.
Negative Bidders Otherwise stated, the structure of the game is the same
as of Example above (positive bidders). Let p(c0i=0)=p(c
0
i=1)=
1
2
: Given these
conditions, the utility of the negative bidders can be written as follows:
u(c; f jc0i ; oi; ri) = (ci   c0i   fi)(p(c i > ci   1)p(fi > f i) +
p(c i > ci + 1)p(fi  f i);8i = 1; 2
In words, each bidder believes that in the case of a tie of bribes, the other bidder
will get the highest possible quality of one and he/she will get a quality of zero. In
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the case of a tie of scores, each bider believes that the other bidder will win with
probability one. Now, suppose we put an upper bound on the biddersbid that
is ci maxc0i=f0;1g.c0i=1. The following strategy is an equilibrium: c(c0i=0)->1,
c(c0i=1)=c(c
0
i=0)-1, f(c
0
i=0)->0.999999998, f(c
0
i=1)->0.999999997. At the equi-
librium, u(c0i=0)->0 (p(c
0
i=0)=
1
4
), and u(c0i=1)=0 (p(c
0
i=1)=0). This example
suggests that negative bidders will be indi¤erent between entering the auction and
not entering the auction. In other words, uncertainty over the moves of the public
o¢ cial and the central planner in the case of a tie of bribes and scores may deter
bidders to enter the auction. Similar to Myersons argument on subjective beliefs
or inconsistency of beliefs among players (Myerson, 1991, p.251), in the model
with a non-strategic public o¢ cial, the bidders could enter the auction having an
expected utility that is higher than it truly is (see the positive-bidders case above)
or the bidders could opt not to enter the auction having a zero expected utility
that is lower that it truly is (see the negative-bidders case).
1.4.2 Main Propositions
Proposition 1.7 In an N-positive-bidder auction game with corruption above in
which the type space is discrete, the strategy space is innite, the central plan-
ner and the public o¢ cial are non-strategic players and bidders beliefs on the
moves of the central planner and the public o¢ cial are subjective beliefs, there ex-
ist multiple equilibria with respect to the bidderssubjective beliefs of the following
form: c(c0i=0)=c(c
0
i=1)+1, f(c
0
i=0)>f(c
0
i=1), 8i = f1; 2g. At these equilibria:
@u(c;f jc0i ;oi;ri)
@ci
jc;f =  @u(c;f jc
0
i ;oi;ri)
@fi
jc;f ;8c0i = f0; 1g;8i = f1; 2g:
Proof. (See Appendix XIII)
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Proposition 1.8 In a twonegative-bidder auction game with corruption above in
which ci maxc0i=f0;1g.c0i=1, the type space is discrete, the strategy space (ci,fi) is in
[0,1] x <1+ , the central planner and the public o¢ cial are non-strategic players and
biddersbeliefs on the moves of the central planner and the public o¢ cial are subjec-
tive beliefs, there exists an equilibrium in pure strategy with respect to the bidders
subjective beliefs of the following form: c(c0i=0)=c(c
0
i=1)+1, f(c
0
i=0)>f(c
0
i=1),
8i = f1; 2g. At this equilibrium: @u(c;f jc0i ;oi;ri)
@ci
jc;f =  @u(c;f jc
0
i ;oi;ri)
@fi
jc;f ;8c0i =
f0; 1g;8i = f1; 2g:
Proof. (See Appendix XIV)
One could extend the scope of this paper by taking bidders with di¤erent
attitudes towards uncertainties and analyze how the existence of an equilibrium
and an equilibrium strategy will change.
1.4.3 How much e¢ ciency is lost?
Note that the probability of the bidder winning is not a function of the true
quality of the bidders, and hence, the probability of the bidder winning in terms of
quality is a perfect randomization. This is what is called "constrained e¢ ciency"
(Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000). In other words, what an auctioneer or a central
planner can best hope for is cost minimization and but not full e¢ ciency. This
is ine¢ ciency from the quality side. The convergence results of the equilibrium
bids as the number of bidder increases to a very large number (1000) with and
without corruption show us that corruption does tend to increase bids. The
distributions of type are not the same in the models with and without corruption,
however, we can still predict that the presence of corruption increases bids by the
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following argument. The quality and cost in the model without a corruption are
identically and independently distributed in the unit interval, while in the model
with a corruption, Example 3, cost is distributed with equal probabilities for c0i=0
and c0i=1. However, in the model without a corruption, regardless of quality, the
bid converges to the true cost that is 0 for c0i=0 and 1 for c
0
i=1, while in the model
with a corruption, the bid never converges to the true cost for c0i=0 even though
it does converge to the true cost for c0i=1. Notice, however, that the equilibrium
bribe is positive only for c0i=0, while no bribe is o¤ered by the high-cost bidder.
Hence, this suggests the mark-up in the case of the low-cost bidder can be blamed
partly on bribes.
1.5 Incentive Mechanism Designs: A Glimpse
Our attempt in this paper is to design an e¢ cient incentive mechanism design in
a procurement auction model when biddersprivate information are multidimen-
sional. We restrict to unobservable and non-contractible quality. Non-contractible
quality means that either qualities are ex-post non-veriable or ex-post veriable
but there is no legal enforcement to punish corrupt bidders and/or public o¢ cials.
In some cases, this assumption is more realistic than earlier literatures that as-
sume contractible qualities for a couple of reasons. One is that qualities of the
bidders are most of the time not directly observable and ex-post are not perfectly
veriable. The most extreme case of imperfectly veriable information is the case
of non-veriable information. Second, we may also assume that the quality is not
contractible even though it is ex-post veriable because, in the worst possible case,
legal enforcement is not e¤ective and hence, corrupt bidders and/or public o¢ cials
are never caught and bidders are not deterred to bribe the public o¢ cials. The nov-
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elty of the result is setting a procurement auction model with corruption into the
generalized model of multidimensional and common values problem to show that
the impossibility result theorem applies to this auction model. A social planner de-
signs an e¢ cient or socially optimal direct mechanism to directly retrieve the multi-
dimensional private information of the bidders that matters for achieving e¢ ciency.
1.5.1 Model and Example
We restrict the number of player to two, however, the results in this section still
holds for N players. An individual player is denoted by i=1,2. The mecha-
nism designer denoted by P is also the procurer and the social planner5. The
social choice function is denoted by f() that is a function of the playerstypes, .
Denote yi() as the decision function for player i, where yi()=1 if the procured
good/service goes to player i, yi()=0 otherwise. The monetary transfer to player
i is denoted by ti(). The function y¯i(i) denotes the marginal decision function
for player i given i and all agents j6=i reveal their types truthfully. Similarly, the
function t¯i(i) denoted the marginal transfer payment function to player i given i
and agents j6=i reveal their types truthfully. The mechanism   implements that
the social choice function f() is there is an equilibrium strategy prole s such
that g(s())=f(), where g(s()) is the outcome function given s(). The strategy
set of each player i is denoted by Si.
Otherwise stated, let the social choice function be:
5Without a loss of generality, we can also assume that the mechanism designer who is also
the procurer and the social planner is a player. The set-up of the model will be slightly di¤erent
although it will not change the theoretical results.
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f() = [y1(); y2(); t1(); t2()] : 1x2 ! X;
fyi() : yi()(vi  max:(v1; v2)) = 0gi=1;2; vi = qi   c0i ; (
X
i=1;2
ti) =  tP ;
where X=the set of alternatives, i=(qi,c0i ), =(1,2),  2 1x2, i= common
knowledge, F(i)=Uniform[0,1]2,8i 2 i:
Dene a direct mechanism:  =(S1,S2,g(s)), Si 2 i, s2 S = S1  S2; and  
implements f() if: g(s = )=f(), or ui(f(), i)ui(f(~i;  i), i), 8~i 2 i;8i =
1; 2:
Example 1.4 Two-Dimensional Private Information
Let uP=
P
i=1;2(yi(^)qi-ti);u(^ji)=-yi(^)c0i+ti;Max.Us=
P
i=1;2yi(^)vi
Claim 1.1 There does not exist an e¢ cient mechanism in the above example.
Proof. (See Appendix XV)
1.5.2 Main Theorems
In fact, we can put the claim above more formally by the following Theorem.
Theorem 1.1 Dene a Social Choice Function, f()=(t(),y()), whose objective
function is yi()((qi-c0i )-maxk=1;2.(qk-c
0
k))=0,
P
iyi()=1, yi()2[0,1], 8i = 1; 2.
The utilities of the procurer and the bidders are the following:
uP=
P
i=1;2(yi(^)qi-ti(^));u(^ji)=-yi(^)c0i+ti(^);Us=
P
i=1;2yi(^)(qi-c
0
i ),
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then there cannot be an e¢ cient mechanism that implements f().
Proof. (See Appendix XVI)
This theorem comes directly from the Jehiel and Moldovanus impossibility
result theorem (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001), which is also proven in Dasgupta and
Maskin (2000) and Maskin (1992), that states that there is no e¢ cient mechanism
when there is at least one player (the bidders) whose private information (their
qualities) a¤ects the choice of the most e¢ cient bidder but does not directly a¤ect
the owner(s) of that information (the bidders). This theorem can be re-stated
as follows: if, under two or more di¤erent private signals, a bidders expected
valuation is the same, but the maximal valuation of all bidders that determines
the most e¢ cient bidder is not the same under these signals, then there cannot
be an e¢ cient mechanism. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) proves the impossibility
theorem by showing that if an e¢ cient mechanism is achieved then it must be the
case that the private and social rates of information substitutions are equal, which
is non-generic in the case of multidimensional and common-value type players.
Note that in the set-up of the model above, players values are private and
not common. However, because the e¢ ciency of the mechanism is determined by
some elements of the playersprivate information that do not a¤ect their valuations,
the impossibility result still holds. In other words, in general, it is not because
biddersvaluations are common values but it is because of the loss of some of the
biddersprivate information, which determines the e¢ ciency of the mechanism,
that generates the impossibility result. From Proposition 3 of Dasgupta and
Maskin (2000), we can directly apply the impossibility result theorem to our model
as follows. Take v1(1; 2)=-c01. We have v1((q1,c
0
1),(q2,c
0
2))=v1((q1,c
0
1),(q2,c
0
2)),
but argmax1;2.(q1-c01, q2-c
0
2)6=argmax.1;2.(q1-c01,q2-c02) for some . Then, there is
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no e¢ cient mechanism to implement f() as it is dened above.
Let private information be separable in the following way:
Eui(ti(^),yi(^),^j(i))=Eui(ti(^),yi(^),^jvi()),
where vi() is the private valuation of bidder i and is a function of the multi-
dimensional private information . Moreover, let wi() be the social valuation of
bidder i. Note that we allow biddersprivate valuations to be common values in
the following Theorem.
Theorem 1.2 Dene a Social Choice Function, f()=(t(),y()), whose objec-
tive function is yi()(wi()-mink=1;2.wk())=0,
P
iyi()=1, yi()2[0,1], 8i = 1; 2.
Suppose biddersutility is the following:
Eui(ti(^),yi(^),^j(i)) = Eui(ti(^),yi(^),^jvi()), where vi()=vi(~i;  i), for some
~i 2 i ,
but argmink=1;2.{wk()} 6=argmink=1;2.{wk(~i;  i)), then there cannot be an
e¢ cient mechanism.
Proof. (See Appendix XVII)
An example of a utility function in which private information is separable as
dened above is a quasi-linear utility function. We can show that for any quasi-
linear utility of the bidders in which private information is separable in this sense
and the private valuation of the bidder is the same under di¤erent private infor-
mation, but the optimal social valuation of all bidders is not the same under these
di¤erent private information, then there cannot be an e¢ cient mechanism if an
e¢ cient mechanism is to maximize the social valuations of the bidders.
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Corollary 1.4 Dene a Social Choice Function, f()=(t(),y()), whose objec-
tive function is yi()(wi()-mink=1;2.wk())=0,
P
iyi()=1, yi()2[0,1], 8i = 1; 2.
Suppose biddersutility is quasi-linear:
Eui(t(^),y(^),^j(i)) = ti(^)-yi(^)vi(), where vi()=vi(~i;  i), for some ~i 2
i ,
but argmink=1;2.{wk()} 6= argmink=1;2.{wk(~i;  i)), then there cannot be an
e¢ cient mechanism.
Proof. (The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2. See Appendix XVII)
Note that we do not assume anything about the utility of the central planner.
However, we assume that for some function of v() and u0(), the social objective is
to minimize some (negative) valuation of the bidder, w(). For example, vi()=(c0i -
"qi),u0()=
P
i=1;2(yi()(1-")qi-ti),wi()=c
0
i -qi.
1.6 Empirical Study: Ine¢ ciency with High Numbers of
Bidders
We examine a case study on Land Management and Policy Development
Project from BAPPENAS (Indonesias National Development Planning Agency)
in 2006 and we perform empirical study on 1,404 auctions conducted by Indonesias
Department of Public Work in 20066. In the empirical study, we run a xed-e¤ects
regression. The regression is given by the following equation:
6This section is taken from Wihardja, 2007.
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Ln(%CostEfficiency) = a+ b(n  n) + c(n  n)2 +
7X
i=1
I(Satkal) +
13X
i=1
I(Prov) +
8X
i=1
I(Category) +
10X
i=1
I(V alue) +
2X
i=1
I(Metode)
where:
I(.): Indicator variable
Ln(% Cost E¢ ciency):
LN of the percentage cost e¢ ciency=LN ( Initial Budget-Contract PriceInitial Budget x100%)
(n-n¯): Centered Number of Bidders = Number of bidders - Mean of number of
bidders
(n-n¯)2: Centered Number of Bidders Squared = (Number of bidders - Mean of
number of bidders)2
Satkal: Department, Prov: Province, Category: Type of auctions, Value: Ini-
tial Budget, Metode: Method of the Auctions
We transform the dependent variable into the natural logarithmic form to nor-
malize the residuals and we center the independent variables in order to avoid
multicollinearity between the number of bidders and the squared number of bid-
ders. We drop one observation that has a very high residual (an outlier). We
drop observations that use Direct Selections/Auctions7 and Direct Appointment
7Public Selection and Direct Selection methods are used for consultant services while Public
Auction and Direct Auction methods are used for construction and goods services.
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methods. Direct Selections/Auctions methods are used for low values projects
and hence observations that fall into Direct Selections/Auctions also fall into one
of the dummy variables for "Value" (or initial budget). In order to avoid multi-
collinearity, we drop these observations. Direct Appointments directly appoints
one bidder and hence, it could not capture the e¤ect of the number of bidders on
the percentage cost e¢ ciency. The following table is the result of the regression
(see Appendix for the complete regression result):
Table 1.5: Regression Coe¢ cients
Number of Observations 1332
F(46, 1285) 11.95
Prof>F 0
R-Squared .2996
Root MSE .82179
Regression Coe¢ cient t-value P>jtj
b .0098179 5.74 0
c -.0000882 -6.93 0
The regression result suggests the concave relationship between the number of
bidders and the natural log of the percentage cost e¢ ciency. Both the linear and
the quadratic coe¢ cients are signicant. The optimum point of the concave graph
is at 149 bidders. In other words, percentage cost e¢ ciency starts to decline at 149
bidders. The mean of the number of bidders in this study is 37.97166. Although
the theoretical model above captures the competition e¤ect as the number of bid-
ders increases, this empirical study suggests that increasing the number of bidders
can have a negative e¤ect for high numbers of bidders above 149 bidders. The fac-
tors that could negatively a¤ect the percentage cost e¢ ciency of the auctions with
high numbers of bidders may include an ine¢ cient selection process with too many
bidders that may not be directly related to the competition e¤ect. A theoretical
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Figure 1.1: (Centered)Number of Bidders vs. (Ln)Percentage Cost E¢ ciency
Figure 1.2: Normality of Residuals
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model that could capture this e¤ect and explaining the discrepancy between the
theoretical predictions and the empirical study will be useful for future study.
The regression result also suggests that auctions conducted by pra-qualication
public selection/auction have lower (log) percentage cost e¢ ciencies than auctions
conducted using pasca-qualication public selection/auction. Pra-qualication
method requires bidders to submit their pre-qualications, such as company pro-
les, at the registration process while pasca-qualication method does not require
bidders to submit their pre-qualications at the registration process.
1.7 Policy Analysis
Although the ine¢ ciency result in auctions with corruption may not be surprising,
what we have shown here is that in general, if quality is non-contractible, meaning
that they are either not ex-post veriable (case 1) or if they are ex-post veriable
(case 2), there is no e¤ective legal punishment to be imposed on corrupt bidders
nor public o¢ cials, then there is no mechanism that is e¢ cient. We have shown
theoretically and empirically how increasing the number of bidders can increase
the e¢ ciency of an auction even if corruption can be pervasive. We therefore
recommend promoting the entries of more potential bidders in such a situation.
One way to do it is through E-Procurement. E-Procurement increases access
to potential bidders that may increase the number of bidders, on top of other
advantages such as allowing greater transparency and monitoring. It also decreases
interactions among bidders that previously could result in physical intimidation.
All these partly solve the issues of nepotism and cronyism. Hence, E-Procurement
auction is one possible alternative to solve ine¢ ciency of auctions if corruption
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can be pervasive. We however recommend that it is conducted for low-value
projects and not high-value project to reduce risk of misdemeanors. We have also
shown theoretically that under non-contractible quality, e¢ ciency of an auction is
constrained from the quality-side. Hence, if non-contractibility of quality comes
from an ine¤ective legal system but monitoring quality is possible (case 2), then
a possible way to increase e¢ ciency of an auction is output-based contract. The
study suggests that too many bidders above 149 bidders might start to give negative
e¤ects to the e¢ ciency of the auctions. Hence, a cap on the number of bidders
might prevent the negative e¤ects on cost e¢ ciency related to high numbers of
bidders, such as an ine¢ cient selection process, from taking place.
1.8 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to show that the equilibrium bids and
bribes in the presence of corruption with a discrete type space and an innite
strategy space decrease as the number of bidders increases. The analysis on
the incentive mechanism design shows a disappointing result that when quality
is not fully veriable and quality is not contractible, there is no mechanism that
is e¢ cient. The second-best option is to minimize cost but to randomize the
choice of quality. The empirical study on Semi E-Procurement from Indonesias
Department of Public Work in 2006 suggests that increasing the number of bidders
starts to give a negative e¤ect of the percentage cost e¢ ciency at a high number
of bidders. A theoretical model that could capture the discrepancy between the
theoretical model in this paper and the empirical study is needed.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let si=qi-ci.
ui=(ci-c
0
i )p(si  s i) (1.17)
Substituting in ci=qi-si, we have:
ui=(qi-si-c
0
i )p(si  s i) (1.18)
Let si=qi-ci:
ui=(qi-si-c
0
i )p(si  s i) (1.19)
We have the utility as a function of vi. Let us assume that si is increasing in vi:
ui=(vi-si)p(si  s i) (1.20)
ui=(vi-si)p(s
 1si  (q i-c0 i)) (1.21)
ui=(vi-si)F(s
 1si) (1.22)
dui
dvi
=F(vi) (1.23)
at the equilibrium, by the Envelope Theorem, where the function F(vi) is the
cumulative distribution function of (qi-c0i ).
u(vi)=
Z vi
v
¯ i
F(i)di (1.24)
by the boundary condition u(v
¯ i
)=0 by our assumption that si is increasing in vi.Z vi
v
¯ i
F(i)di=(qi-c
0
i -si)F(qi-c
0
i ) (1.25)
si=vi-
R vi
v
¯ i
F(i)di
F(vi)
(1.26)
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as we have in Proposition 1 above.
dsi
dvi
=1-
F(vi)
2-p(vi)
R vi
v
¯ i
F(i)di
F(vi)
2 >0 (1.27)
Our assumption is consistent. We can check that at the equilibrium, u(v
¯ i
)=0.
Appendix II: Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Di¤erentiating the scoring rule of the bidder, si, at the equilibrium
with respect to vi, we have the result.
Appendix III: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Di¤erentiating c(vi,c0i ) with respect to qi:
@c(vi,c
0
i )
@qi
=
@c0i
@qi
+
@
@qi
R vi
v
¯ i
F()d
F(vi)
(1.28)
@c(vi,c
0
i )
@qi
=
@
@qi
R vi
v
¯ i
F()d
F(vi)
=
@
@vi
R vi
v
¯
0
i
F()d
F(vi)
@vi
@qi
(1.29)
@c(vi,c
0
i )
@qi
=
F(vi)
2   R viv
¯ i
F()dp(vi)
F(vi)
2 (1)=1-
R vi
v
¯ i
F()dp(vi)
F(vi)
2 (1.30)
The cumulative and density distribution functions F(vi) and p(vi) are given by:
F(vi)=
264 (vi+1)22 , -1  vi  0
1- (1-vi)
2
2 , 0<vi  1
375 (1.31)
p(vi)=
264 (vi+1), -1  vi  0
(1-vi), 0<vi  1
375 (1.32)
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Table 1.6: Proof of Proposition 2
0 0 :25 1
:1 :04935 :354025 :860603
:2 :094933 :4624 :794694
:3 :13335 :570025 :766063
:4 :1616 :6724 :759667
:5 :177083 :765625 :768707
:6 :1776 :8464 :79017
:7 :16135 :912025 :823086
:8 :126933 :9604 :867833
:9 :07335 :990025 :925911
1 0 1 1
For -1vi 0,
@c(vi,c
0
i )
@qi
=1-
R v0i
-1
(+1)2
2 dp(vi)
(vi+1)
4
4
=1-
[1
6
(+1)3jvi 1](vi+1)
(vi+1)
4
4
(1.33)
@c(vi,c
0
i )
@qi
=1-
[1
6
((vi+1)
3-0)](vi+1)
(vi+1)
4
4
=1-
[1
6
(vi+1)
4]
(vi+1)
4
4
(1.34)
@c(vi,c
0
i )
@qi
=1-
4
6
=
1
3
>0. (1.35)
For 0<vi 1,
@c(vi,c
0
i )
@qi
=1-
R vi
-1 1-
(1-vi)
2
2 dp(vi)
(1- (1-vi)
2
2 )
2
=1-
[+ (1-vi)
3
6 ]
vi
0 (1-vi)
(1- (1-vi)
2
2 )
2
(1.36)
@c(vi,c
0
i )
@qi
=1-
(vi+
(1-vi)
3
6 -(0+
(1-0)3
6 ))(1-vi)
(1- (1-vi)
2
2 )
2
=1-
(s0i+
(1-vi)
3
6 -(
1
6 ))(1-vi)
(1- (1-vi)
2
2 )
2
(1.37)
and we could show that:
@c(vi,c
0
i )
@qi
=1-
(vi+
(1-vi)
3
6 -(
1
6 ))(1-vi)
(1- (1-vi)
2
2 )
2
>0. (1.38)
Let:Column 1: s0i ;Column 2: (s
0
i+
(1-s0i )
3
6 -(
1
6 ))(1-s
0
i ); Column 3: (1-
(1-s0i )
2
2 )
2;Column
4: @c(qi,c
0
i )
@qi
=1- (s
0
i+
(1-s0i )
3
6 -(
1
6 ))(1-s
0
i )
(1-
(1-s0
i
)2
2 )
2
:
Without corruption, the bid is increasing with the bidders quality in the game
with the initial probability distribution F(qi)=F(c0i )=Uniform [0,1].
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Appendix IV: Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Taking the derivative of ci with respect to c0i :
@c(vi,c
0
i )
@c0i
=
@
@c0i
c0i+
@
@c0i
R vi
v
¯ i
F()d
F(vi)
(1.39)
@c(vi,c
0
i )
@c0i
=1+
@
@vi
R vi
v
¯ i
F()d
F(vi)
@vi
@c0i
(1.40)
@c(vi,c
0
i )
@c0i
=1-(1-
p(vi)
R vi
v
¯ i
F()d
F(vi)
2 )>0 (1.41)
the bid increases with the cost for any prior probability distributions.
Appendix V: Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. For any distribution of F(qi) and F(c0i ), the auction is e¢ cient:
dsi
dvi
=1-
F(vi)
2-p(vi)
R vi
v
¯ i
F(i)di
F(vi)
2 >0 (1.42)
The probability of the bidder winning depends positively on the bidders quality:
dsi
dvi
dvi
dqi
=1-
F(vi)
2-p(vi)
R vi
v
¯ i
F(i)di
F(vi)
2 (1)>0 (1.43)
Appendix VI: Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. For any distribution of F(qi) and F(c0i ), the auction is e¢ cient:
dsi
dvi
=1-
F(vi)
2-p(vi)
R vi
v
¯
0
i
F(i)di
F(vi)
2 >0 (1.44)
The probability of the bidder winning depends negatively on the bidders cost:
dsi
dvi
dvi
dc0i
=1-
F(vi)
2-p(vi)
R vi
v
¯
0
i
F(i)di
F(vi)
2 (-1)<0 (1.45)
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Appendix VII: Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. Let si=qi-ci.
ui=(ci-c
0
i )p(si  s i)N 1 (1.46)
Substituting in ci=qi-si, we have:
ui=(qi-si-c
0
i )p(si  s i)N 1 (1.47)
Let si=qi-ci:
ui=(qi-si-c
0
i )p(si  s i)N 1 (1.48)
We have the utility as a function of vi. Let us assume that si is increasing in vi:
ui=(vi-si)p(si  s i)N 1 (1.49)
ui=(vi-si)p(s
 1si  (q i-c0 i))N 1 (1.50)
ui=(vi-si)F(s
 1si)
N 1 (1.51)
dui
dvi
=F(vi)
N 1 (1.52)
at the equilibrium, by the Envelope Theorem, where the function F(vi) is given in
Appendix I.
u(vi)=
Z vi
v
¯ i
F(i)
N 1di (1.53)
by the boundary condition u(v
¯ i
)=0 by our assumption that si is increasing in vi.Z vi
v
¯ i
F(i)
N 1di=(qi-c
0
i -si)F(qi-c
0
i )
N 1 (1.54)
si=vi-
R vi
v
¯ i
F(i)
N 1di
F(vi)
N 1 (1.55)
as we have in Proposition 1 above.
dsi
dvi
=1-
F(vi)
2(N 1)-(N-1)F(vi)
N 2p(vi)
R vi
v
¯ i
F(i)
N 1di
F(vi)
2(N 1) >0 (1.56)
Our assumption is consistent.
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Appendix VIII: Proof of Corollary 3
Proof. @c(vi,c
0
i )
@N =
R vi
v
¯ i
(F()N 1)(lnF())dF(vi)
N 1 lnF(vi)(F(vi)N 1)
R vi
v
¯ i
F()N 1d
(F(vi)
N 1)2
=
R vi
v
¯ i
(lnF())F()N 1d R viv
¯ i
(lnF(vi))F()
N 1d
(F(vi)
N 1)
0,8vi 2[-1,1],
* lnF(vi)> lnF(),8 :v¯ i   vi.
Appendix IX: Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. First, we denote the utility of the bidders without rst assuming the
dominant strategy of the agent, and we assume that the strategy of the bidders is
a function of both quality and cost. Therefore, we have the following:
u(c(ti),f(ti),c(t i),f(t i),q
mjti) (1.57)
= (c(ti)-c
0
i -f(ti))(p(s
m
i  sm ijf(ti)  (1.58)
f(t i))p(f(ti)  f(t i))+p(smi  sm ijf(ti)<f(t i))p(f(ti)<f(t i))) (1.59)
Denote qm by qmiwhen f(ti)f(t i) and by qm iwhen f(ti)<f(t i). Also, note that
qm is a function of bribes. Then, writing the utility of bidders after substituting
for the terms qm gives us:
u(c(ti),f(ti),c(t i),f(t i),q
mjti) = (1.60)
(c(ti)-c
0
i -f(ti))(p(q
mi
i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(ti)  (1.61)
qmi i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(t i))p(f(ti)  (1.62)
f(t i))+p(q
m i
i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(ti)  (1.63)
qm i i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(t i))p(f(ti)<f(t  i))) (1.64)
After we substitute the agents scoring rule, the expected utility of the bidders de-
pends on one exogenous variable, c0i , that is, the utility of the bidder is c
0
i -dependent
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(i.e. it only depends non-trivially on c0i ). The incompleteness of payo¤-relevant
information is only in the variable c0i . In contradiction, suppose the bidders strat-
egy depends on both the cost and quality. The incentive compatibility constraints
that must hold at the optimal strategies are given by the following inequalities for
ti=(c0i ,qi) and ti=(c
0
i ,qi):
u(c(ti),f(ti),c(t i),f(t i),q
mjti) =
(c(ti)-c
0
i -f(ti))(p(q
mi
i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(ti) 
qmi i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(t i))p(f(ti) 
f(t i))+p(q
m i
i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(ti) 
qm i i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(t i))p(f(ti) < f(t i)))

u(c(ti),f(ti),c(t i),f(t i),q
mjti) =
(c(ti)-c
0
i -f(ti))(p(q
mi
i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(ti) 
qmi i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(t i))p(f(ti) 
f(t i))+p(q
m i
i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(ti) 
qm i i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(t i))p(f(ti) < f(t i)))
similarly:
u(c(ti),f(ti),c(t i),f(t i),q
mjti) =
(c(ti)-c
0
i -f(ti))(p(q
mi
i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(ti) 
qmi i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(t i))p(f(ti)  f(t i))
+p(qm ii (f(ti); f(t i))-c(ti) 
qm i i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(t i))p(f(ti) < f(t i)))
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u(c(ti),f(ti),c(t i),f(t i),q
mjti) =
(c(ti)-c
0
i -f(ti))(p(q
mi
i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(ti) 
qmi i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(t i))p(f(ti) 
f(t i))+p(q
m i
i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(ti) 
qm i i (f(ti); f(t i))-c(t i))p(f(ti) < f(t i)))
The two inequalities above show a contradiction: the strategies, ci and fi, depend
non-trivially on both cost and quality
.
Appendix X: Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The proof can be referred directly to Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001,
Maskin and Dasgupta, 2000, or Maskin 1992. Also, see section on Incentive
Mechanism Design of this paper.
Appendix XI: Lemma 2
Proof. The Lagrangian to the constrained optimization problem is given by:
L=f1p1+f2p2+f3p3-(
P3
i=1pi-1)+1p1+2p2+2p2-
0
1(p1-1)-
0
2(p2-1)-
0
3(p3-1)
We can show that the Kuhn-Tucker rst-order conditions and by checking the
second order conditions will give us the solution.
45
Appendix XII: Example 3
Example 3: Finite Type Space and Innite Strategy Space (Multiplicity of
Equilibria) (Proof by hand is omitted. Available upon request.)
The following is the numerical calculation by using Mathematica for n=2 to
nd a Pareto Dominant Equilibrium:
n := 2
i := i
j := j
u := (a - 0 - i)
v := (a - 1 - 1 - j) (3/4)
a := a
P:=(p^(n-1))(r^(n-1))+
Pm=n 2
j=1 (p^(n - 1 - j)) (q^j) ((n - 1)!/((j)! ((n-1 - j)!))
((r^(n - 1 - j)) (s^ j)))) + (q^(n - 1)) (s^(n - 1))
NMaximize[{u + v,
(a - 1 - 1 - 0 - 0) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 1}) <= u,
(a - 1 - 1 - 1 - 0) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 1}) <= v,
(a - 1 - 1 - 0 - .01) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 1}) <= u,
(a - 1 - 1 - 1 - .01) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 1}) <= v,
(a - 1 - 1 - 0 - j) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 1}) <= u,
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(a - 1 - 1 - 1 - j) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 1}) <= v,
(a - 1 - 1 - 0 - j - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 1}) <= u,
(a - 1 - 1 - 1 - j - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 1}) <= v,
(a - 1 - 1 - 0 - i) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 1}) <= u,
(a - 1 - 1 - 1 - i) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 1}) <= v,
(a - 1 - 1 - 0 - i - .01) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 1}) <=u,
(a - 1 - 1 - 1 - i - .01) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 1}) <= v,
(a - 1 - .01 - 0 - 0) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= u,
(a - 1 - .01 - 1 - 0) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= v,
(a - 1 - .01 - 0 - .01) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <=u,
(a - 1 - .01 - 1 - .01) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= v,
(a - 1 - .01 - 0 - j) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= u,
(a - 1 - .01 - 1 - j) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= v,
(a - 1 - .01 - 0 - j - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= u,
(a - 1 - .01 - 1 - j - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= v,
(a - 1 - .01 - 0 - i) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= u,
(a - 1 - .01 - 1 - i) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= v,
(a - 1 - .01 - 0 - i - .01) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= u,
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(a - 1 - .01 - 1 - i - .01) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= v,
(a - 1 - 0 - 0) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= u,
(a - 1 - 1 - 0) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= v,
(a - 1 - 0 - .01) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= u,
(a - 1 - 1 - .01) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= v,
(a - 1 - 0 - j) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= u,
(a - 1 - 1 - j) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= v,
(a - 1 - 0 - j - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= u,
(a - 1 - 1 - j - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= v,
(a - 1 - 0 - i) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= u,
(a - 1 - 1 - i) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= v,
(a - 1 - 0 - i - .01) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= u,
(a - 1 - 1 - i - .01) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 1/2}) <= v,
(a - .01 - 0 - 0) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a - .01 - 1 - 0) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a - .01 - 0 - .01) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a - .01 - 1 - .01) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a - .01 - 0 - j) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= u,
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(a - .01 - 1 - j) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a - .01 - 0 - j - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a - .01 - 1 - j - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a - .01 - 0 - i) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a - .01 - 1 - i) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a - .01 - 0 - i - .01) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a - .01 - 1 - i - .01) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a - 0 - 0) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a - 1 - 0) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a - 0 - .01) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a - 1 - .01) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a - 0 - j) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a - 1 - j) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a - 0 - j - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a - 1 - j - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a - 0 - i) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a - 1 - i) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a - 0 - i - .01) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= u,
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(a - 1 - i - .01) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a + 1 - .01 - 0 - 0) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a + 1 - .01 - 1 - 0) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a + 1 - .01 - 0 - .01) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <=u,
(a + 1 - .01 - 1 - .01) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <=v,
(a + 1 - .01 - 0 - j) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a + 1 - .01 - 1 - j) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a + 1 - .01 - 0 - j - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a + 1 - .01 - 1 - j - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a + 1 - .01 - 0 - i) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a + 1 - .01 - 1 - i) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a + 1 - .01 - 0 - i - .01) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a + 1 - .01 - 1 - i - .01) (P /. {p -> 1, q -> 0, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a + 1 - 0 - 0) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a + 1 - 1 - 0) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a + 1 - 0 - .01) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a + 1 - 1 - .01) (P /. {p -> 0, q -> 1, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a + 1 - 0 - j) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= u,
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(a + 1 - 1 - j) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a + 1 - 0 - j - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a + 1 - 1 - j - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a + 1 - 0 - i) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a + 1 - 1 - i) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= v,
(a + 1 - 0 - i - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= u,
(a + 1 - 1 - i - .01) (P /. {p -> 1/2, q -> 1/2, r -> 1/2, s -> 0}) <= v,
a >= 0, i >= i, j >= j, u >= 0, v >= 0}, {a, i, j}]
{7., {a -> 6., i -> 2., j -> 5.55112*10^-17}}
Appendix XIII: Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. The utility function of the positive bidder is given by the following:
u(c,f,qmjc0i )=(ci-c0i -fi)(Pi),
Pi=(p(c i ci-1)N 1p(fi f i)N 1+
PN 2
j=1
 
N 1
j

p(c i ci-1)N 1 jp(c i ci+1)j
p(fi f i)N 1 jp(fi<f i)j+p(c i ci+1)N 1p(fi<f i)N 1).
The incentive compatibility constraints are satised at these equilibria showing
that the solution to the F.O.C. above is a solution to a maximization problem and
not a minimization problem. It is su¢ cient to show that the marginal utility of
the bid and the marginal disutility of the bribe for each type of the bidder are
equal at these equilibrium bid and bribe:
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1. The marginal utility of the bid is equal to:
@u(c; f jc0i ; oi; ri)
@ci
= (N   1)(1  F (ci   1) +
p(ci   1))N 2( p(ci   1))F (fi)N 1 +
f
N 2X
j=1

N   1
j

[(N   1  j)(1  F (ci   1) +
p(ci   1))N 2 j( p(ci   1))
(1  F (ci + 1) + p(ci + 1))jF (f)N 1 j(1  F (f))j +
(j)(1  F (ci + 1) + p(ci + 1))j 1( p(ci + 1))(1  F (ci   1) +
p(ci   1))N 1 j(1  F (fi))j(F (fi))N 1 j]g
+(N   1)(1  F (ci + 1) + p(ci + 1))
N 2( p(ci + 1))(1  F (fi))N 1
2. The marginal utility of the bribe is equal to
@u(c; f jc0i ; oi; ri)
@fi
= (N   1)F (fi)N 2(p(fi))(1  F (ci   1) + p(ci   1))N 1 +
f
N 2X
j=1

N   1
j

[(N   1  j)(F (fi))N 2 j(p(fi))
(1  F (fi))j(1  F (ci   1) +
p(ci   1))N 1 j(1  F (ci + 1) + p(ci + 1))j +
(j)(1  F (fi))j 1( p(fi))(F (fi))N 1 j(1  F (ci   1) +
p(ci   1))N 1 j(1  F (ci + 1) + p(ci + 1))j]g+
(N   1)(1  F (fi))N 2( p(fi)
(1  F (ci + 1) + p(ci + 1))N 1)
3. We can check for both c0i={0,1},
@u(c;f jc0i ;oi;ri)
@ci
jc;f =  @u(c;f jc
0
i ;oi;ri)
@fi
jc;f
Q.E.D.
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Appendix XIV: Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. The utility function of the negative bidder is given by the following:
u(c,fjc0i ; oi; ri)=(ci-c0i -fi)(p(c i>ci-1)p(fi>f i)+p(c i>ci+1)p(fi f i),8i=1,2
The incentive compatibility constraints are satised at this equilibrium only
up to ci=1, showing that the solution to the F.O.C. above is a saddle point. It is
su¢ cient to show that the marginal utility of the bid and the marginal disutility of
the bribe for each type of the bidder are equal at these equilibrium bid and bribe
in (ci,fi):[0,1] x <1+ :
1. The marginal utility of the bid is equal to:
@u(c; f jc0i ; oi; ri)
@ci
= (p(c i > ci   1)p(fi > f i) +
p(c i > ci + 1)p(fi  f i)) +
(ci   c0i   fi)( p(ci   1)(F (fi)  p(fi))
 p(ci + 1)(1  F (fi) + p(fi)))
2. The marginal utility of the bribe is equal to:
@u(c; f jc0i ; oi; ri)
@fi
=  (p(c i > ci   1)p(fi > f i) +
p(c i > ci + 1)p(fi  f i)) +
(ci   c0i   fi)((1  F (ci   1))p(fi) 
(1  F (c+ 1))p(fi))
3. We can check for both c0i={0,1},
@u(c;f jc0i ;oi;ri)
@ci
jc;f =  @u(c;f jc
0
i ;oi;ri)
@fi
jc;f :
Q.E.D.
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Appendix XV: Proof of Example 4
Proof. Note that the biddersexpected utility is only a function of the cost,
but not quality.
1. Suppose the true type of bidder i is ~i=(qi,c0i ), then the incentive compati-
bility constraint that must hold if i=~i is:
ti(~i)  yi(~i)c0i  ti(i)  yi(i)c0i
2. Suppose now the true type of bidder is i=(q¯i,c0i ), then the incentive com-
patibility constraint that must hold if i=i is:
ti(i)  yi(i)c0i  ti(~i)  yi(~i)c0i
3. By (1) and (2) above, the allocation and payment rules, t¯i(:) and y¯i(:):
ti(i)  yi(i)c0i = ti(~i)  yi(~i)c0i
But then, bidder with i=i and i=~i will be indi¤erent between reporting
^i=i and ^i=~i. Suppose:
argmaxi=1;2.(v1(~1; 2),v2(~1; 2))6=argmaxi=1;2.(v1(1; 2),v2(1; 2)).
This event occurs with positive probability given the distribution of types.
Hence, it is impossible to implement an e¢ cient auction mechanism. Fix:
1=(q1,c01)=(0,0), 2=(q2,c
0
2)=(
1
2
,0).
Socially optimal (e¢ cient) rule will allocate the procured project to bidder
2. However, there is no incentive compatible mechanism that can implement
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this socially optimal allocation since bidder 1 will be indi¤erent between reporting
^i=i and ^i=(qi,c0i ), for any q2[0,1].
Appendix XVI: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. By the Revelation Principle, we can restrict the choice of mechanisms
to a direct mechanism.
1. By Claim 1, the incentive compatibility constraints require that the bidders
indi¤erence curve is a vertical line in the (c0i ,qi) space: (see proof of Claim 1 above)
t¯i(i)-y¯i(i)c0i=t¯i(~i)-y¯i(~i)c
0
i ,8i,~i 2 i, s.t. i=(qi,c0i ),~i=(qi,c0i ).
2. The indi¤erence curve for the social planner who implements the SCF is a
45% line in the (c0i ,qi) space.
3. A SCF is truthfully implementable if the indi¤erence curves of the social
planner and the bidders in the (c0i ,qi) space coincide: Suppose not. Fix i where
{i : i = argmaxk=1;2.(qk-c0kj1,2)} and i lies below or on the 45% line at (0,0).
Without a loss of generality, let i=1. Then, an e¢ cient mechanism will locate the
good to bidder 1. Now, suppose bidder 2, the losing bidder, reports ~2=(c02,1),
the highest point that lies on bidder 2s indi¤erence curve { t¯2(2)-y¯2(2)c02=t¯2(~2)-
y¯2(~2)c02}. This point lies above or on the 45% line at (0,0). If argmaxi=1;2.(qi-
c0i j1,2)=argmaxi=1;2.(qi-c0i j1,~2) then it must be that ~2=1=(1,1). For some {:
p()>0), argmaxi=1;2.(qi-c0i j1,2)6=argmaxi=1;2.(qi-c0i j1,~2). A contradiction.
4. Hence, by (1) to (3), there is no mechanism that is both e¢ cient and
incentive compatible.
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Appendix XVII: Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. 1. Let vi()=vi(~i;  i), for some i; ~i 2 i, i 6= ~i;
argmink=1;2.{wk()}6=argmink=1;2.{wk(~i;  i)).
2. Incentive Compatibility requires:
(i) Eui(ti(),yi(),jvi())Eui(ti(~i;  i),yi(~i;  i),(~i;  i)jvi())
(ii) Eui(ti(~i;  i),yi(~i;  i),(~i;  i)jvi(~i;  i))Eui(ti(),yi(),jvi(~i;  i))
)Eui(ti(),yi(),jvi())=Eui(ti(~i;  i),yi(~i;  i),(~i;  i)jvi())
Bidder i will be indi¤erent between reporting i and ~i.
3. By our assumption, argmink=1;2.{wk()}6=argmink=1;2.{wk(~i;  i)}, then,
f() is not implementable.
Appendix XVIII: Regression Result, Empirical Study
The following is the description of the xed-e¤ect variables.
Satkal: Department
1. Badan Pembinaan Konstruksi dan SDM
2. Balitbang
3. Direktorat Jenderal Penataan Ruang
4. Direktorat Jenderal Bina Marga
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5. Direktorat Jenderal Cipta Karya
6. Direktorat Jenderal Sumber Daya Air
7. Sekretariat Jenderal
Prov: Province
1. Central
2. East Java
3. DKI Jakarta
4. West Java
5. Central Java
6. DKI Yogyakarta
7. North Sumatera
8. South Sumatera
9. East Kalimantan
10. South Sulawesi
11. Maluku
12. Banten
13. Gorontalo
Category: Type of auctions
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The auctions are categorized as the following:
1. Goods (in Rp.)
2. Consultant Service
3. Street
4. Street Maintenance
5. Building
6. Bridge
7. Community Management
8. Village Street
9. Clean Water Provision
10. Community Street
11. Drainage
12. Residential Community
13. Small reservoir
14. Drinking
15. Construction Building
16. Water Sewerage
17. Sewage.
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18. Other Services
Value: Initial Budget
1. <=100million
2. >100million and <=200million
3. >200million and <=500million
4. >500million and <=1billion
5. >1billion and <=3billion
6. >3billion and <=5billion
7. >5billion and <=10billion
8. >10billion and <=25billion
9. >25million and <=50billion
10. >50billion
Metode: Method of the Auctions
1. Public Selections/Auctions with Pasca-Qualications
2. Public Selections/Auctions with Pra-Qualications
3. *Direct Selections/Auctions with Pasca-Qualications
4. *Direct Selections/Auctions with Pra-Qualications
5. *Direct Appointment with Pasca-Qualications
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6. *Direct Appointment with Pra-Qualications
*=no data/ dropped
Table 1.7: Regression
Source SS df MS
Model 371.12104 46 8.0678487
Residual 867.804204 1285 .675334011
Total 1238.92524 1331 .930822873
Table 1.8: Regression, cont.
Number of obs 1332
F(46,1285) 11.95
Prob>F .000
R-Squared .2996
Adj R-squared .2745
Root MSE .82179
Note: Category 15 is omitted.
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Table 1.9: Regression, cont.
LnPerCostE¤ Coef. t P>jtj
Num_Bidder .0098179 5.74 0.000
Num_BidderSq -.0000882 -6.93 0.000
Table 1.10: Regression, cont.
Satkal2 .6413851 1.90 .058
Satkal3 .0812997 .48 .633
Satkal4 .025225 .16 .870
Satkal5 -.0394326 -.27 .787
Satkal6 .4356443 2.47 .014
Satkal7 -.2619483 -1.36 .173
Table 1.11: Regression, cont.
Prov2 .9255826 9.5 .000
Prov3 .0399416 .25 .806
Prov4 .2436976 2.23 .026
Prov5 -.0377443 -.35 .728
Prov6 .4798776 3.69 .000
Prov7 .1279765 .85 .394
Prov8 -.49795 -1.28 .202
Prov9 .7069094 2.29 .022
Prov10 -1.354866 -7.67 .000
Prov11 .0765659 .09 .928
Prov12 -.7580284 -2.32 .021
Prov13 -.3846256 -1.80 .073
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.Table 1.12: Regression, cont.
Category2 .9984222 2.72 .007
Category3 .1427126 .98 .325
Category4 .1886267 1.19 .234
Category5 .5297576 3.37 .001
Category6 1.043102 4.33 .000
Category7 .3607561 2.08 .038
Category8 -.0627995 -.34 .736
Category9 -.4422209 -.74 .457
Category10 .3355173 1.7 .089
Category11 .2356982 1.14 .255
Category12 -.0162866 -.06 .948
Category13 .6991261 1.33 .182
Category14 -.4860328 -2.04 .042
Category16 -.0103385 -.02 .983
Category17 .4324898 .87 .385
Category18 .7480788 2.54 .011
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.Table 1.13: Regression, cont.
Value2 .2400642 1.06 .288
Value3 .43351 2 .046
Value4 .4831737 2.18 .029
Value5 .4775163 2.07 .039
Value6 .6273924 2.53 .012
Value7 .294342 1.13 .260
Value8 .3115373 1.03 .305
Value9 -.0337986 -.07 .942
Value10 2.396304 4.63 .000
Metode2 -.7872117 -2.18 .029
Constant 1.319907 4.65 .000
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CHAPTER 2
THEORY OF ENDOGENOUS INSTITUTION AND EVIDENCE
FROM AN IN-DEPTH FIELD STUDY IN INDONESIA
(with Iwan Jaya Azis1)
2.1 Introduction
Although there have been many studies on institutions, there has been little eld
study on institutions. Moreover, institutions have often been understood to be
exogenous factors that a¤ect welfare with little thoughts given to the endogene-
ity issues of the formation of institutions. North (1990) wrote, "What makes
for e¢ cient markets? If poor countries are poor because they are the victims
of an institutional structure that prevents growth, is that institutional structure
imposed from without or is it endogenously determined or is it some combination
of both?... Still to be undertaken is systematic empirical work that will identify
the costs and underlying institutions that make economies unproductive" (p.134-
135). Indeterminacy and context-specicity of institutions make traditional social
science empirical study on institutions di¢ cult because neither deductive nor in-
ductive analysis is su¢ cient to explain the complexity of institutions (Greif, 2006).
In this paper, we study the theory of endogenous institutions in the light of in-
stitutions in Indonesia by using an in-depth eld study on institutions conducted
in ve districts in Indonesia. During our eld study, we collected primary data
on the net e¤ect of local capture on welfare, local leadership, and participation
level as well as various social indicators. We conducted interviews with local key
1The empirical study in this paper was conducted with the assistance of the researchers at
KPPOD.
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informants including Regents/ Mayors, other high-ranking public o¢ cials, political
parties, oppositions, NGOs, local media, business associations, and poor-family
card holders and quantied our primary data into scale-based indicators. We then
show how these institutional elements are correlated with various indicators of both
the current and lagged socioeconomic conditions that suggest the endogeneity of
institutions.
There are limitations to our eld study. For example, we are unable to explain
fully why institutions and socioeconomic conditions in Balikpapan were ranked
high according to our eld study while the secondary data on GRDP suggested an
increasingly unequal society with declining or low sectoral average annual growths
compared to its overall average annual GRDP growth before and after the decen-
tralization in sectors that directly a¤ect the poorest of the poor, including animal
husbandry, forestry, shery, and private social community services. Factors that
could limit our eld study include not interviewing a su¢ cient number of partici-
pants that come from the poorest of the poor societies and the opposition groups,
partial district surveys instead of comprehensive district surveys at one point of
time instead of over a period of time, insu¢ cient comparisons made between the
poor and the elites with respect to institutional access within a district instead of
across districts, and a small number of districts surveyed. Our eld study how-
ever enables us to get a rough, rst estimation of the quality of institutions and
socioeconomic conditions in these districts.
We study Greifs (2006) theory of institutional change and enrich Greifs model
with institutional complexes in the context of Indonesia in the post-decentralization
period. This helps to explain the phenomena of endogeneity of institutions ob-
served in our eld study. We nd that the concepts of self-reinforcement factors
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and quasi-parameters as dened in Greif (2006) play important roles in explaining
the persistence of poor growth or low welfare and poor qualities of institutions
in Indonesia. Self-reinforcement factors in this study may include the level of
education, the level of political awareness and health awareness of the citizens as
well as the level of public information. We argue that initial socioeconomic con-
ditions are associated with some self-reinforcement factors that shape institutional
complexes, including the participation level, local capture and local leadership,
that contribute to generating welfare. This creates an evolution between welfare
and institutions in the presence of some self-reinforcement factors. The model
could explain the persistence of poor growth or low welfare and poor qualities of
institutions in Indonesia by introducing the concept of negative self-reinforcement
or self-undermining factors, such as low level of education and low political and
health awareness of citizens.
This paper provides a game-theoretical approach to illustrate the two most
important concepts in the theory of endogenous institutions (Greif 2004, 2006),
self-reinforcement and quasi-parameter, in the context of institutions in Indonesia.
Game theoretical approach has been used to model institution since the works by
Ullmann-Margalit (1977) and Schotter (1981). We then integrate Greifs game
theoretical approach with Azistypology of leadership model (2008) to better pre-
dict the long-run progress of districts in the contexts of institutions in the post-
decentralization period in Indonesia. This model is able to explain the persistence
of low welfare level and poor-quality institutions through institutional mechanisms,
such as local capture, local leadership, and participation level as well as local ac-
countability. Similar to Greifs approach, we do not attempt to highlight all insti-
tutional mechanisms to explain institutional changes through game theory. But
we would like to capture the self-reinforcement factors that could self-reinforce the
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existence of an institution, particularly in game-theoretical model, that we believe
to be most appropriate for the context of institutions in Indonesia. In general,
self-reinforcement factors work through quasi-parameters that are dened as para-
meters in the short run but as variables in the long-run. As a parameter, a quasi-
parameter could self-enforce a behavior, but as a variable, a quasi-parameter could
self-reinforce or self-undermine a behavior. We also illustrate how decentraliza-
tion in Indonesia, which has shortened the political distance between local leaders
and local elites, could exacerbate the quality of institutions in a poor district that
had diminished quality to begin with. This poor district can be associated with
self-undermining factors such as low education that can be further associated with
low local accountability, rendering local policies more corruptible.
2.2 Literature Review
Endogenous institutions have been discussed in literature as early as Myrdals An
American Dilemma (1944). In what he calls "the theory of the vicious cycle,"
Myrdal argues that white prejudice and discrimination keep the Negro oppressed
and more oppressions in turn exacerbate white prejudice. Moreover, he argues
that the original change of either white prejudice or Negro oppression could set a
di¤erent future trajectory that spirals either upward or downward. North (1990)
denes institutions as rules of the game in a society that consist of three main ele-
ments: formal rules, informal constraints, and enforcements. Institutional equilib-
rium is dened as "a situation where given the bargaining strength of the players
and the set of contractual bargain that made up total economic exchange, none
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of the players would nd it advantageous to devote resources in restructuring the
agreements" (p.86).
Among the more recent theories on endogenous institutions are those of Greif
(2006) and Acemoglu (2008). Greifs (2006) theory of endogenous institutional
change argues that institutionalized rules, beliefs, norms, and actions constitute
an equilibrium if players nd it optimal to follow the institutionalized rules, which
would in turn generate behaviors. The two most important ideas in Greifs the-
ory of endogenous institutional change are the concepts of self-reinforcements and
quasi-parameters. Using the historical studies on the Genoese and Maghribis
traders, game theoretical analysis on inter-agency relationship is discussed. In-
terclan mutual deterrence, arms race, and cooperation under external threats are
also explored. Acemoglu (2008) discusses the reasons a dysfunctional institution
continues to persist, and relates to the theory of endogenous institutions. He
argues that distributions of resources and initial political institutions a¤ect the de
facto and de jure political power that a¤ect the economic institutions and political
institutions of the next period. Economic institutions and political institutions
further a¤ect the economic growth and the distributions of resources in the pe-
riod after next. This framework illustrates the evolution between distribution of
resources or growth and institutions, and thus, the endogeneity of institutions.
Myerson (2004) contends that focal points, such as institutions, justice, and
truthful equilibria, determine an equilibrium play in the case of a multiplicity of
equilibria of a coordination game. It further exhibits that the importance of insti-
tutions as focal points and coordinating instruments. This paper also shows that
the equilibrium-selection process of a focal point is not trivial and may depend on
the power of the players. Acemoglu and Robinson (2007) show an equilibrium that
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is called captured democracy. The de facto investment on political power by the
elites is high enough that the economic institution is captured by the elites despite
democratic political institution. In the context of decentralization in Indonesia,
the de jure political structure in the post-decentralization period is democracy.
However, because local regulations are now regulated at the local level and po-
litical leaders are now directly elected by the people, more opportunities arise for
local elites to become politically closer to the local leaders or local regulators. This
increases the level of local capture and investments in the de facto political power
by the local elites post-decentralization. Hence, what we see in some districts
in Indonesia in the post-decentralization period, despite the de jure democratic
political regime, are economic institutions that are captured by local elites.
Alesina and Spolaore (2005) argue that decentralization is predicted after a fall
of an autocratic regime. Their argument helps to explain the nature of decentral-
ization in Indonesia in that it immediately followed the fall of the Soeharto regime.
They argue that decentralization is a way of constraining Leviathans, or autocratic
rules, particularly when mobility is high, because tax competition among locali-
ties may o¤er a substitute for scal constraints on taxing power (Brennan and
Buchanan, 1980). Moreover, decentralization is not only a way of achieving lim-
ited government intervention, but also a way of promoting competition (Hayek,
1959). Another related theory is that of "market preserving federalism," (Wein-
gast, 1995) which argues that moving away from a central government solves the
problem of property rights, by imposing limitations preventing the central rule
from expropriating too much. They further argue that, "when a dictator falls,
even if the nation does not break up, at least it becomes more decentralized." The
statement that democratization leads to decentralization has also been proven em-
pirically.
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Cai and Treisman (2005) nd that there are two e¤ects of capital ows liber-
alization: competition and polarization. The result is not a convergence, but a
polarization of policies and government qualities if unit homogeneity assumption
fails. This paper helps to explain the possible factors that could result in the fail-
ures of decentralization and the divergence of welfare among districts in Indonesia.
Azis (2008) studies the e¤ect of a higher degree of local capture on welfare. This
paper helps to capture the e¤ects of decentralization in Indonesia through insti-
tutional constraints including higher degrees of local capture. The model in this
paper endogenizes the net e¤ect of local capture on welfare given the initial level
of poverty, inequality, participation level and local leadership. Using a typology
of leadership, he argues that the net e¤ect of local capture on welfare can be both
negative and positive (what is also termed the "backward bending curve of local
capture on welfare") depending on the poverty level, participation level and local
leadership. The long-run progress can be categorized into complete, deteriorating,
incomplete, and stagnant progress.
The following papers show some possible solutions to poor qualities of insti-
tutions. Della-Giusta (2008) o¤ers a di¤erent approach to development issues
by introducing a trust-based system of intermediation. This theory argues that
the lack of depth of trust-based intermediation may result in a market-based legal
system in which only those who can a¤ord legal fees could have access to deliveries
of goods or secure contract enforcements. Serra (2008) conducts an experimental
study showing that the most e¤ective monitoring on bribery is a combined top-
down and bottom-up monitoring. Wade (1988) argues that collective action is
cheaper in terms of state resources than private property and state control regimes
to better utilize common-pool resources. Empirically and analytically, collective
action yields better outcomes than what these theories predict, including Olsons
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logic of collective action. Hirschman (1970) argues that there are two possible
actions for the citizens when a state deteriorates: exit or voice. When exit is not
an option, such as in the case of monopoly or an authoritarian state, then voice
will prevail. However, he argues that when exit is not a possible option, then
voice may not be e¤ective because there is no threat to exit. On the other hand,
when exit is too easy, then voice, which is often more costly and requires collective
action, becomes less likely, thus impeding changes from within. The ideal situa-
tion occurs when exit is possible, but not exceedingly easy. In a political system,
both a totalitarian government and multi-party system might fail to promote de-
velopment. In the case of the former, both exit and voice are impossible. In the
latter case, exit is freely available and members may often exit whenever there is
a disagreement. Dixit (2004) discusses the issues on middle-country trap. At
some middle level of development, information networks that sustain small eco-
nomic activities could no longer support contract enforcement. Although state
institutions are needed, the scale of activity is not yet large enough to justify the
costs of establishing them. Moreover, there are political obstacles associated with
people who have sunk stakes in the old system, preventing the establishment of a
new system.
2.3 A Note on The Theory of Endogenous Institutional
Change (Greif, 2006)
In sustaining the fundamentals of the theory of endogenous institutional change,
it is important to remember that individualschoices of behaviors are governed by
beliefs and norms, as well as social and cultural rules, and not only their pursuits of
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self-interested goals. In consideration of this, one must acknowledge that individu-
als are Homo Sociologicus (Social Man), instead of Homo Economicus (Economic
Man). Their behaviors are shaped by social environments and norms. In par-
ticular, Greif argues that not only do individuals act based on social and normal
rules, but also that these individuals are rational decision-makers; their behaviors
are strategic in the sense that their preferences on outcomes are consistent and
their choices of behaviors are motivated by consequences. In other words, Homo
Socialogicus is consistent with rational decision-making and strategic behaviors.
Greifs argument is based on experimental results regarding rationally altruistic
behaviors, such as the Dictator Game experiment by Andreoni and Miller (2002).
Here, they observe that altruistic behaviors are consistent with a well-behaved pref-
erence ordering or Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference. Considering Varian
(1982) and Afriats theorem (1967), this experiment shows that the observed al-
truistic behaviors are derived from utility-maximization. From these results, Greif
further contends that altruistic behaviors are consistent with backward induction
and reputation-based arguments. In organizational terms, a society can be ei-
ther "collectivist" or "individualistic". A collectivist society has a "segregated"
form of social structure, where each individual interacts socially and economically
within a particular group. An individualistic society has an "integrated" form of
social culture, where each individual is not distinguished by any particular group.
This social structure is an important basis for its culture and cultural beliefs. As
a collectivist country, Indonesia and hence its institutions might be subject to a
collectivist strategy in which intra-agency instead of inter-agency relationship is
more likely to prevail.
It is important to dene some terms on endogenous institution and institution
as an equilibrium, which we take from Greif (2006). Institution is dened as a
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system of rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations that together imply a regularity
of (social) behavior. In the context of corrupt institution, rules may constitute
a regulation of payment of bribes such as the amount paid, how, and to what
e¤ect. Organizations may constitute the state administration, police, courts of
law. Beliefs and internalized norms may constitute the notion that the responses
of the state, police, and courts to bribery renders it protable to take and the
belief that paying the bribe is the least costly way to advance ones interest. An
institution is an equilibrium if it constitutes the structure that inuences behavior,
while the best behavioral responses of agents to this structures reproduce the
institution. The fact that players play against institutionalized rules explains
the phenomenon of a persistence of an institution that constitutes some implied
behaviors. Persistence or inertia, institutional path dependence, or steady-state
equilibrium in institutional setting are among the names used in describing the
study of endogenous institutional change.
The two important features to study the theory of endogenous institutional
change are quasi-parameters and self-reinforcement factors. Quasi-parameters are
parameters that determine self-enforcibility in the short run but are endogenously
determined and hence variables in the long run. Myerson (2004) argues that jus-
tice, institution, and truthful equilibrium determine what self-enforcing behaviors
arise. However, Greifs theory o¤ers the explanation that justice, institution and
truthful equilibrium itself are results of some evolutionary change of beliefs and
behaviors that in the long run may persist or cease to exist. In the context of de-
centralization, economic gains from cooperation by local leaders, local elites, and
citizens can be regarded as quasi-parameters that change over time given coop-
eration or non-cooperation in the previous period, or given self-reinforcement or
self-undermining factors as a result of implied behaviors in the previous period.
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Quasi-parameters may therefore take the form of payo¤s of the players that change
over time, such as economic gains in the next period from playing a certain strategy
today. Implied behaviors may change due to a change in exogenous parameters,
such as payo¤s, an idea posted by game theory, but as implied behaviors change,
these exogenous parameters may endogenously change resulting in either neutral,
positive, or negative self-reinforcement.
Positive self-reinforcement of an implied behavior as a result of a change in
quasi-parameters results in the persistence of that implied behavior. In other
words, this implied behavior is positively self-reinforced. Negative self-reinforcement
of an implied behavior as a result of a change in quasi-parameters results in un-
dermining of that implied behavior. After some periods, this implied behavior
ceases to exist as it negatively self-reinforces. Neutral self-reinforcement of an
implied behavior results in no change of that implied behavior. To clarify the de-
scription of self-reinforcement, an implied behavior is called positively, neutrally,
or negatively self-reinforcing if the existence of this implied behavior changes the
quasi-parameter that makes this implied behavior more, neutrally, or less likely
to self-reinforce respectively. Persistence of an implied behavior is the result of
positively or neutrally self-reinforcing implied behavior. Quasi or exogenous pa-
rameters may not change if there is no observable change in behavior. Extinction
of an implied behavior is the result of negatively self-reinforcing implied behavior.
An increase of the payo¤ from cooperation tomorrow if there is a cooperation to-
day is an example of positive self-reinforcement factors in which cooperation today
makes cooperation tomorrow more likely.
Institutional changes take place in di¤erent settings called institutional com-
plexes. These institutional complexes determine the evolutionary process of insti-
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tutions. In Greifs example, institutional complexes explain why the abolition of
slavery comes faster in the Christian world than in the Muslim world. The fact
that Christianity follows Roman law enables the new European states to reassert
control gradually over slavery, while Islam is a religion that regulates not only the
religious life but also the economic, political, and social life, rendering the abolition
of slavery a violation to the sacred law.
To understand the path-dependent nature of institutions, Greif argues that
there are three ways that past institutions may a¤ect current institutions: coordi-
nation, inclusion, and environment e¤ect. Coordination e¤ect arises from shared
observable events. Inclusion e¤ect arises from the tendency of some elements
of past institutions to be included in current institutions. Environment e¤ect
arises from the fact that current institutions exist under some path-dependent in-
stitutional environment. Fundamental asymmetry between past institutions and
alternative institutions, where institutionalized rules have not yet been formed in
new situations, suggests that history shapes beliefs and norms as well as the rules
of the game for the choice of behaviors in new situations. Past institutional ele-
ments remain in peoples minds, thus helping to shape the initial conditions of new
institutions. In other words, history projects the dynamic of institutional change
and trajectories. Focal point or coordination e¤ect arises from this asymmetry
in the case of multiple equilibria in order to select one institution out of many
others. In the context of Indonesia, it may be that people may never try to
behave non-corruptly because they never see others behave non-corruptly out of
fears of being cheated. This shows coordination failures to behave non-corruptly,
which becomes the focal point.
Empirical studies on endogenous institutions include those on Genoa and
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Venice. Genoa in the period from 1096-1194 provides an example of institu-
tional failures because of negative reinforcements of arms races, from the previously
self-enforcing mutual deterrence, that were triggered by political and economic in-
centives of Genoese clans to control the city as economic prosperity increased.
Interclan cooperation was built up during the period of external threat from the
new German emperor in 1154, although this cooperation subsided as the threat
subsided. The new institution of Non-Genoese Podestà failed to refrain the clan-
like patronage networks in the long-run from clan rivalry. Venice in the period
from 1032-1172, on the other hand, provides an example of institutional success
because positive enforcements of Venices republican magistracy, established in
1032, reinforced stability. In 1032, elected monarchy was changed into a repub-
lican magistracy. This new institution self-reinforced cooperation among clans.
Among the features that make this political institution self-enforcing were the rules
ensuring that only one family member could be on any committee reducing the
establishment of patronage networks, the rules weakening clan identities while fos-
tering the norms of loyalty to the city, and the magisterial rules preventing clans
from establishing political faction through a patronage system.
In the context of institutions in Indonesia, payo¤s from certain behaviors today,
such as cooperative behaviors by local leaders, local elites, and citizens, are a¤ected
by socioeconomic conditions of the citizens today, namely the level of education and
political awareness. This occurs because the level of education and the political
awareness of the citizens may determine the type of local leadership through local
elections by the citizens, thus determining the welfare of the citizens today. These
factors together with implied behaviors of the citizens, local leaders and local
elites form other institutional complexes, such as the net e¤ect of local capture
on welfare and participation level. This a¤ects the level of welfare today that
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determines socioeconomic conditions in the subsequent period that determines the
payo¤s from cooperation tomorrow, and so on. Hence, factors such as the level
of education can be self-reinforcement or self-undermining factors. For instance,
in a very poor district, common citizens lack education and political awareness.
Because of this, local accountability is low and local policies are more likely to
be distorted by the local leaders under strong inuences of the local elites. The
absence of education and political awareness make low welfare self-reinforce itself
because of the higher likelihood that local policies are distorted. The absence
of education and political awareness are examples of negative self-reinforcement
or self-undermining factors. High education and political awareness, typically
associated with richer districts, provide examples of positive self-reinforcement
factors.
A parametric change may fail or be delayed in changing beliefs and implied
behaviors if it does not result in a change or immediate change of observable out-
come or action, or it is not observable by players. In other words, although there
may be a parametric change, if playersbeliefs about what equilibrium is going to
be played does not change, institution persists. The more crucial point of this
theory is the explanation of why players fail to coordinate. Ability to coordinate
alone, mutually beneting players, is not enough to make them coordinate and
cooperate. Sunk costs associated with coordinating change, the free-rider prob-
lem, distributional issues, uncertainties, limited understanding of alternatives, and
asymmetric information are among the factors that prevent coordination from aris-
ing. More importantly, implicit mutual trusts or distrusts that are formed from
the past behaviors of the players and are institutionalized in peoples mind may
shape the focal point for players to either coordinate or defect. Other factors that
determine persistence of institution include limited attention capacity of observ-
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able changes in the rule, habits or routines that overweigh judgement, and other
cognitive processes. Moreover, the reputation-based model in private-order insti-
tutions might not be su¢ cient since they might be inuenced by the public-order
institutions. Furthermore, "the capacity of institutions to change are functions of
history" (Greif, 2006, p.209). Consider very poor people with no health awareness
in a very poor district. National free health care service might fail in this poor
district because poor people do not even have the money to a¤ord transportation
to the nearest local community health centre. Or, they may lack the incentive to
use this free health care service because they are unaware that they are sick, since
they may be uneducated about health.
2.4 Laying Out Game Theoretical Foundation of Endoge-
nous Institutions
"The changes among the citizens after the 1997/1998 Asian Financial Crisis
include citizens becoming more emotional (or aggressive), decreasing business
self-conscience, deeper feeling towards one owns region, creating racial and
religious conicts more easily, growing independent institutions." Anonymous
(from the authors eld study, Kota Bogor, Indonesia, May 27, 2008)
We often blame poor economic performance of Indonesia compared to its neigh-
bors on weak institutions, including the culture of corruption among public o¢ cials,
non-performing and corrupt law and enforcement bodies, and abuses of property
rights. However, it does not o¤er a much deeper explanation as to why the culture
of corruption and the other weak legal and property right institutions persist in
some countries and cease to exist in others. Singapore was once considered a
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country where corruption was pervasive, however, the increased wages of public
o¢ cials and the establishment of an anti-corruption body transformed Singapore
into a country free from corruption. Many believed that the culture of corrup-
tion was born in the Soeharto era when he ruled over the country for 32 years.
However, after 10 years of Soehartos fall in 1997, we have still yet to see an im-
provement in institutions that eliminate corruption among public o¢ cials, judicial
bodies, as well as abuses of property rights. One example is the corruption in
public procurement auction that reached $3.9 billion (US dollars) in 2006 alone.
One of Indonesias leading economists wrote that poverty, inequality and corrup-
tion were still central issues in Indonesia despite the strengthening nancial sector
after the 1997-1998 Asian nancial crisis (Soesastro, 2008).
We examine the cause of persistence in the lack of institutions through the
theory of endogenous institutional change as in Greif, 2006, and later, we will
enrich Greifs model with evidence from the authorseld study in Indonesia. As
the quote above implies, an economic or political crisis, such as the 1997-1998
Asian nancial crisis, may alter behavior, perhaps rendering one more emotional
or aggressive, and even result in more egoism towards ones race, ethnicity, or
religion. In turn, these changes may create more incidences of social conicts and
corruption. Additionally, the feeling of dissatisfaction among the citizens towards
the government endangers even more aggression, resulting in more incidences of
social and political conicts. The longer term impact is principally poorer quality
of institutions, characterized by more and more corrupt bureaucrats and citizens.
To illustrate the endogeneity of qualities of institutions, we take an innitely re-
peated, two-player Coordination game. Game theoretical approach to institutions
has been discussed in early literatures on institutions to illustrate cooperative or
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non-cooperative behaviors that could shape di¤erent types of institutions (North,
1990,1991; Greif, 2006). North (1990,1991) argues that repeated interactions,
smaller groups, and more complete information about other memberspast behav-
iors help to build cooperation. The players in the two-player game are a local
leader and a local elite. The pure strategies of both the local leader and the local
elite are Good Cooperationor cooperate (G) and Bad Cooperationor defect
(B). To make the model more realistic, we introduce local citizens as players in
this game. The total payo¤s of the player can illustrate the level of welfare in the
society. If the local leader and the local elite as well as the citizen behave well
or cooperate (G), we refer to these as cooperative behaviors in the society, which
may be associated with positive local capture, a non-corrupt institution, or a po-
litically stable society. Positive local capture is exemplied by an establishment of
social programs by local elite groups with support from the local governments or
by donations from local elites to nance public educational recreations or public
parks, such as in the case of Yogyakarta. If they all defect (B), we refer to these as
non-cooperative behaviors, which may be associated with negative local capture,
a corrupt institution, or a politically unstable society. Negative local capture is
exemplied by collusion between local leaders and local elites leading to corrup-
tion, whether or not the citizens participate in the corrupt institutions. In each
period, a local leader (representing local leaders) and a local elite (representing
local elites) as well as a citizen (representing citizens) meet. Note that in the
above payo¤ matrix, bad cooperation by the local leader and the local elite but
good cooperation by the local citizen give lower payo¤s to both the local leader
and local elite than if they all cooperate. In reality, there are some cases in which
their payo¤s are higher.
A local leader in one period represents the elected local leaders in a district
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for that period, while a local elite in one period represents the local elites in
the same district for that period. A citizen in one period also represents the
citizens in that district for that period. Information is perfect and complete. As
an example, we assume that institutional complexes are generated from the implied
rational behaviors of the local leaders, local elites, and local citizens, including the
e¤ect of local capture on welfare. Implied behaviors and institutional complexes
are therefore endogenous variables. Social and economic conditions that we argue
become self-reinforcement factors are also endogenous variables that are associated
with the level of welfare, which is a¤ected by institutional complexes. Exogenous
factors may include natural disaster or changes of central governments policies
that a¤ect payo¤s of local leaders, local elites, and citizens, as well as social,
economic, and political structures. We argue that Coordination game could better
illustrate real-life cases in the context of cooperation between local leaders and local
elites (as well as among local citizens in the three-player game) than Prisoners
Dilemma game, which is the game that is discussed in Greif, 2004-2006. What is
the circumstance under which negative, neutral, or positive reinforcement exists
and what incentive mechanism can we o¤er to reform institution?
Example 2.1 Coordination Game
G=Good Cooperation, B=Bad Cooperation
LE=LL G B
G at; at c; b
B b; c 0; 0
; a0 > b; c < 0
Denition 2.1 (Greif, 2006) Self-reinforcement factors can be categorized into
the following types:
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1. Positive, if at+1-at>0
2. Neutral, if at+1-at=0
3. Negative, if at+1-at<0
Lemma 2.1 (Greif, 2006) In an innitely repeated, Coordination game above,
cooperative behaviors by the local leader and the local elite are self-reinforcing given
that the self-reinforcement factor is either positive or neutral, while cooperative
behaviors by the local leader and the local elite are not self-reinforcing given that
the self-reinforcement factor is negative, for any discount factor.
Proof. (i) Non-corrupt institution with neutral reinforcement, where at+1-
at==0, is self-reinforcing since non-corrupt institution is a Nash Equilibrium in
the one-stage game.
(ii) Non-corrupt institution with positive reinforcement, where at+1-at=>0, is
self reinforcing since non-corrupt institution with positive reinforcement is a Nash
Equilibrium in the one-stage game.
(iii)Non-corrupt institution with negative reinforcement, where at+1-at=<0, is
not self-reinforcing since after some T periods, aT<b, and players will deviate from
the cooperative strategy.
Q.E.D.
Case 2.1 Negative self-reinforcement factors can be associated with a low-level of
welfare in the following way. In a poor district, citizens are uneducated. High costs
of educating the citizens about health to make health programs work e¤ectively may
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make implementing health programs unattractive to local leaders and local elites in
the long-run. Hence, they stay away from health care provision altogether.
Consider the following three-player Coordination game below. This example
illustrates the persistence of high welfare and good cooperation of the local leader,
the local elite and the citizen and the persistence of low welfare and bad cooperation
among the same players. Suppose cooperative behaviors of the local leader, the
local elite and the citizen is a su¢ cient and necessary condition for a high quality
institution, while non-cooperative behaviors constitute a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for a low quality institution.
Example 2.2 Three-Player Coordination Game
Good Cooperation (G) by the Citizen (C):
LLnLE G B
G at,at,at 6,0,6
B 3-",4,4 6,6,-1
Bad Cooperation (B) by the Citizen (C):
LLnLE G B
G 7,7,-1 3-",6,6
B 6,0,6 3,3,3
There are three players: Local Elite (LE), Local Leader (LL), and Citizen (C)
Each of the players has two possible pure strategies in the one-stage game: Good
Cooperation (G) and Bad Cooperation (B).
There are two pure one-stage Nash Equilibrium: (G,G,G) and (B,B,B)
Let a0 be the payo¤ of each of the players from all cooperate. Assume a0=10,
and at+1-at ( or <)0,t=0,..1. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1 (Example 1-
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the two-player Coordination game) above, (G,G,G) is self-reinforcing (or not self-
reinforcing) for any discount factor.
Welfare is the sum of the payo¤s of the local leader, the local elite, and the
citizen. If (G,G,G) is self-reinforcing, then the society (the local leader, the local
elite, and the citizen) could earn 30 in period 0, and 30+t, for t>0, assuming
at+1-at =  for all t>0 (time-invariant self-reinforcement factor). This can be
called the high-welfare society. If (G,G,G) is not self-reinforcing, then (B,B,B)
is the only sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies in this innitely
repeated game (Friedman, 1971) and the society earns 9 in period t0. This can
be called the low-welfare society.
Starting from (G,G,G), any defector will be "punished" by a lower payo¤ given
the other two players do not defect. However, the degree of punishment is di¤erent
for the local leader, the local elite, and the citizen who defect. A local leader who
defects from (G,G,G) is punished the least with a decrease in the payo¤ of (7+"),
the local elite who defects is punished with a decrease in the payo¤ of (10), and
the citizen who defects is punished with a decrease in the payo¤ of (11). The
degree of punishment from defecting is inversely related to political power. Starting
from (B,B,B), any good cooperation will be"punished" by a lower payo¤ given the
other two players do not cooperate. The degree of punishment from cooperating in
this case is positively related to political power. However, starting from (B,B,B),
welfare will be improved if one of the players cooperates.
An example of (G,G,G) is when all players cooperate well, which can be asso-
ciated with "good institution" and positive local capture. An example of (G,B,G)
is when the local elite defects from good cooperation, and because the local leader
and the citizen do not defect, the defecting local elite will be punished, perhaps by
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incarceration, although welfare will decrease from that of the high-welfare state of
(G,G,G). An example of (B,G,G) is when the local leader defects from good co-
operation, and because the local elite and the citizen do not defect, the defecting
local leader will be punished. An example of (G,G,B), which can be associated
with positive local capture, is when the citizen defects from good cooperation, and
because the local leader and the local elite do not defect, the defecting citizen, such
as a common businessman, will be punished. Since the local leader has the most
political power, punishment to the defecting local leader is the least severe but the
loss to welfare is the greatest.
An example of (B,B,B) is when all players defect, which can be associated with
"bad institution" and negative local capture. An example of (G,B,B) is when the
local leader initiates good cooperation, in which case welfare increases, although
the local leaders payo¤ is lower because the local elite and the citizen still defect.
Failures of good policies because the local elite and the citizen are not cooperating
are examples of this case. An example of (B,G,B) is when the local elite initiates
good cooperation, in which case welfare increases, although the local elites payo¤ is
lower because the local leader and the citizen still defect. Collusion, cronyism, or
nepotism between the local leader and a specic common businessman could hurt
the local elite. An example of (B,B,G), which can be associated with negative
local capture, is when the citizen initiates good cooperation, in which case welfare
increases, although the citizens payo¤ is still lower because the local leader and the
local elite still defect. Collusion, cronyism, or nepotism between the local leader
and local elite hurt a common businessman. Since the local leader has the most
political power, initiation of a good cooperation by the local leader increases welfare
the most, followed by the local elite and then the citizen.
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The welfare matrix given the playersstrategies is given by the payo¤ matrices
below. The highest welfare is achieved when every player displays good cooperation
(G,G,G). A defect by the local leader will yield a welfare of (11-"), a defect by
the local elite will yield a payo¤ of (12), while a defect by the citizen will yield
a payo¤ of (13). The lowest welfare is attained when every player displays bad
cooperation (B,B,B). A good cooperation by the local leader will yield a welfare of
(15-"), a good cooperation by the local elite will yield a payo¤ of (12), while a good
cooperation by the citizen will yield a welfare of (11). Here, we assume that the
local leader is the most dominant player in a¤ecting welfare. A defect by the local
leader will decrease the welfare by the greatest degree but a good cooperation by the
local leader will also increase welfare by the greatest degree. The local elite plays
the second most dominant role in a¤ecting welfare, followed by the citizen. The
welfare matrices is given by the following tables:
Good Cooperation (G) by Citizen (C):
LLnLE G B
G 30 12
B 11-" 11
Bad Cooperation (B) by Citizen (C):
LLnLE G B
G 13 15-"
B 12 9
In order to make the above game theoretical more realistic, we will give real-life
examples from our eld study for each of the possible sets of strategies above.
Case 2.2 Let:
(LL) Local Leaders be Mayors/ Vice-Mayors/ Heads of local governments de-
partments/ other high-ranked public o¢ cials with power to regulate policies
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(LE) Local Elites: members of ASMINDO (furniture), KADIN (businesses),
GAPENSI (contractor) etc., with ability to inuence local policies directly
(Citizens) Local Citizens: (or representatives of common citizens) Peoples
NGOs, poor families, etc., without ability to inuence local policies directly
1. (G,G,G)
Balikpapan, East Kalimantan: A balanced city
The high welfare of Balikpapan could be attributed to the balanced cooperation
among the local leaders, local elites, and the citizens. This is illustrated by the
high level of participation by its citizens, even the poor and illiterate citizens. The
participation level was noted by all participants of the eld study as being maxi-
mal through the regular Monday Morning Forum or the Co¤ee Morningwith all
executive o¢ cials including the sub-district leaders, and hence information owed
to and from the locals, even the poor and illiterates. At the sub-district levels,
regular socialization events took place to inform the locals about new local govern-
ment regulations, for instance. The Mayor also held regular meetings with local
businesses every month. The participants in this forum include the micro, small,
medium, and large businesses, and all other stakeholders who were involved in the
topic being discussed at the Forum. All stratas of the community were involved.
2. (B,B,B)
Manggarai Barat: The Memosystem in Public Procurement Auctions
Public procurement auction in Manggarai Barat, de facto, was never conducted,
and the high degree of cronyism prohibited those who were not close to the executive
or legislative o¢ cials from getting a government project. This memosystem of
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procuring a project made contractors come to see and beg the Regent to write a
memo to the procurers in order to give them government projects. Local capture
only could only make local regulations to bias towards the low-scale contractors,
many of which were owned by the legislative members. In fact, the head of the
biggest contractors association, GAPENSI, was the head of the legislative body.
De facto and de jure were very di¤erent. The legislative body as the controlling
body of the executive had not been e¤ective either, because political control was not
accompanied by technical control. Still, those who owned the projects controlled the
projects. What was ironic was that citizens never lost their hope of winning the
public projects by directly meeting with the Regent in person. All sides, namely the
local leaders, the local elites, and the citizens, were involved in this process.
3. (G,B,B)
Yogyakarta: Relocation of Pasar Klithikan Pakuncen
A few years ago, used-good street sellers in three locations in Yogyakarta were
removed to a new location. There had been resistance by these street sellers out
of fear that the relocation of their places might cause a reduction in the number
of buyers. This had been troublesome to the Mayor, although after the mandate
to reallocate, the newly established market, Pasar Klithikan, had not experienced
a reduction in the number of its visitors. This case might exemplify how non-
cooperation by the local elites (more established used-good street sellers) and citizens
(ordinary used-good street sellers) might create trouble for the local leaders.
4. (B,G,B)
Prabumulih: Corruption in Public Planning Project of Technical Roads and
Bridge
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In 2004, the head of local department of public work of Prabumulih city and a
professor of University Muhamadiyah Palembang were found guilty of corruption
in public planning project of technical roads and bridges that had caused a loss of
489.403.200 Rupiah. Both are jailed to three months in prison. This charge
involves only a local leader and a citizen.
5. (B,B,G)
Manggarai Barat: The Binongko-Cold Storage case
Binongko is the house for handicapped children in Labuan Bajo that accommo-
dates around fteen handicapped children in Manggarai Barat and is equipped with
a swimming pool or a bathtub for regular physical therapy. About 100 children in
St. Damian Cancar, a sister handicapped house of Binongko, are circulated and
brought to Binongko for physical therapy. In recent years, particularly in 2004,
the case between Sister Virgula, the pioneer of the Binongko House for handicapped
children, and a Singaporeanowned sh cold storage was hotly debated. The sh
cold storage was built right beside Sister Virgulas Binongko Rehabilitation House
in Labuan Bajo. Building a sh cold storage besides a rehabilitation house was
disturbing since a sh cold storage polluted the sea where these handicapped chil-
dren take sea-water baths for their physical therapy and moreover, during the sh
seasons, the air would smell of sh. Although the local government had issued an
o¢ cial date when this cold storage had to move, up until now, it has not. There
had been many demonstrations protesting the construction for this sh cold storage
because of the harmful polluting e¤ects on these children. After a period of failures
to remove the cool storage, Sister Virgula nally gave in and gathered some money
from donators to build its own swimming pool for the childrens physical therapy
that had cost approximately Rp. 1.000.000.000, 00. After the changing of the old
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Regent of Manggarai to the new Regent of Manggarai Barat, the new local govern-
ment was not supportive and complaints by the Binongkos House about the Cold
Storage were not heard. Demonstrations were conducted.
6. (B,G,G)
Prabumulih: High Number of Legal Charges on Corruption against Public Of-
cials
In 2004, the Mayor of Prabumulih, Drs. H. Rachman Djalili MM, was charged
with corruption on land ownership (or pembebasan tanah) for a local government
o¢ ce that was known as Pangkul Gate. The corruption charge involved as much
as Rp.3.000.000.000,00. He was nally freed by the Mahkamah Agung, but his
sta¤ was found guilty. It was suspected that some public o¢ cials asked someone
to buy the land from the citizens at a price lower than the market price before the
project was run, and this land was bought by the local government at a price above
the market price. In separate cases, two department heads were found guilty of
corruption. Local governments secretary and some of its sta¤ were also found
guilty of corruption. Though corruption by local leaders often involves some local
elites or local citizens, however, in the case of civil charges in procuring land for
the Mayors o¢ ce in 2004, only high-ranking public o¢ cials were prosecuted with
the civil charges.
7. (G,B,G)
Prabumulih: Legal Charges on Corruption against Local Elites
Defectby local elites is exemplied by corruption charges by local businesses
or prominent people (or local elites) in Prabumulih. There were at least four civil
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charges against local businesses or prominent people, such as the head of a high
school, between January 1997 and June 2008 that we recorded from the judicial
body in Prabumulih for corrupting public funds. Only these local businessmen or
prominent people were prosecuted with the civil charges without any local leader nor
citizen being involved. Again, corruption by local elites causes a loss to the society,
including local leaders and citizens, on top of having these local elites incarcerated.
8. (G,G,B)
An example of Defectby citizens could be more general daily-life, law-breaking
cases, such as stealing. We did not focus on behaviors of common citizens in our
eld study because these cases are more trivial, and di¢ cult to nd. Stealing public
possessions creates a welfare loss to local leaders and local elites, on top of having
the citizens put in jail.
Case 2.3 Positive self-reinforcement factors can be associated with a high level
of welfare. Consider the case of Balikpapan. The capability of the citizens to
participate in regular local forums conducted by the government increase local par-
ticipation, thus generating higher welfare. Negative self-reinforcement factors can
be associated with a low level of welfare. Consider the case of Sragen. The in-
capability of the citizens to participate in free health-care programs because of low
education may make the implementation of other health-care programs unattractive
to local leaders and local elites. Moreover, the citizens who lack health awareness
do not consider going to health clinics to be benecial.
The incentives and disincentives of the players to act may depend on some
self-reinforcement factors. These self-reinforcement factors are the forces behind
the persistence of the evolution between welfare and the quality of institutions.
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Under negative self-reinforcement factors, low welfare evolves with poor quality of
institutions in which the local leader, the local elite, and the citizen behave "mis-
chievously" or non-cooperatively. Conversely, under positive self-reinforcement
factors, high welfare evolves with high quality of institutions in which the local
leader, the local elite, and the citizen behave cooperatively. In order to break
the persistence of non-cooperative equilibrium of low welfare and poor quality of
institution, a district needs to change the self-reinforcement factors to motivate
the local leader, the local elite, and the citizen to behave well. The example
above shows that an increase, no change or a decrease in the payo¤ from cooper-
ation tomorrow if there is cooperation today is an example of a positive, neutral
and negative self-reinforcement factor respectively. Self-reinforcement factors that
underlie these changes in payo¤s, or the quasi-parameters, include the level of ed-
ucation and the political or health awareness of the citizens in the districts. Three
elements that determine the evolution between welfare and qualities of institutions
and could explain the persistence of non-cooperative or cooperative equilibrium,
are the initial welfare of the district, the self-reinforcement factors and the qualities
of institutions.
Past behaviors that have become a culture institutionalized in peoples beliefs
and norms are more di¢ cult to change than one might predict. In other words,
past institutions, in particular one that has turned into a culture, matter. In
order to change peoples beliefs of corrupt government in Indonesia, for example,
the new leaders must transform the bad image of government by creating a body
with leaders of high integrity in order to prevent an institutionalized distrust in
government. Moreover, in order to erase the culture of corruption, there must be
a reform in the beliefs and norms of the people for a stable equilibrium, which may
be more gradual. Furthermore, as mentioned above, past institutional elements
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determine the initial conditions of the new institutions and the capacity of the
current institution to change. An institution does not grow independently. It has
players, namely the stakeholders of the rules. An unjust law with a wise judge
might result in a more rational outcome than a just law with an unwise judge. In
the context of corruption, an institution entails changing the beliefs of how others
might behave and what one believes is right in order to induce good behaviors.
Therefore, corruption that has become a culture requires a more complex process
in order to change. This process involves a signicant investment of time as it
requires changes in observable behaviors.
Institutional complexes that make a costly transitional change may explain why
corruption is more persistent in Indonesia than it is in other countries, such as in
Singapore. The recent case of reformation in the bureaucracy of Indonesia (June
2008), changes in the remuneration of public o¢ cials and personnel changes in the
tax and custom o¢ ces under the Ministry of Finance did not guarantee success. It
showed that the pilot project on the tax and custom o¢ ces was a failure. Hence, it
is necessary to note that a change in rules and regulations or the establishment of
new rules and regulations may not be e¤ective if they are not followed by changes
in beliefs that result in new found motivation to follow these rules and regulations.
Thus, all institutional elements, not only rules and organizations matter. Serra,
2008, shows the importance of a combined bottom-up and top-down approaches.
When applied to political settings, the presence of self-reinforcement factors may
suggest that intrinsic personal values of individuals are important, honesty, for
instance.
Other external factors aside from the few elements mentioned above may also
be signicant. Allowing the establishment of relationships between public o¢ cials
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and citizens, allowing public o¢ cials to directly appoint citizens as participating
bidders, and repeated interactions between public o¢ cials and citizens increase
the incentives for public o¢ cials and citizens to coordinate to corrupt. Repeated
interactions will allow public o¢ cials and citizens to form beliefs about how the
others will behave, thus facilitating coordination of corruption. Frequent job ro-
tations among public o¢ cials, prohibiting family members from participating or
regulators from indirectly getting involved in bidding in public procurement auc-
tions may prevent networks of cronyism among policy makers, public o¢ cials, and
citizens, thus reducing the incentives to corrupt (e.g. the case of Venice). Hence,
randomized instead of organized matching and fewer networks between public of-
cials and citizens may prevent coordination to corrupt. Incentive mechanism
designs must also change negative reinforcement of non-corrupt institutions. In
other words, non-corrupt behaviors must be rewarded with higher payo¤s in the
following periods. Also, good reputation of public o¢ cials or citizens must be
rewarding rather than harmful. Non-corrupt institutions must bring economic
gains in terms of better public services and higher national economic performance,
and thus, a higher standard of living. As long as an institution remains negatively
self-reinforcing, no institutional change can be expected. Other incentive mecha-
nism designs include collective punishments and rewards based on past behaviors
of all, rather than only a few players, and the internalization of greater social
identities (e.g. Venice). For example, a public o¢ cial should identify him/herself
as a public o¢ cial and a law enforcer who serves the country, instead of just a
public o¢ cial. In the worst possible case, a completely new system, including
new norms, new beliefs, new rules, new organizations, and new implied behaviors,
must be introduced. The theory of endogenous institutional change enables us to
nd an incentive mechanism design that creates an environment where change of
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institutions can occur. We argue that in the long-run a stable improvement in the
qualities of institutions and welfare relies on the self-reinforcement factors.
2.5 Endogenous Institutions in the Decentralization Pe-
riod in Indonesia
We have seen in Example 1 and 2 above how an institution may or may not
self-reinforce cooperative behaviors. In the context of endogenous institutions,
we formalize evidence gathered from our eld survey conducted in Indonesia be-
tween June 9 and July 31, 2008, in ve districts in Indonesia2. During this eld
study, we interviewed local key informants in each district to collect primary data
on local capture, local leadership, and participation level. We also collected sec-
ondary data on social indicators. Specic indicators, including questions asked
of various local key informants, for these four variables are given in Appendix I.
In this section, we are going to combine Greifs game theoretical approach to en-
dogenous institutions as it is described in the previous section with the typology
of leadership model by Azis (2008) (see Appendix II). The table in Appendix II
shows the topology of leadership of the original model (Azis, 2008). By combin-
ing these models, we attempt to better illustrate the endogeneity of institutions
in the context of Indonesian institutions during the post-decentralization period,
in which institutional constraints take e¤ect mainly in the forms of high degree of
local capture and other changes in political structures, particularly with regards
2The following section is based on the eld survey on the e¤ect of local capture on welfare
in the post decentralization era in Indonesia, conducted between June 9 - July 31 2008 in ve
districts in Indonesia (see Azis and Wihardja, 2008). See Appendix I for how the eld survey
was conducted and the summary of primary and secondary data on the ve districts collected
during the eld study.
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to local elections. By quality of leadership (Azis, 2008), we mean the integrity of
local leader. By quantity of local leadership, we mean the degree to which a leader
is e¤ective in generating local revenues and economic growth. A Type-A leader
is one who could increase local budget under some degrees of local capture. A
Type-B leader is one who uses the benets of local capture for his/her own private
benet and thus, does not contribute to the local budget. A Type-C leader is one
who does not only use the benet of local capture for his/her own private benet,
but also corrupts the local budget, such as a kleptocratic local government.
We nd a correlation between various social indicators and institutional ele-
ments, namely local capture, local leadership, and participation level. To test for
causality, we lag the time for the variables on socioeconomic conditions. We nd
a correlation between socioeconomic conditions in the pre- and early decentral-
ization period and institutional elements, namely, local leadership, participation
level, and the e¤ect of local capture on welfare in the post-decentralization period,
suggesting the endogeneity of institutions. To explain this correlation, we provide
a theoretical model that illustrates the evolution between welfare and qualities of
institutions in the presence of some self-reinforcement factors that may generate
di¤erent types of progresses in the long run. In this model, institutions are endoge-
nous and the manner in which institutions and welfare evolve is a¤ected by some
self-reinforcement factors that depend on initial welfare and past institutions.
The model in this paper also shows how one could endogenize the participation
level and local leadership assumed to be exogenous in Azis, 2008. It could also ex-
plain the persistence of low welfare and poor-quality institutions in some districts
in Indonesia in the presence of negative self-reinforcement or self-undermining fac-
tors, such as low education. How these self-reinforcement factors could generate
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the evolution between welfare and qualities of institutions is illustrated in the game-
theoretical approach in the previous section. (Also see the term "persistence" of a
dysfunctional institution in Acemoglu, D., 2008). We argue that starting with an
initial welfare, a district is associated with some socioeconomic factors, such as the
level of education and political awareness of the citizens, that could be the nega-
tive, neutral, or positive self-reinforcement factors to the progress of the district.
These self-reinforcement factors generate certain institutional complexes, such as
local accountability, local capture, participation level, and the local leadership.
These institutional complexes along with exogenous factors in turn a¤ect welfare
in the next period.
We nd that in the presence of self-reinforcement factors, the evolution between
welfare and qualities of institutions that could persist may be associated with com-
plete, incomplete, stagnant, or deteriorating progress as discussed in Azis, 2008.
We propose that the initial welfare and past institutions a¤ect future institutional
trajectory through election of local leadership, the e¤ect of local capture on social
welfare, the participation level and so on. The self-reinforcement factors in Greifs
model on endogenous institutions help to explain the self-reinforcing forces behind
the di¤erent types of progress discussed in Azis, 2008.
From the eld survey, we observe that of the ve districts studies in Indonesia,
one of them, Manggarai Barat, is identied to have deteriorating progress. By
deteriorating progress, we mean that this district experiences the negative e¤ects
from increasing local capture on welfare in the post-decentralization era because of
incompetent leadership and high levels of poverty as well as low participation levels
that can be associated with uneducated and politically uninformed citizens. Two
districts (Prabumulih and Sragen) are identied with stagnant progress, mean-
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ing negative local capture is present with relatively moderate poverty levels but
low quality of local leadership. Prabumulih is an oil-and-gas producing region,
although corruption among local leaders is pervasive as is evident from the re-
cent records of legal corruption charges among public o¢ cials, including heads of
departments. Sragen has local program aimed at reducing poverty rates, unem-
ployment rates, and improving infrastructures even though the quality of local
leadership is ranked low based on our in-depth interviews. The other two districts
are characterized by complete progress, meaning they experience positive e¤ects
from increasing local capture on welfare in the post decentralization era because
of competent leadership and low poverty levels as well as high participation levels
that can be associated with educated and politically informed citizens.
From our observation, the district identied with deteriorating progress is a
poorly developed region with a high poverty rate above 25%, poor basic infrastruc-
tures, and a below-average literacy level below 90%, as well as low Human Develop-
ment Indexes of below 70. Its economic condition is characterized by low GRPDs
per capita excluding oil and gas of below Rp.2 million and a low ratio of the local
revenue to the total local budget of below 5% implying a high dependency on the
central governments funds. Moreover, besides having poor social and economic
conditions, this less developed district also tends to have ow participation levels
and a high intimidation level as compared to more developed regions. However,
these might be the endogenous e¤ects of having poorly educated and politically
unaware citizens who elect bad local leaders.
In order to determine the causality of social conditions on institutions, we take
di¤erent social indicators including the 1999 Human Development Index, the 1999
Human Poverty Index, the 2000 Infant Mortality Rate, and the 2003 Literacy Rate
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(see Appendix III) and plot them against institutional indicators from our eld
study, namely local capture, local leadership and participation level. These graphs
show some evidence that poor social conditions negatively a¤ect institutional ele-
ments. The causality between welfare and institutions in the post-decentralization
era is harder to determine because there has not been data since the decentral-
ization. Moreover, changes in institutional elements take time. In the evolution
process, local leadership, participation level and local capture will constitute the
new institutional elements of a district, which in turn a¤ect welfare in the next
period. Welfare endogenously a¤ects the new institution, and so this become an
evolutionary process. In the following section, we will enrich Greifs theory of
endogenous institutional change by combining it with Azismodel to explain the
phenomenon of endogenous institutions in Indonesia, taking initial socioeconomic
conditions and past institutions as the initial determinants of future and long-run
institutional trajectory.
2.5.1 Decentralization in the Midst of Political and Eco-
nomic Crisis
Some literature suggests that the decentralization in Indonesia is predicted as a
derivative of the fall of an autocratic ruler and it took place to appease peoples
hostility over the 1997-1998 nancial crisis. The regional autonomy tax was passed
under high uncertainties, in which political hostility showered GOLKAR, which
was the political party of the then president of Indonesia, the armed forces, and the
then president himself. Relying on information from political experts, under these
uncertain circumstances, the then president was convinced that decentralization
would save him from electoral supports at the sub-national level, thus the law
108
was passed. Consistent with the theories that argue decentralization constraints
Leviathans and promotes competitions and that decentralization is a predictable
outcome of a fall of autocratic rule, the extreme decision to decentralize might have
occurred under pressures to save old authoritarian-era legislators from political
hostilities. Furthermore, it served to appease the peoples hostility during the
1997 nancial and political crisis to win electoral votes without much thoughts
to consequences. Some literature already suggests that decentralization in poor
developing countries proves to be stable.
As Alesina and Spolaore (2005) predict, "in practice, the discussion of what
form of decentralization to adopt is also related to the level of development... coun-
tries with a low level of development may simply not be able to leave to localities
independent handling of public nance... especially in poor and rural regions of
developing countries, central government intervention may be unavoidable for rea-
son of technical competence... underestimating this problem may lead to serious
problems from poor institutional design" (p.142). Decentralization in Indonesia
may worsen welfare through low-quality institutions in low-welfare districts.
Although decentralization and democracy are two separate concepts, the fall of
the autocratic ruler brings a more democratic environment to the post-decentralization
period in Indonesia. Przeworski (2005) argues that democracy in poor countries
is not stable because the marginal utility of rich political leaders in defaulting in
electoral result and separating from the newly elected government to dictate is
lower than the cost of losing freedom, while the marginal utility of poor political
leaders in doing so is higher than the cost of losing freedom if utilities of political
leaders are concave. Thus, democracy is not stable in poor countries. Although
the political environment becomes more democratic in the post-decentralization
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period, this e¤ect seems to be eroded by a higher degree of local capture because
of the closer political distance between local leaders and local elites. Our model
in the last sub-section may explain why democracy under a high degree of local
capture might be unstable.
2.5.2 How Past Institutions and Initial Conditions A¤ect
Institutional Trajectories?
As we have seen, an "institution" is described by Greif as a system that consists
of rules, organizations, beliefs and internalized norms, and implied regularity of
behaviors. This system is in equilibrium if the implied regularity of behaviors to
follow the rules are best-responses to the beliefs and internalized norms that are
formed. Many policies in Indonesia, for example, the policies that were erected
after the decentralization in 1999, failed to achieve their objectives simply because
the institution was not in equilibrium. The following tables (Table 2.1-2.4) illus-
trate how some policies that were regulated in recent years in Indonesia might fail
or succeed to be in equilibrium as it is dened in Greifs model, and hence fail or
succeed to achieve their objectives.
Table 2.1: Examples of Institutions in Indonesia - Rule
Rule
1 Issuing business licenses
Ministerial Decree of Home A¤airs, No.24, 06
2 National regulations on ring workers ("pesangon")
(National Law No.13, 03, Ch.IX-X)
3. Amendments regarding conducts of Public Procurement Auctions
Presidential Decrees No. 80, 03 and Instructions No.8, 06
These are simple examples of institutions in disequilibrium as described in Greif
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Table 2.2: Examples of Institutions in Indonesia - Organization
Organization
1. One-Stop-Service (OSS)
Local businesses
2. Private companies
Central government
Business Associations
3. Procurement Committee
Bidders
Table 2.3: Examples of Institutions in Indonesia - Belief and Internalized Norm
Belief and Internalized Norm
1. Business license issuance involves bribes and cronyism
Business license issuance does not involve bribes and cronyism
2. Recession will occur
Recession will not occur
3. Procurement committee could be bribed; punishment are ine¤ective
Procurement committee could not be bribed;punishments are e¤ective
(2006) and are presently evident in Indonesia. For instance, after the issuance of
a national regulation requiring private rms to provide monetary benets should
they re a permanent worker, private rms now hire their workers only temporarily
in fear that there will be another nancial crisis in the near future that they will
have to re workers. The regulation that was intended to increase the welfare of
workers thus backred.
From the evidence of the eld survey, we build a model that combines Greifs
institutional change theory and Aziss typology of leadership. The evidence of
the eld study enriches both models by providing institutional details and real-life
examples. We will rst explore the social, economic, and political explanations
underlying the disparity in local capture, participation level, and local leadership
between less developed and more developed countries. We will use Greifs insti-
tutional dynamic process and game-theoretical approach to explain institutional
change and institutional trajectories as functions of past institutions and initial
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Table 2.4: Examples of Institutions in Indonesia - Implied Behavior
Implied Regularity of Behavior (failures and successes)
1.Bribe-taking activities occur, investment decreases
Bribe-taking activities do not occur, investment increases
2.Companies hire workers temporarily
Companies continue to hire permanently
3.Mark-ups and kick-backs continue to be pervasive
Start procuring goods and services according to the laws
conditions that endogenize the type of local leadership and the e¤ect of local cap-
ture on social welfare as well as participation level through self-reinforcement fac-
tors. Endogenous variables in this process are the institutional elements, namely
local leadership, local capture, and participation level, while the quasi-parameters
are the time-variant payo¤s of local leaders, local elites and citizens. These time-
variant quasi-parameters are the self-reinforcement factors that can be associated
with di¤erent levels of welfare, that depend on socioeconomic conditions, such as
the level of education, political and health awareness of the citizens. Uneducated
citizens who are incapable of participating in government social programs provide
less incentive for local leaders and local elites to implement social programs be-
cause of high costs of educating the citizens to make the programs work e¤ectively.
Establishing a health care program might incur losses in the long-run if the citizens
believe in magical doctors (or Dukun in Indonesian) instead of medical doctors.
In some parts of the paper, we will regard interchangeably the quasi-parameter
and the underlying factors of the quasi-parameter, such as the level of education,
as the self-reinforcement factors.
Greif (2006) argues that past institutions a¤ect the evolutionary process of a
new institution through three factors: environment, inclusion, and coordination
e¤ects that play roles in determining future trajectories of institutional change as
a function of past institutions. Environment e¤ects explain why institutions that
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could better adapt to the past institutions are more likely to be adopted as new
institutions. Inclusion e¤ects explain why past institutions rather than new in-
stitutions are more likely to be adopted as new institutions. Coordination e¤ects
explain why past institutions are focal points in the case of multiple selections
under the new institutions. The tables below (Table 2.5-2.6) set the initial condi-
tions and the three e¤ects on institutional change as a function of past institutions.
Table 2.7-2.8 show the initial conditions for less and more developed regions, and
possible outcomes that arise based on both the initial conditions and past institu-
tions. As mentioned above, past institutions create fundamental asymmetry and,
together with initial conditions, generate certain institutional complexes. Given
past institutions and initial conditions, certain self-reinforcement factors arise that
determining the evolution of institutions and welfare.
Table 2.5: Indicators of Initial Social Conditions
Initial Social Conditions Indicators
Social Indicators Poverty Level
Education
Health
Unemployment
Table 2.6: Past Institutions
E¤ects Sub-indicators Explanations
Environment Political The role of central government
The role of local government
The role of (local) Peoples Representative Body
Social National social insurance programs
National micro-nance programs
Inclusion Institutional The past local capture
The past corruption/collusion/nepotism
Coordination Legal system The reward and punishment/ other legal system
In these tables, we show that all ve districts are a¤ected by the past insti-
tutions equivalently. However, the ve districts are a¤ected di¤erently by their
initial social conditions. We argue that di¤erent initial social conditions are as-
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Table 2.7: Initial Social Conditions and Past Institutions - Less (More) Developed
Regions
Past institutional e¤ects Less (More) Developed Regions
& Initial conditions
Initial Social Conditions High (Low) poverty level, IMR,
unemployment; low (high) literacy rate
Environment (political and social) The persistence of central government control
An increase in the role of local leaders
A less e¤ective role of Peoples Rep. Body
Continued national social programs
Continued national micro-nance programs
Inclusion (institutional) An increase in local capture
Inherited past corruption/collusion/nepotism
Coordination (legal system) Continued ine¤ective legal punishments
Table 2.8: Possible Outcomes - Less (More) Developed Regions
Possible Outcomes in Less (More) Developed Regions
a. Social and micro-nance programs are ine¢ cient (e¢ cient)
b. Low (High) quantity-quality local leaders are elected
because of low (high) political awareness of the citizens
c. Policies tend to be top-down (bottom-up)
d. Citizens do not (do) serve as a controlling body
e. Participation level is low (high) , access to information is poor (easy),
and intimidation level is high (low)
f. The e¤ect of local capture on social welfare is negative (positive)
because local accountability is low (high) (c, d and e)
=> Deteriorating (Complete) progress; Incomplete (stagnant) progress,
if quantity-quality of local leadership is high (low)
sociated with di¤erent self-reinforcement factors that could develop into di¤erent
institutional complexes. A district with a high poverty level can be associated
with low education and low political as well as health awareness of the citizens,
thus generating payo¤s to the local leaders and local elites as well as the citizens
from cooperation in such a way that leads to negative local capture. Low qual-
ities of institutions because of negative self-reinforcement factors generate lower
welfare in the next period. The existence of negative self-reinforcement factors,
such as low level of education and low political and health awareness, can make
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the evolution between low welfare and poor qualities of institutions persist in the
long-run. We will call this "deteriorating" progress (Azis, 2008). Conversely, the
existence of positive self-reinforcement factors, such as the high level of education
and high political and health awareness, can make the evolution between high wel-
fare and high qualities of institutions to persist in the long-run. We will call this
"complete" progress. In the case of the less to moderately developed region, in
which high quantity-quality of local leadership emerges, it will be termed "incom-
plete" progress. In the case of moderately to more developed region, in which low
quantity-quality of local leadership emerges, it will be termed "stagnant" progress.
Based on our eld study, we argue that "incomplete" progress is unstable, and
a region in this state will eventually fall into either complete, deteriorating, or
stagnant progress.
2.5.3 Evidence of Endogenous Institutions
The results from the eld survey show that based on the typology of Azis (2008),
the less developed regions as dened in the above section of the ve districts
studied are associated with deteriorating progress, the more developed regions are
associated with complete progress, and the more developed region with low quality
of local leadership is associated with stagnant progress. None fall into incomplete
progress. In Figure 1, we show that the net e¤ect of local capture is correlated
to the social conditions3. Social conditions are measured by poverty rate, IMR,
3The indicator on "local capture" in areas of public procurement auctions, local regulations,
and social programs as specied in the questionnaires of the eld study measures the e¤ects
of the relationship between local leaders and local elites in these three areas. This indicator,
however, measures the intensity of "negative" local capture by the designs of the questions
while the intensity of the "positive" local capture is captured from the questions on the quality
of leadership in organizing social programs and the quantity of leadership in generating and
managing local revenues and GRDP growth by establishing relationships with private sectors.
The latter indicators question how local leaders use their relationship with private sectors to
115
Figure 2.1: Social Conditions (2008) vs. Net E¤ect of Local Capture (2008)
Figure 2.2: Social Conditions (2008) vs. Leadership (2008)
literacy rate, and unemployment rate. We also show correlations between local
leadership and social conditions (Figure 2). Participation level is also positively
correlated with social conditions (Figure 3).
Although we cannot determine the causality of these variables, we show that
various social indicators in the pre-decentralization or early post-decentralization
periods a¤ect the net e¤ect of local capture on welfare, local leadership and partic-
ipation level in the post-decentralization period. We show that the high Human
Poverty Index in 1999 is associated with negative net e¤ects of local capture on
increase local revenues and economic growth as well as to implement social programs. The net
e¤ect of local capture is equal to positive local capture minus negative local capture.
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Figure 2.3: Social Conditions (2008) vs. Participation (2008)
Figure 2.4: HDI(1999) vs. Local Capture (2008)
welfare (Figure 5), low quality-quantity local leadership (Figure 9), and low partic-
ipation level (Figure 13). Other plots (Figure 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15), except
for literacy rates, show the relationships between these social indicators in 1999,
2000, and 2003 and institutional elements in 2008 that support our hypothesis that
poor social conditions are associated with low quality institutions, and vice versa.
They further show that social conditions in current period could a¤ect qualities of
institutional elements in the future.
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Figure 2.5: HPI (1999) vs. Local Capture (2008)
Figure 2.6: Literacy Rate (2003) vs. Local Capture (2008)
Figure 2.7: IMR(2000) vs. Local Capture (2008)
118
Figure 2.8: HDI(1999) vs.Leadership (2008)
Figure 2.9: HPI (1999) vs. Leadership (2008)
Figure 2.10: Literacy Rate (2003) vs. Leadership (2008)
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Figure 2.11: IMR(2000) vs. Leadership (2008)
Figure 2.12: HDI(1999) vs. Participation (2008)
Figure 2.13: HPI(1999) vs. Participation (2008)
120
Figure 2.14: Literacy Rate (2003) vs. Participation (2008)
Figure 2.15: IMR(2000) vs. Participation (2008)
2.5.4 Proposition on The Endogenous Institutional Change
Model
In this section, we will show an example of how institutions can be endogenized,
leading to long-run progress or a persistence in the evolution between welfare and
institutions. We will assume that initial conditions consist of the socioeconomic
conditions and past institutions as we have in the previous section. Participation
level, local leadership, the net e¤ect of local capture are considered endogenous
variables. This is slightly di¤erent from the typology of leadership model in
Azis, 2008, in which local leadership is exogenous. In the example that follows we
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show how the presence of self-reinforcement factors associated with di¤erent initial
conditions could reinforce di¤erent types of progress.
The ve districts surveyed are categorized into four types of institutions, which
we will call Institution 1, weak Institution 1, and Institution 2 as well as weak In-
stitution 2. These categories are distinguished by their self-reinforcement factors
and institutional complexes. In other words, the four types of institutions are
di¤erent with regards to their initial socioeconomic conditions that create di¤erent
self-reinforcement factors and institutional elements, namely local leadership, local
capture, and participation level. Institution 1 is associated with good socioeco-
nomic conditions, positive self-reinforcement factors, and positive institutional el-
ements, namely high quantity-quality of local leadership, high participation level,
and positive net e¤ect of local capture on welfare. Institution 2 is associated
with poor socioeconomic conditions, negative self-reinforcement factors, and neg-
ative institutional elements, namely low quantity-quality of local leadership, low
participation level, and negative net e¤ect of local capture on welfare. Weak
Institution 1 is associated with moderate socioeconomic conditions and neutral
self-reinforcement factors, but is associated with negative institutional elements,
namely low quality of local leadership (Type B/C), low participation level, and
negative net e¤ect of local capture on welfare. Weak Institution 2 is associated
with moderate socioeconomic conditions and neutral self-reinforcement factors, but
is associated with positive institutional elements, namely high quantity-quality of
local leadership, high participation level, and positive net e¤ect of local capture
on welfare. Although there are four types of institutions that we consider, none
of the ve districts we studied falls into the category of weak Institution 2.
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Four types of Institutions: Institution 1, Weak Institution 1, Institution
2, and Weak Institution 2 We divide institutions in the ve districts studied
into four types. Institution 1 is associated with high levels of initial socioeconomic
conditions, high participation level, and high quantity and/or quality leadership
(Type A) as well as positive net e¤ect of local capture on welfare (Table 2.9)4.
Table 2.9: Institution 1 - Initial Conditions
Institution 1 Initial conditions
1 Low poverty rate
2 Low inequality
3 Other social indicators: low IMR,
high literacy rate, low unemployment rate
4 High quantity-quality of local leadership
5 High participation level
6 Positive local capture
Examples of districts that fall into the "Institution 1" category based on our
eld study are Balikpapan and Yogyakarta City (Table 2.10). Based on the
evaluations of indicators (see Appendix I), these two regions receive the following
values for indicators in socioeconomic conditions, participation level, and local
leadership as well as the net e¤ect of local capture on welfare:
Weak Institution 1 is characterized by moderate socioeconomic conditions but
low participation level, and low quality of local leadership (Type B/C) as well as
negative net e¤ect of local capture on welfare. Two districts that fall into the
"Weak Institution 1" category are Prabumulih and Sragen (Table 2.11).
Institution 2 is associated with low initial socioeconomic conditions, low quantity-
quality of local leadership (Type C), low participation level, and negative net e¤ect
4We will exclude the inequality variable in our analysis because of a lack of data.
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Table 2.10: Institution 1 - Balikpapan and Yogyakarta City
IndicatorsnCity Balikpapan Yogyakarta City
Poverty Level 9.5 7.5
IMR 8.75 9
Literacy Rate 8.75 9
Unemployment Rate 8.75 8
Average Socioeconomic Conditions 8.91 (Good) 8.375 (Good)
Participation Rate 8.67 (High) 8.375 (High)
Local Leadership 8.125/7.33 (High/High) 8.125/7.33 (High/High)
Local Capture 3.5 (Positive) 1.92 (Positive)
Table 2.11: Weak Insitution 1 - Prabumulih and Sragen
IndicatorsnCity Prabumulih Sragen
Poverty level 7.3 2
IMR 1.5 5.5
Literacy rate 9.1 4.9
Unemployment 5.3 9.2
Average socioeconomic conditions 5.8 (Moderate) 5.4 (Moderate)
Participation Level 4.67 (Low) 4.5 (Low)
Local Leadership 2.875/4.57(Low/Low) 4.625/6 (Low/High)
Local Capture -2.5 (Negative) -2.17 (Negative)
of local capture on welfare (Table 2.12)5.
Table 2.12: Institution 2 - Initial conditions
Institution 2 Initial conditions
1 High poverty rate
2 High inequality
3 Other social indicators: high IMR,
low literacy rate, high unemployment rate
4 Low quantity-quality of local leadership
5 Low participation level
6 Negative local capture
A district that falls into the "Institution 2" category according to the eld
study is Manggarai Barat (Table 2.13). Based on the evaluations of indicators,
this region receives the following values for indicators in the initial socioeconomic
conditions, participation levels, local leadership, and the net e¤ect of local capture
5We will exclude the inequality variable in our analysis because of a lack of data.
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on welfare:
Table 2.13: Institution 2 - Manggarai Barat
IndicatorsnCity Manggarai Barat
Poverty Level 1.5
IMR 1.5
Literacy Rate 6.67
Unemployment Rate 8
Average Socioeconomic Conditions 4.4 (Bad)
Participation Level 3.167 (Low)
Local Leadership 4.125/3.67 (Low/Low)
Local Capture -3.92 (Negative)
None of the districts from our eld study falls into the "Weak Institution 2"
category. Weak Institution 2 might be less likely to arise than other institutions
because high quality of institutions in the long run will generate high socioeconomic
conditions. All types of Institutions are associated with the following factors
(Table 2.14):
Table 2.14: (Weak) Institution 1 & 2 - Common Factors
(Weak) Institution 1 & 2 Factors a¤ecting endogeneity
e¤ects on quasi parameters
1 Central governments role still exists
2 The role of local leaders increase
3 The role of DPRD become less e¤ective
4 National social programs and
micro-nance programs are present
5 Past local capture, corruption,
collusion, and nepotism continue to exist
6 Legal punishment/system is ine¤ective
Claim 2.1 The endogenous institutional e¤ect of the initial socioeconomic condi-
tions and the past institutions, namely the environment e¤ect, the inclusion e¤ect,
and the coordination e¤ect, are the participation level, the type of local leadership
,and the net e¤ect of local capture on welfare. In Institution 1, participation level
tends to be high, high quantity-quality leadership (Type A) is more likely to be
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elected, and the net e¤ect of local capture on welfare is positive. In Institution
2, participation level tends to be low, low quantity-quality leadership (Type C) is
more likely to be elected, and the net e¤ect of local capture on welfare is negative.
In weak Institution 1, participation level tends to be low, low quality leadership
is more likely to be elected (Type B or C), and the net e¤ect of local capture on
welfare is negative. In weak Institution 2, participation level tends to be high, high
quality leadership is more likely to be elected (A), and the net e¤ect of local capture
on welfare is positive.
The claim above is based on our eld study. In order to distinguish between
weak institutions 1 and 2, in which initial socioeconomic conditions are moderate,
we consider the specics of the initial conditions that make one institution have a
low quality of institution and the other a high quality of institution. For example,
weak institution 1 could be associated with regions that are rich in natural resources
thus reducing will to reform institutions. Conversely, weak institution 2 could
be associated with regions that are poor in natural resources, thus motivating
people to work harder to reform institutions. These examples also suggest that
initial conditions determine the capacity in which new institutions develop. For
example, a district with uneducated citizens and politically unaware voters, or
low participation of the citizens may not be capable of electing good leadership,
preventing the district from reforming.
The above primary and secondary data, which we collected during our eld
study, could not fully explain some contradicting observations that were derived
from other sources, such as the GRDP data from the Indonesias statistical body
collected outside the eld study. In the case Balikpapan, for example, the average
annual GRDP growth between 2000 and 2007 was nine percent, however, the
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growth in animal husbandry is seven percent, in forestry is minus one percent,
in forestry is two percent, in private social community services is four percent.
These are the sectors that could directly a¤ect the poorest of the poor societies.
The banking sector, which is a sector that is more likely to benet the higher
income groups of citizens grows at an average of thirty one percent annually. This
suggests an increasingly unequal society. In early April 2009, the reghting
service department and o¢ cials of the Balikpapan city administration were accused
of marking up the budget to procure reghting equipments and vehicles. Despite
the high score on local leadership including the local bureaucracy, Balikpapan is
not a city free of corruption. According to some news, East Balikpapan area
was also noted for being left-behind in terms of its development from the other
areas, especially the city areas. The glitters of the city areas might therefore
conceal the marginalized areas in Balikpapan, which were not observed during
our eld study. Ination was also generally higher than the national average
between 2002 and 2007, which could make poverty rate higher that what the o¢ cial
statistics revealed. Our observations from the eld study cannot fully explain
these anomalies. The limitations of our eld study in this case are insu¢ cient
participants who come from the poorest of the poor societies, a lack of comparisons
between the poor and the elites within Balikpapan instead of across districts with
respect to institutional access, and the length of time we observed the city.
Propositions on Endogenous Institutions in the Decentralization Period
in Indonesia
In order to illustrate that self-reinforcement factors could generate an evolution
between welfare and qualities of institutions, we assume that self-reinforcement
factors exist in the forms of di¤erences in the payo¤s from cooperation today
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and tomorrow. These time-variant payo¤s are what Greif calls quasi-parameters.
These quasi-parameters, we claim, are themselves endogenous, and are a¤ected by
the initial conditions and past institutions, namely the environment, inclusion, co-
ordination e¤ects. A higher payo¤ from cooperation tomorrow to some or all of the
players if there is cooperation today is associated with a positive self-reinforcement
factor, while a lower payo¤from cooperation tomorrow if there is cooperation today
is associated with a negative self-reinforcement factor. An unchanged payo¤ from
cooperation tomorrow if there is cooperation today is associated with a neutral
self-reinforcement factor.
We can now model Institution 1, weak Institution 1, and Institution 2 as a
game theoretical model of endogenous institutional change with quasi-parameters
(Greif, 2006). We will assume that weak Institution 2 is an unstable institution
that over time will fall into one of the other three types. As an illustration, we
take the three-player coordination game above. In this model, we see how self-
reinforcement factors rea¢ rm initial trajectories that lead to either a complete,
stagnant, or deteriorating progress through the incentives of the players to initi-
ate good cooperation (associated with positive local capture) or bad cooperation
(associated with negative local capture).
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Proposition 2.1 and 2.2
(Weak) Institution 1(2) at time t: a(t)-a(t-1)(<)0, a0=10
Good Cooperation(G) by Citizens(C):
LLnLE G B
G at,at,at 6,0,6
B 3-",4,4 6,6,-1
Bad Cooperation(B) by Citizens(C):
LLnLE G B
G 7,7,-1 3-",6,6
B 6,0,6 3,3,3
Rules at t: local regulations and central regulations (environment e¤ects)
Beliefs and norms at t: corruption/collusion/nepotism of
past institutions (inclusion e¤ects),
legal laws and punishment (coordination e¤ects)
Organizations at t: local leaders, local elites, citizens
Implied behaviors at t: G=Good Cooperation, B=Bad Cooperation
Take an example of Institution 1: Balikpapan. In this district, because the
initial socioeconomic conditions are high, citizens are capable of participating in
the political arena. Because the citizens are politically informed and participation
level is high, a high quantity-quality of leadership is elected (Type A). If the
local leader, the local elites, and the citizens cooperate, local capture is positive
and welfare increases. Because welfare increases, a better leader is elected in the
following period and participation level is higher. The payo¤ from all cooperating
in the next period is even higher. In the long run, more cooperation among the
local leader, local elites and citizens are established. This is evident from the
growing business activities with the supports of the local government.
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Take an example of Weak Institution 1: Prabumulih. In this district, despite
the high initial socioeconomic conditions because of oil and gas, quality of local
leader is low (Type B/C) and participation level is low. Cooperation by the local
leader and the local elites as well as the citizens does not increase welfare or even
decreases welfare because low quantity-quality of local leader reaps the benets
from cooperation or initiates projects for private gains. However, because the dis-
trict is rich in rubber, and other natural resources, the citizens are able to maintain
a moderate standard of living. It is known that villagers are able to maintain xed
incomes by working in rubber plantations and sharing the incomes with the own-
ers, while city dwellers are more likely to fall into poverty. There is no gain from
cooperation in the next period by cooperating in the current period. In the long
run, cooperation among local leader, local elites and citizens are stagnant.
Take an example of Institution 2: Manggarai Barat. In this district, the initial
socioeconomic condition is poor, participation level is low, and hence, quality of
local leadership is low (Type C). Cooperation today may result in bad projects,
such as the Aldira project in which cooperation by local leader, local elites, and
citizens to plant new Tapioca seeds fails because of the wrong choice of season (low
quality and unprofessional leaders without su¢ cient local accountability), thus
lowering welfare. An even worse quality local leader is elected in the following
period and participation level is lower. The gain from cooperation in the next
period is therefore lower. In the long run, less cooperation among local leader,
local elites and citizens are established. This is evident from the shrinking business
activities.
Although our eld study reveals no district that we study that falls into weak
Institution 2, a possible example of weak Institution is Blitar City, in which so-
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cioeconomic condition is moderate, and the local leadership is relatively good. We
might argue that weak institution 2 might arise despite poor natural resources be-
cause citizens work hard to establish high-quality institutions and because of this,
a good local leader is elected.
Proposition 2.1 In a three-player Coordination game of Example 3 above, under
Institution 1 and weak Institution 1, cooperative behaviors by local leaders, local
elites, and local citizens are (weakly) self-reinforcing for any discount factor.
Proof. Under positive self-reinforcement or neutral self-reinforcement, (G,G,G)
is a one-stage Nash equilibrium in each period. Hence, no unilateral deviation is
protable. Playing (G,G,G) in every period constitutes a sub-game perfect Nash
Equilibrium.
Proposition 2.2 In a three-player Coordination game of Example 3 above, under
Institution 2, cooperating is not self-reinforcing for any discount factor.
Proof. Under negative self-reinforcement, at some period t, (G,G,G) is no
longer a one-stage Nash equilibrium. The citizens at some period T will have an
incentive to deviate to playing B.
Although there is no observation of weak Institution 2, we claim that under
weak Institution 2, cooperative behaviors by local leaders, local elites, and local cit-
izens, are weakly self-reinforcing for any discount factor because socioeconomic con-
dition is only moderate in this district, which is possible only if self-reinforcement
is zero. Although both weak Institution 1 and 2 have zero self-reinforcement
factors, each has its own institutional complexes.
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Claim 2.2 In a three-player Coordination game of Example 3 above, under weak
Institution 2, cooperating is weakly self-reinforcing for any discount factor.
The evolution between welfare and qualities of institutions in the presence of
self-reinforcement factors is shown in Figure 16. In the long-run, Institution
1 can be associated with "complete" progress; Institution 2 can be associated
with "deteriorating" progress; weak Institution 1 and 2 can be associated with
"stagnant/ incomplete" progress respectively (Azis, 2008).
Figure 2.16: Evolution of Intitutions and Welfare
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2.5.5 The Path from Dictatorship to Democracy
The previous section shows how the quality of institutions is endogenous to the
level of welfare. We show a particular example of a poor district, in which some
negative self-reinforcement factors are present that will eventually deteriorate both
the quality of institutions and the welfare of the district resulting in declining
progress. From this result, we will show that the process towards democracy
from dictatorship in Indonesia will not be easy, and might lead to a more serious
outcome, such as a revolution. Sukma (2003) writes that the democratic regime
in Indonesia after three decades of dictatorship with no rule of law exists with no
democratic rule of game. There is still no e¤ective legal system nor a democratic
competition. Physical pressures and threats are still used as political weapons.
Local conicts cannot be resolved because, unlike the previous period, the military
cannot be used. These are de facto rules of the game in the post-Soeharto era in
Indonesia. After Indonesia decentralized, taking e¤ect in 2001, de jure democratic
rules consisted of direct local elections, decentralized scal policies, increased shares
of local revenues from local natural resources. It was out of a selsh political
motivation to appease the public that the decentralization law was passed right
after the political and economic turbulences in 1997-1998. At the time, that
local institutions were still very weak and socioeconomic conditions of the people
in many districts were still very poor. Instead of having a more democratic
political regime, in which there is a fair election, freedom to speak, and access of
information to the citizens, many regions experienced a reversal to democracy in
which the de jure democratic rule exists in the absence of a democratic rule of the
game. In many regions, especially poor districts, local leaders were elected by
poor, uneducated and uninformed citizens, making the local leader a local King
without accountability from above (central government) nor below (citizens).
133
Moreover, Indonesia decentralized at a time when the roots of corruption have
not been completely eliminated and the power of the old King has not truly van-
ished. Although there have been some e¤orts by a newly built independent anti-
corruption body (KPK in Indonesian) to reform, the post-Soeharto institutions,
most of which are inherited from the past, could not make a clean government
sustainable at the level of welfare of the people. One of the main reasons that the
culture inherited from the Soeharto era is di¢ cult to eliminate is that the political
change after the fall of Soeharto was not a complete change from the Soeharto
era, but an incrementalism (Cassing, 2000). The next appointed president was
one of his close associates and the new cabinet was full of his cronies and family.
Only political rivals could slowly change this. It is therefore not surprising that
the appointments of local district leaders and central government o¢ cials are not
completely free of inuence from the former regime. As a result, instead of uproot-
ing corruption, corruption spreads to localities and lower level state departments
and organizations. Local capture as a result of closer political distance between
local elites and local leaders erodes the fruits of the new democratic regime, as
local elections are nanced by local elites who capture local policies after the seats
are won.
We are going to show a simple example of what could happen if de jure de-
mocratic regime exists with lawless rules of game. There might be a revolution
in which the democratic system collapses. Suppose there are three players in this
game: a local leader, a local elite, and a local citizen. For simplicity, the local
leader distributes c portion of the local revenues, R, in each period to the citizen.
Because central government taxes regions after the decentralization not on local
revenues but on local expenditures, the taxes owed to the central government is
t, the tax rate, times whatever is left for the local government expenditure, (1-
134
c)R, which is equal to t(1-c)R. Hence, the net local government expenditure is
(1-t)(1-c)R, which we assume can be used by the local leader to buy ballots, -
nance personal legal cases, or repay debts to campaign contributors namely the
local elite. In each period, the local elite makes an investment in political power,
I, that is a function of the net local government expenditure, (1-t)(1-c)Rt. The
higher the net local government expenditure, the higher one invests in political
power because the expected share by cooperating with the local leader is higher.
In this case, suppose local elites invest in political power for their own benet
and not the benet of the citizen, in which case they will invest more if the ex-
pected wealth is less. For simplicity, assume that I t=i(1-t)(1-c)Rt, where i0.
The parameter i may measure the political distance of the local elite to the local
leader. The closer the political distance, the higher i is because there is a higher
probability that cooperation with the local leader results in a protable outcome
for the local elite. Because of this cooperation, local capture can be negative or
positive depending on the participation level of the citizen. The participation
level of the citizen depends on the level of welfare of the citizen in the previous
period, because, as we have shown, participation level is endogenous with respect
to the level of welfare of the citizen. For example, more educated citizens could
participate more. Assume that the participation level is P t=pW t 1, where p0
Moreover, the local revenue R is a function of the social condition of the citizen,
which is a function of the level of welfare of the citizen in the previous period. For
example, healthier citizens are more productive. Assume that Rt=W t 1. The
welfare of the citizen is the sum of the local governments transfers plus the e¤ect
from local capture that can be either negative or positive. The welfare of the
citizen can be written as follows:
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Wt = cRt + (Pt   k)(It)
This says that the degree of local capture that a¤ects the citizen is equal to the
investment in political power made by the local elites weighted by the degree of
local accountability that is equal to the participation level minus a constant k.
If the participation level is above the critical level k, then investment in political
power is positive, while it is negative if the participation level is below this critical
level k. Thus, cooperation between a local leader and a local elite without su¢ cient
local accountability from the citizen usually becomes detrimental to the citizen.
The constant k measures the underlying formal and informal institutions that
regulate cooperation by local leader and local elite, other than the participation of
the citizens. Higher values of k correspond to higher levels of participation needed
to induce positive local capture, or they may mean weak formal legal institutions,
for example. By our assumption, we can write the welfare of the citizen as
follow:
Wt = cWt 1 + (p(Wt 1)  k))(i(1  t)(1  c)Wt 1)
Wt = (c  ki(1  t)(1  c))Wt 1 + (pi(1  t)(1  c)(Wt 1)2)
Consider the following case:
(c  ki(1  t)(1  c))  0
pi(1  t)(1  c)  0
The second inequality is always true for p and i greater than or equal to zero, and
t and c less than or equal to one. Re-arranging the rst inequality:
c  ki(1  t)
1 + ki(1  t)
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In this case, the portion of the local revenue that is distributed to the citizen
is small enough compared to the degree of negative local capture, ki, and the
portion of the local revenues minus the distribution to the citizens that goes to
the local government, (1-t). The lower the portion of local revenue distributed to
the citizen, the more likely that the inequality holds. The higher the degree of
negative local capture, ki, and/or the higher the portion of the local revenues less
the distributions to the citizens that goes to the local government, (1-t), the more
likely that the inequality holds. Figure 17 plots the possible trajectory of welfare
over time given these two inequalities hold:
Figure 2.17: The Process to Revolution
What we see from the graph is a declining level of welfare to the point zero if
W0 is small enough. At W=0, a revolution could occur, in which case people will
become dissatised enough and revolt. A breakdown of democracy and another
institutional change might occur.
137
2.6 Policy Recommendation
From the previous result, we introduce new insights on institutional reform.
Initial welfare entails di¤erent institutional complexes that set di¤erent capaci-
ties to reform. Our results have two major policy implications. One is that
institutional reform must ensure some level of welfare in which high qualities of in-
stitutions will be sustainable. E¤orts to reform institutions may therefore include
ensuring that low-ranked public o¢ cials receive su¢ cient wages and other welfare
benets to support their families. Well-paid public o¢ cials could also corrupt,
as is evident in developed countries, but we argue that not paying public o¢ cials
su¢ ciently could exacerbate institutional problems. In the context of Indone-
sia, Seda (2001) inserts, "although Soeharto is no longer in power today, however,
petty corruption in the Indonesian government as well as in society at large is
very likely to continue for a long time. There are several sets of conditions that
are conducive for corruption to endure (King 2000:608). One set of conditions
pertains to the social economic status of government bureaucrats. Their salaries
are notoriously low and have not kept pace with the cost of living, particularly in
the major cities."
Second, because initial welfare is associated with di¤erent institutional com-
plexes and set di¤erent capacities to reform, institutional reform must be targeted
di¤erently among di¤erent districts. In the case of a very poor district, for exam-
ple, before institutional reform can occur, citizens must be capable of participating
in the social programs. We call this type of institutional reform a welfare-based
approach.
It is also important to note that in order to change an endogenous system, policy
reforms need to be multidimensional. Policy reforms will only work to change an
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evolution between low welfare and poor quality of institution if it is approached
from multiple angles, improving both welfare and quality of institution. Myrdal
(1944) wrote, "a rational policy will never work by changing only one factor"
(p.77). This is particularly true in the case of an endogenous system. In order for
the system to work well, these two variables must reinforce each other. Moreover,
Greif (2006) writes that,"rather than focusing only on helping countries specify
rules, it will have to seek to change organizations, beliefs, and intertransactional
linkages" (p.403).
One important observation that we made during the eld study was that cor-
rupt poor districts tend to carry many mega or white-elephant projects despite
the rampant poverty. It has been known that white elephant or mega projects
may elicit high mark-ups because of their size and value and these illegal payments
are shared between the local government and the local elites who implement the
projects. It is therefore recommended that independent watchdogs be able to
recognize this.
Endogenous institution creates an evolution between welfare and qualities of
institutions. In order to break the cycle, an exogenous shock is sometimes needed.
This shock may come from outside the system, such as a natural disaster (e.g., the
case of Aceh) or adopting Western or formal style institutions, or it may come from
within, such as a sudden demand for a change or "voice" (Hirschman, 1970), such
as a revolution. Dixit (2004) writes that the institutional reform is often faced
with the question of whether to adopt Western laws or to keep local customs, or,
in other words, whether to induce external shock therapy or to allow gradualism.
However, he argues that typically, the best choice is a subtle combination. In some
cases, in Indonesia, for example, exogenous shocks from outside the system such
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as modern medical treatment without adjustment to the local customs, in this
instance traditional medical treatment, might not work. A health care program
that gives free health care services might not work if the local people do not believe
in medical treatment but believe in magical treatment (or Dukun, in Indonesian).
Again, it must be adjusted to the institutional complexes, namely cultural beliefs,
norms, and social as well as political conditions. Dixit (2004) further calls for
the need of country-specic knowledge to generate policy prescription for a one
specic country. Hence, institutional reforms must also be context-based.
Dixit (2008) argues that a relation-based contract enforcement that is based
on localization of information and honesty is not sustainable after some level of
development, or some size of economic activities because of constraints on commu-
nication technology. Because of this, middle-income countries, such as Indonesia,
might be trapped in a situation in which relationship-based contract enforcement
no longer works, but the size of the economic activities or level of development is
not big enough to a¤ord a rule-based contract enforcement. Moreover, issues sur-
rounding collective action and political incentives of those who stand to lose from
a change in institutions make institutional transition still more di¢ cult. In most
cases, the relation- and rule-based systems coexist. Dixit argues that the best
combination between relation- and rule-based systems will depend on the history
and economic prospects of each country. In the context of Indonesia, institutions
are still dominated by relation-based systems.
We discuss the importance of participation level in determining the long-run
progress of a district in Indonesia6. The importance of participation level in curb-
6This argument is supported by an Analytical Network Process (see Appendix IV) that is
performed for each district that ranks the level of participation as the most inuential factor to
determine welfare among the poverty level and inequality given a network of factors that could
inuence welfare. ANP is a pairwise comparison - based analysis given a network of factors that
could determine a variable, which in this case is welfare. Authors opinions are used to make
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ing corruption is ingeniously captured by Serra (2008), who conducts an experi-
mental study on bribery games that show that combining bottom-up and top-down
monitoring on corruption is most e¤ective even if the institution is weak. Trust-
based, informal institutions may also help to attenuate institutional constraints
(Della -Giusta, 2008). Providing access of information to voters, thus avoiding a
narrow ow of information to only specic interest group is necessary (Economic
Review, RIETI, 2009). Some specic interests groups with access to the govern-
ment can overcome asymmetric information between the government and voters.
Hence, specic interest groups have an informational advantage over general voters
about government internal information in order to organize activities. However,
these specic groups could hurt the majority of voters by organizing activities that
serve the group interests only. In general, access of information to general voters
is necessary because the failure to retrieve government information could distort
the outcome of the election, and as a result, create a vicious cycle of bad leadership
and low welfare with poor and uninformed participation of voters.
In summary, policy implications on institutional reform are subtle. However,
this study highlights a few possible ways to reform. Institutional reform must
be welfare-based and context-based to allow adjustments to di¤erent institutional
complexes and capacities to reform as well as di¤erent cultural beliefs, norms,
political and social conditions. Due to the endogeneity of the system, it must
come from some exogenous shocks such as formal (or rule-based) institutions. It
might be that these exogenous shocks come from a sudden demand for change or
revolution. Moreover, institutional reform must be multidimensional due to the
endogenous nature of the problem, requiring both variables, welfare and institu-
tions, to reinforce.
the pairwise comparisons.
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In the context of Indonesia during the post-decentralization period, reforms
must focus on local institutions. Due to the closer political distance between lo-
cal leaders and local elites and the political and scal transfer of authority from
the central government to the local leaders, the degree of local capture increases
and in many cases, local leaders become "local kings". Thus, one possible way
to reform both institutions and welfare is to have the central government intro-
duce incentive systems that both punish corrupt local leaders, for instance, by an
establishment of an anti-corruption body and reward districts that achieve some
targeted social indicators, for instance, giving awards to districts that are able to
consistently reduce poverty level. Another possibility could be to introduce a com-
bined top-down and bottom-up approach as is suggested by Serra (2008). Central
government must be able to provide legal rules to ensure participation of citizens
in regulating local policies, and must be able to empower the citizens to raise their
voices and demand for change (Hirschman, 1970). Relationship-based systems,
such as cooperation between local leaders and local elites, must be combined with
rule-based institutions. Thus, investments in rule-based institutions may also be
necessary. Because of the heterogeneity of Indonesian districts, welfare-based and
context-based approaches are also important.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we rst lay out a game theoretical model to illustrate the endoge-
nous system of institution through self-reinforcement factors based on Greif, 2006.
We then use real-life case studies gathered from our eld study in Indonesia to
rationalize our game theoretical model. We place this model in the context of
institutions in Indonesia, based on the past institutions and socioeconomic condi-
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tions of the districts we visited. We categorize these districts into di¤erent types
of institutions by their initial socioeconomic conditions based on the evidence from
our eld study, and propose possible institutional trajectories and progresses in the
long-run. We support our propositions by game theoretical analysis to model the
economic incentives for local leaders, local elites, and citizens to behave in a way
that could self-reinforce good or bad quality institutions.
We show that institutions are not exogenous and the policy implications on
institutional reform could be more complicated. Districts with low level of socioe-
conomic conditions have di¤erent institutional complexes than districts with high
level of socioeconomic conditions. Because of the poor socioeconomic conditions,
participation level tends to be high, local capture tends to hurt the citizens, and
quality of leadership tends to be low. Moreover, we agree with Greifs remark
(2006) that initial socioeconomic conditions and past institutions determine the
capacity of how an institution can change. E¤orts to reform may fail simply be-
cause poorly educated and politically unaware citizens do not have the capability
to participate in government programs or elect good local leaders. It is true that
wealthy countries also face issues of bad institutions. Hence, there are other fac-
tors aside from socioeconomic conditions that a¤ect institutions. However, we
argue that low level of welfare could make institutional reforms even more di¢ -
cult. For a policy recommendation, we suggest that institutional reforms be taken
di¤erently among regions with di¤erent levels of welfare, accounting for di¤erent
institutional complexes and capacities in which institutions are formed. We also
suggest that policies to reform endogenous institutions must be multidimensional
and exogenous to the system.
Our results on the diversity of progress among districts in Indonesia could
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be related to the Cai and Treisman (2005) paper in that these districts are not
homogeneously endowed. The fact that some regions have strong power of political
and business elites that tend to dominate both political and economic institutions
in this de jure democratic country may partly correspond to what Acemoglu and
Robinson (2002) call "captured democracy." In these districts, the de jure political
democracy has been captured by de facto investments by the elites. Democracy
in Indonesia might have been failing because it exists with a high degree of local
capture in the post-decentralization period. Barseghyan and Guerdjikova (2008),
Acemoglu et. al. (2002) might refer to a naturally rich but relatively poor district
like Prabumulih as experiencing a "reversal of fortune" or a curse of rich natural
resources. This is also evident in some districts in East Indonesia, especially those
with rich natural resources. In Barseghyan and Guerdjikova (2008), the cause of
reversal of fortune is related to the low bargaining power of the citizens.
The purpose of this paper is to understand the driving force behind the persis-
tence of low welfare and poor qualities of institutions. The game theoretical model
used in this paper merely illustrates how this driving force could self-reinforce or
self-undermine the existence and quality of an institution. A more sophisticated
game theoretical model could be useful to better understand the evolution of in-
stitutions.
Moreover, more empirical studies are needed to advance the studies on insti-
tutions. A more comprehensive district survey studied over a period of time and
more districts surveyed could improve the quality of our eld study. In a district
with rich natural resources, such as the city of Balikpapan, an unequal society is
more likely to emerge. The glitters of some parts of the city could easily conceal
the other parts of the city where the marginalized groups of citizens live. Hence,
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it is easier to conduct a biased interview by interviewing only those who are in the
circle of the elites while being completely blind to the marginalized society. A
higher number of participants from the poorest of the poor societies is necessary.
Interactive, deductive, inductive, context-specic, and evidence-based model com-
plemented by comparative and counterfactual analyses is the empirical method
that is proposed in Greif (2006), which we believe is the appropriate method to
use. Other methods, such as the Analytical Network Process, could enrich our
eld study.
There are two main reasons why neither pure deductive nor inductive method
alone is not su¢ cient to study institution: it cannot predict the endogenous out-
comes given a set of exogenous and observable features of the situation because of
a multiplicity of equilibria; and observable endogenous variables are not su¢ cient
to give a meaningful theoretical model of institution (Greif, 2006). Our model
could be improved by eliminating a multiplicity of outcomes or indeterminacy that
could still arise given an initial socioeconomic condition. For example, given a
moderate socioeconomic condition, both low and high quality of institution could
arise (Weak Institution 1 and 2). Moreover, it could be improved by distin-
guishing di¤erent types of beliefs, norms, other institutional elements that could
give rise to the same initial socioeconomic condition. For example, in the case
Prabumulih and Sragen, both districts have moderate socioeconomic conditions,
however, each of districts has di¤erent institutional elements that give rise to the
same level of socioeconomic condition. In the case of Prabumulih, rich natural
resources combined with poor quality of leadership yield moderate socioeconomic
condition. However, in the case of Sragen, moderate natural resources combined
with "forced" local government programmes yield moderate socioeconomic condi-
tion. In the long-run, these two districts will have di¤erent types of institutions
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and progress. This work is miniscule when compared to the works left to be done
in endogenous institutions and institutional reforms.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I: Summary Reports of Five Districts Field Survey in In-
donesia (summer 2008) (Azis and Wihardja, 2008)
The eld study is conducted in ve districts in Indonesia: Balikpapan in East
Kalimantan, Yogyakarta in D.I. Yogyakarta, Sragen in Central Java, Manggarai
Barat in NTB, and Prabumulih in South Sumatra. With the help of a local au-
tonomy watchdog, KPPOD, the author and a member of KPPOD visited each
district. In each district, we interviewed the Regent/Mayor (except in Prabu-
mulih), high-ranked public o¢ cials, political parties, oppositions such as losing
political candidates, business associations, NGOs, local media, and poor-family
card holders. We spent one to two hours for each interviews and three to one week
in each district. Questionnaires were prepared prior to the eld study that were
approved by Institution Review Board at Cornell University for condentiality of
the participants. All interviewed were tape-recorded and transcribed. After the
interviews, the author and eld researchers from KPPOD discussed to quantify
the results from the interviews into scale-based indicators. The primary indicator
table and secondary indicators are given below. The following guidelines are the
sample guidelines used to interview our participants. The results are in the tables
proceeding the guidelines.
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Indicators:
I. Primary Indicators:
Figure 2.18: Primary Indicator
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II. Secondary Indicators: (source)
1. Quantity of Welfare
a. Growth of RGDP in constant price (RGDP)
b. RGDP per capita in constant price (RGDP)
c. (PAD)/ (Total Budget APBD) (APBD)
d. Growth of (total) investment (Industry/Trade/Cooperative Dept., or others)
e. (Prot from BUMD)/PAD (APBD)
f. (Realized budget for 9-year compulsory education)/(Pop. 5-14 yrs old)
(APBD, City/Regency In Figures)
g. (Budget for road construction)/(#kms of roads severely damaged) (APBD,
City/Regency in Figures)
h. (Budget for health)/(the number of poor people) (APBD, City/Regency in
Figures)
2. Quality of Welfare
a. Human Development Index (City/Regency in Figures)
b. Poverty rate (Social Welfare Dept., or others)
c. Gini ratio (Social Welfare Dept. or others)
d. Infant Mortality Rate (Health Dept.)
e. Literacy Rate (Education Dept.)
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f. Crime rate (Social Welfare Dept.)
g. Unemployment (Human Resource Dept.)
h. Local public - private sector partnership in physical infrastructure construc-
tions (LKPJ)
i. Local public- private sector partnership in building joint-ventures (LKPJ)
j. Local public - private sector partnership in health sector (LKPJ)
k. Local public - private sector partnership in education (LKPJ)
l. Local public - private sector partnership in crime prevention (LKPJ)
m. Government programme in SMEs (micro-nance, soft-loans) (LKPJ)
3. Participation
a. Regular forum between local government and stakeholders (co¤ee morning,
etc) (LKPJ)
b. APBD publication in local media/website (Local Media/Website)
c. (#of female DPRD)/(Total #of DPRD) (DPRD)
d. Health, Education, and Poverty Reduction (Social Welfare Dept. and other
Dept.s)
e. Information to govprograms in health, education, and poverty reduction
(LKPJ)
Note:
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PAD=local revenues, APBD= local budget
BUMN= state companies, LKPJ=Responsibility Boldness Report
DPRD=local Peoples Representatives Body
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Sample Guideline for Interview 1:
Assessment Sheets(For Regents/Mayors)
Interviews should be conducted with 4-5 questions (1-hour). The three topics
that should be kept in mind when interviewing are:
A. The motives of Regents/Mayors in establishing relationship with local
businesses: private or public interest?
B. Vision and Mission: what are the notable achievements?
C. Background: is the Regent/Mayor used to be a local businessman who
might be very skilled in establishing local business connection and in managing
funds?
The following questions might help answer those questions: (always relate to
local capture)
1. Programs on investment?
2. Programs on welfare?
3. Notable changes from previous programs/ achievements?
4. Regular Forum with Local Businesses?
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Sample Guideline for Interview 2:
Assessment Sheets
(For BAPPEDA/ DPRD/ Political Parties/ other Local Public O¢ cials)
This questionnaire is addressed to Mayors/Regents, however, some of the
questions are sensitive that cannot be directly addressed to Mayors/ Regents.
Hence, in order to answer the questions in these questionnaires, they can be ad-
dressed to BAPPEDA, DPRD, political parties, etc.
Part 1: In-depth interview. With these assessments, we should be able to iden-
tify the progress of the districts (complete, incomplete, stagnant, deteriorating).
Section I & II: Endogenous Institution and Decentralization (Ask if necessary)
Section III: Local Capture
A. General (Ask if necessary)
B. Public Procurement Auction
21. How is auction conducted? Public auction, direct selection, direct ap-
pointment?
22. How can the local association of contractors (GAPENSI) a¤ect the
process of the auction?
23. Is there any association that is usually given government projects?
24. Is there a controlling body for these activities:
1. Budget allocation
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2. Internationally accepted qualities
25. Is sub-contracting allowed? Any e¤ort to reduce sub-contracting?
C. Local Regulation (Ask all)
D. Social Program (Ask all)
(Interviewers: identify the intensity of local capture)
Section IV: Local Leadership
A. Quantity
1. How is the relationship between the Mayor/Regent with local businesses
in generating local revenues and production? (What has been realized?)
2. How is the relationship between the Mayor/Regent with local businesses
in establishing public-private business partnership, including government holding
shares in private companies?
3. How is the relationship between the Mayor/Regent with local businesses
to improve both local and foreign investments?
B. Quality
51. Has the Mayor/Regent been charged with corruption/collusion/nepotism?
(If there is any specic case the interviewer knows of, address it here).
52. During the Mayor/Regent, is he/she also active in running businesses?
53. What are the e¤orts by the leader to combat corruption, nepotism, and
collusion? What are the e¤orts by the leader to increase the standard of liv-
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ing/ social conditions of the citizens, such as infrastructure, poverty alleviation,
inequality, participation?
(Interviewer: Identify the type of local leadership- type A, B, or C)
Section V: Participation
1. Has a regular meeting between government o¢ cials and representative
citizens been held? Who attends it? What sorts of local policies, public projects,
etc., that are the fruits from this meeting?
2. Who are the stakeholders?
3. Is there any access to and from poor and illiterate citizens?
4. How transparent is the budget planning statement (APBD)?
5. Can citizens give their inputs or report their complaints in the formula-
tion and implementation of local and national public projects? How e¤ective is
this?
(Interviewer: Identify the level of participation)
Section VI: Welfare (Ask all)
Section VII: Others (Ask if necessary)
Part 2: ANP. With these assessments, we should be able to identify the factors
and to what extent they a¤ect the quantity and quality of welfare.
Section VIII: ANP (Ask all)
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Appendix I.1: Balikpapan
Appendix I.11: Balikpapan - Secondary Data (Source: In-depth Interviews,
Balikpapan City in Figures, East Kalimantan Province in Figures, LKPJ, APBD
& other data collection from governmental departments and participants.)
Table 2.15: Balikpapan - Secondary Data
Economic Figures
Growth of GRDP in constant price (inlc. oil & gas) 3.23% (2005), 5.4% (06)
Growth of GRDP in constant price (excl. oil & gas) 7.52%* (2005), 6.14%* (06)
GRDP per capita in constant price (incl.oil & gas) Rp.26.713.000,00 (05)
GRDP per capita in constant price (excl. oil & gas) Rp.14.480.068,00 (05),
Rp.14.747.546,00 (06)
PAD/ APBD 10.32%(2005), 9.64%(06),
8.83%(07)
Growth of Investment 13.5% (07), 55.27% (08)
Level of Investment Rp. 4.401.733.830.000,00 (07),
Rp.6.834.660.560.000,00(08)
Social Figures
Poverty Rate (Level) 3.69% (06)
Poverty Rate (Negative Growth) 2.895% (02-06)
Inequality .23(03?), 0.09(05)
IMR 28.76 (00)
Literacy Rate 96.75% (05)
Unemployment 8.89% (2005)
HDI 70.6 (99), 73 (02),
76.1 (05)
HDI Growth 2002-2005 4.25%
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Appendix I.12: Balikpapan - Primary Data (Source: In-depth Interviews)
Table 2.16: Balikpapan - Primary Data
Indicator Sub-Indicator (equal weights) Scale
Local Leadership Fund Management 9
(Quantity) Joint Public-Private Partnership 5
Attracting Investment 8
Local Leadership (Absence of) Corruption/Collusion/Nepotism 9
(Quality) Public (vs. Private) Interest 7.5
E¤orts to eliminate C/C/N 8
Innovations of Social Programs 8
Local Capture Public Procurement Auctions 5
Local Regulations 5
Crowding out of Social Programs 5
Participation E¤ectiveness of MUSRENBANG 8
Access to information 9
Freedom to speak (vs. Intimidation) 9
Initial Social Conditions Poverty Level (2006) 9.5
IMR (2000) 8.5
Literacy Rate (2005) 8.75
Unemployment Rate (2006) 8.75
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Appendix I.2: Manggarai Barat
Appendix I.21: Manggarai Barat - Secondary Data (Source: In-depth Inter-
views, Manggarai Barat in Figures, NTT Province in Figures, LKPJ, APBD &
other data collection from governmental departments and participants.)
Table 2.17: Manggarai Barat - Secondary Data
Economic Figures
Growth of GRDP in constant price (inlc. oil & gas) 3.07% (05), 3.68%*(06)
Growth of GRDP in constant price (excl. oil & gas) 3.07%(05), 3.68%*(06)
GRDP per capita in constant price (incl.oil & gas) Rp.1.682.000,00 (05),
Rp.1.694.034,98*(06)
GRDP per capita in constant price (excl. oil & gas) Rp.1.682.000,00 (05),
Rp.1.694.034,98*(06)
PAD/ APBD 3.90%(05), 2.35%(06),
3.21%(07)
Growth of Investment -
Level of Investment -
Social Figures
Poverty Rate (Level) 29.51%(03), 29.13%(04),
29.28%(06)
Poverty Rate (Growth) .78%(03-06)
(no data in 02)
Inequality .268 (06), .28 (07)
IMR 55.65 (00)
Literacy Rate 88.74%(05)
Unemployment (Estimated 6%) (07)
HDI (no data) (99,02),63.2 (05)
HDI Growth 2002-2005 (new district)
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Appendix I.22: Manggarai Barat - Primary Data (Source: In-depth Interviews)
Table 2.18: Manggarai Barat - Primary Data
Indicator Sub-Indicator (equal weights) Scale
Local Leadership Fund Management 3
(Quantity) Joint Public-Private Partnership 5
Attracting Investment 3
Local Leadership (Absence of) Corruption/Collusion/Nepotism 3
(Quality) Public (vs. Private) Interest 4.5
E¤orts to eliminate C/C/N 4.5
Innovations of Social Programs 4.5
Local Capture Public Procurement Auctions 9
Local Regulations 6.5
Crowding out of Social Programs 7.5
Participation E¤ectiveness of MUSRENBANG 3
Access to information 2.5
Freedom to speak (vs. intimidation) 4
Initial Social Conditions Poverty Level (2006) 1.5
IMR (2000) 1.5
Literacy Rate (2005) 6.6
Unemployment Rate (2006) 8
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Appendix I.3: Yogyakarta City
Appendix I.31: Yogyakarta City - Secondary Data (Source: In-depth Inter-
views, Yogyakarta City in Figures, D.I. Yogyakarta in Figures, LKPJ, APBD &
other data collection from governmental departments and participants.)
Table 2.19: Yogyakarta City - Secondary Data
Economic Figures
Growth of GRDP in constant price (inlc. oil & gas) 4.88%(05), 3.96%(06)
Growth of GRDP in constant price (excl. oil & gas) 4.88%(05), 3.96%(06)
GRDP per capita in constant price (incl.oil & gas) Rp.10.109.232,70 (05),
Rp.10.322.561,79 (06)
GRDP per capita in constant price (excl. oil & gas) Rp.10.109.232,70 (05),
Rp.10.322.561,79 (06)
PAD/ APBD 22.4%(05), 18.3(06),
18.55%(07)
Growth of Investment -
Level of Investment -
Social Figures
Poverty Rate (Level) 10.13% (06)
Poverty Rate (Growth) 27.686%(02-06)
Inequality -
IMR 20.81(00); 4.9 (06)
Literacy Rate 97.10%(06)
Unemployment 7.04%
HDI 73.4(99), 75.3(02), 77.7(05)
HDI Growth 2002-2005 3.19%
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Appendix I.32: Yogyakarta City - Primary Data (Source: In-depth Interviews)
Table 2.20: Yogyakarta City - Primary Data
Indicator Sub-Indicator (equal weights) Scale
Local Leadership Fund Management 8
(Quantity) Joint Public-Private Partnership 7
Attracting Investment 7
Local Leadership (Absence of) Corruption/Collusion/Nepotism 8.5
(Quality) Public (vs. Private) Interest 9
E¤orts to eliminate C/C/N 7.5
Innovations of Social Programs 7.5
Local Capture Public Procurement Auctions 5.5
Local Regulations 7
Crowding out of Social Programs 5
Participation E¤ectiveness of MUSRENBANG 8
Access to information 8.5
Freedom to speak ( vs. intimidation) 9
Initial Social Conditions Poverty Level (2006) 7.5
IMR (2000) 9
Literacy Rate (2005) 9
Unemployment Rate (2006) 8
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Appendix I.4: Sragen
Appendix I.41: Sragen - Secondary Data (Source: In-depth Interviews, Sragen
in Figures, Central Java Province in Figures, LKPJ, APBD & other data collection
from governmental departments and participants.)
Table 2.21: Sragen - Secondary Data
Economic Figures
Growth of GRDP in constant price (inlc. oil & gas) 5.16% (05), 5.18%(06)
Growth of GRDP in constant price (excl. oil & gas) 5.16%(05), 5.18%(06)
GRDP per capita in constant price (incl.oil & gas) Rp.2.710.505,85 (05),
Rp.2.836.602,94(06)
GRDP per capita in constant price (excl. oil & gas) Rp.2.710.505,85 (05),
Rp.2.836.602,94(06)
PAD/ APBD 7.53% (07), 7.04%(08)
Growth of Investment 25.65% (06), 8.33% (07)
Level of Investment -
Social Figures
Poverty Rate (Level) 33.69% (00), 27.11%(01),
24.28% (05), 23.72%(06),
21.35%(07)
Poverty Rate (Growth) 15.164%(02-06)
Inequality .280 (06), .283 (07)
IMR 32.74(00); 14 (06)
Literacy Rate 74.89% (05)
Unemployment 4.19%(05)
HDI 62.3(99), 64.9(02), 66.6(05)
HDI Growth 2002-2005 2.62%
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Appendix I.42: Sragen - Primary Data (Source: In-depth Interviews)
Table 2.22: Sragen - Primary Data
Indicator Sub-Indicator (equal weights) Scale
Local Leadership Fund Management 6
(Quantity) Joint Public-Private Partnership 4
Attracting Investment 6.5
Local Leadership (Absence of) Corruption/Collusion/Nepotism 4
(Quality) Public (vs. Private) Interest 4.5
E¤orts to eliminate C/C/N 5
Innovations of Social Programs 5
Local Capture Public Procurement Auctions 7.5
Local Regulations 8
Crowding out of Social Programs 7.5
Participation E¤ectiveness of MUSRENBANG 4
Access to information 7
Freedom to speak ( vs. intimidation) 2.5
Initial Social Conditions Poverty Level (2006) 2
IMR (2000) 5.5
Literacy Rate (2005) 4.9
Unemployment Rate (2006) 9.2
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Appendix I.5: Prabumulih
Appendix I.51: Prabumulih - Secondary Data (Source: In-depth Interviews,
Prabumulih in Figures, South Sumatra Province in Figures, LKPJ, APBD & other
data collection from governmental departments and participants.)
Table 2.23: Prabumulih - Secondary Data
Economic Figures
Growth of GRDP in constant price (inlc. oil & gas) 4.12%* (05), 4.55%*(06)
Growth of GRDP in constant price (excl. oil & gas) 6.88%*(05), 6.95%*(06)
GRDP per capita in constant price (incl.oil & gas) Rp. 8.172.484,00 (04),
Rp.8.491.158,00 (05)
GRDP per capita in constant price (excl. oil & gas) Rp. 5.559.000,00 (05)
PAD/ APBD 4.76% (06), 3.97%(07)
Growth of Investment 1.1%(06), 1.6%(07),
1.33%(08)
Level of Investment -
Social Figures
Poverty Rate (Level) 9.33% (06)
Poverty Rate (Growth) - (No data in 02)
Inequality .232 (06), .210 (07)
IMR 53.66 (Muara Ilir, 02)
Literacy Rate 97.72%
Unemployment 14.04%
HDI 71.1 (05)
HDI Growth 2002-2005 (new district)
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Appendix I.52: Prabumulih - Primary Data (Source: In-depth Interviews)
Table 2.24: Prabumulih - Primary Data
Indicator Sub-Indicator (equal weights) Scale
Local Leadership Fund Management 4.5
(Quantity) Joint Public-Private Partnership 5.5
Attracting Investment 4
Local Leadership (Absence of) Corruption/Collusion/Nepotism 1
(Quality) Public (vs. Private) Interest 4
E¤orts to eliminate C/C/N 2
Innovations of Social Programs 4.5
Local Capture Public Procurement Auctions 8.5
Local Regulations 6.5
Crowding out of Social Programs 6
Participation E¤ectiveness of MUSRENBANG 5
Access to information 4.5
Freedom to speak ( vs. intimidation) 4.5
Initial Social Conditions Poverty Level (2006) 7.3
IMR (2000) 1.5
Literacy Rate (2005) 9.1
Unemployment Rate (2006) 5.3
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Appendix II:
Quality\Quantity (Net) High GRDP Growth
because of
High Quality-Quantity Leader (
s¶
¶ (.)F
>0)
(Net) Low GRDP Growth
because of  Low Quantity-
Quality Leader ( s¶
¶ (.)F
<0)
Low Initial Poverty &
Inequality; High
Participation because
of high education and
high political awareness
( s¶
¶ (.)H
>0)
(Complete Progress)
· Type A
· Extremely Good –
Moderate Social
Welfare Indicators +
High Participation
Level
(Stagnant Progress)
· Type B/C
· Extremely Good –
Moderate Social
Welfare Indicators +
High Participation
Level
High Initial Poverty &
Inequality; Low
Participation because
of low education and
low political awareness
( s¶
¶ (.)H
<0)
(Incomplete Progress)
· Type A
· Extremely Bad – Low
Social Welfare
Indicator + Low
Participation Level
(Deteriorating Progress)
· Type B/C
· Extremely Bad – Low
Social Welfare
Indicators + Low
Participation Level
Figure 2.19: Typology of local leadership (Azis, 2008)
Appendix III: (BPS Data Statistics) HDI, HPI, IMR, and Literacy
Rates
HDI(1999) HDI (2002) HDI(2005) HPI(1999) HPI(2002) IMR(2000) Lit(2003) Lit(2004) Lit(2005)
Balikpapan 70.6 73 76.1 10.3 8 28.76 97.3 97.67 96.75
Manggarai Barat 60.9 60.3 63.2 32.9 33 55.65 89.39 90.04 88.74
Yogyakarta 73.4 75.3 77.7 16.8 14.3 20.81 97.22 96.69 96.24
Sragen 62.3 64.9 66.6 31.3 24.8 32.74 73.29 72.62 74.89
Prabumulih 63.1 64.2 71.1 31.1 28.8 53.66 97.23 97.49 97.72
Figure 2.20: HDI, HPI, Infant Mortality Rate, Literacy Rate (BPS)
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Appendix IV: Analytical Network Process
Analytical Network Process of Endogenous
Institution
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Graphic Alternatives Total Normal Ideal Ranking
Inc Distribution 0.0849 0.1698 0.3191 3
Participation 0.2660 0.5321 1.0000 1
Poverty 0.1491 0.2981 0.5603 2
Figure 2.21: ANP: Balikpapan
Figure 2.22: Sensitivity Analysis, Balikpapan
Graphic Alternatives Total Normal Ideal Ranking
Inc Distribution 0.0788 0.1577 0.2890 3
Participation 0.2728 0.5456 1.0000 1
Poverty 0.1484 0.2968 0.5439 2
Figure 2.23: ANP: Manggarai Barat
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Figure 2.24: Sensitivity Analysis, Manggarai Barat
Graphic Alternatives Total Normal Ideal Ranking
Inc Distribution 0.0658 0.1316 0.2411 3
Participation 0.2730 0.5459 1.0000 1
Poverty 0.1613 0.3225 0.5908 2
Figure 2.25: ANP: Yogyakarta City
Figure 2.26: Sensitivity Analysis, Yogyakarta City
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Graphic Alternatives Total Normal Ideal Ranking
Inc Distribution 0.0395 0.0789 0.1240 3
Participation 0.3184 0.6368 1.0000 1
Poverty 0.1421 0.2843 0.4464 2
Figure 2.27: ANP: Sragen
Figure 2.28: Sensitivity Analysis, Sragen
Graphic Alternatives Total Normal Ideal Ranking
Inc Distribution 0.0670 0.1340 0.2708 3
Participation 0.2473 0.4946 1.0000 1
Poverty 0.1857 0.3714 0.7510 2
Figure 2.29: ANP: Prabumulih
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Figure 2.30: Sensitivity Analysis, Prabumulih
.
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CHAPTER 3
INFORMATION AND COORDINATION: TOWARDS EAST ASIAN
REGIONAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
"In macroeconomic models with imperfect information, strategic complemen-
tarities arise also naturally. The economy can get stuck at a low activity equilib-
rium and there may exist a role for policy to move to a better equilibrium." (Vives,
1990)
3.1 Motivation
The primary motivation for this paper is to study how East Asian countries could
better coordinate themselves to achieve greater cooperation. This paper begins
with coordination analysis from the perspective of information theory. Information
is a fundamental issue in any coordination problem. It is very important to discuss
this issue in the context of coordination and cooperation because an accidental
distrust among agents could create a vicious cycle between more distrust and
more non-cooperative behaviors. It is also an institutional issue as institutions
are places of information exchange. Institutional issues resemble those of a public
good namely free-riding problem and collective action.
To understand this, consider the following simple example. There are two
individuals who try to cooperate. Cooperation is better than non-cooperation for
both individuals, but a defect by an opponent while cooperating is worse than non-
cooperation. These individuals could be either mischievous or good-natured that
are private information. The mischievous type is more likely to defect while the
good-natured type is more likely to cooperate. However, because of some history,
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the belief about the other individuals type is biased towards mischievous that this
belief will discourage cooperation. Thus, each individual never learns about the
good nature of the opponent. This initial belief creates a cycle of distrust and
non-cooperation. The only way to initiate cooperation, leaving out other frictions
and exogenous shocks that could a¤ect the incentives to cooperate except for the
initial beliefs and the observable actions, is to reveal the individualstypes. Hence,
information in this case is a necessary condition. It is, however, not a su¢ cient
condition because cooperation will only occur if both individuals are good-natured.
Thus, information becomes very important if there is an accidental distrust among
individuals that would discourage cooperation.
We rst show theoretically that in a simple strategic complementary investment
game with partially-informed agents who both have private information about their
own fundamentals and private and public information about the others agentsfun-
damentals, agents with low and intermediate fundamentals may prefer less trans-
parency in revealing information than agents with high fundamentals. If trans-
parency is endogenous, then we might be facing an adverse selection problem or
the lemon car issue. In this situation, the only agents who will not reveal their
types are the worst-fundamental agents.
We then conduct an empirical study to analyze the e¤ect of economic funda-
mentals on the transparency of central banks. We show that one-year lagged
ination, ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves, and ratio of current
account decit to nominal GDP a¤ect the transparency of central banks after
controlling for the other economic and non-economic factors, namely the level of
development or GDP per capita, the exchange rate regimes, polity, region-specic
biases, occurrence of crisis, and year-e¤ect or general worldwide time trend. Coun-
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tries with higher ination, higher ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves,
and high ratio of current account surpluses to nominal GDP tend to have lower
transparency. This study also highlights the fact that economic fundamentals and
economic institutions could be endogenous. That is, countries with higher eco-
nomic fundamentals tend to have higher transparency that in turn creates higher
economic fundamentals, and so on. Other observations include the convergence or
catching-up bias, in which countries with lower initial levels of transparency tend
to have higher growths of transparency.
In many real-life cases, transparency is endogenous, and reputation e¤ects or
adverse selection biases arise. These might not be signicant in a large group, such
as a worldwide cross-country community, because there are many non-fundamental
factors that could a¤ect the level of transparency such that transparency does not
su¢ ciently signal fundamentals. However, they are more prevalent in a smaller
group, such as a regional community, because the non-fundamental factors such
as region-specic biases are better controlled and information travels faster (see
"localization of information" (Dixit, 2004) and "diminishing anonymity" (Greif,
2006)). Moreover, in a small group, there is a higher probability of future in-
teractions. We argue that transparency-aversion by low-fundamental countries
cannot completely explain the non-seeking behaviors towards regional institutions,
whose members would have to abide by some laws regulating the adoption of some
transparency measures, because of the reputation e¤ects or adverse selection bi-
ases. Instead of transparency aversion, all countries except the lowest-fundamental
countries will become transparency-seeking.
We show that economic fundamentals could not explain the variations in the
transparency of central banks of eight ASEAN+3 countries. We nd that varia-
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tions and anomalies surrounding the transparency of central banks in these coun-
tries can be explained by the inherent levels of democracy. This suggests that
the quality of economic institutions may not depend only on economic funda-
mentals but also on polity. Policy issues and e¤orts towards regional nancial
integration should therefore consider all of these factors. We also examine the
non-economic factors that could slow progress towards regional integration among
the ASEAN+3 countries, including military and security issues as well as socio-
cultural factors.
This paper highlights not only the importance of information in coordination,
but also the issues of institutions, including the endogenous system of institutions.
An institution is a place of information exchange that enables countries to make
transactions, borrow and lend, as well as invest. Many countries would turn
to the IMF because it is the only way that other countries would lend to these
countries under the monitoring and surveillance measures. The reserve pooling
fund of the ASEAN+3 that amounts to at least US$80 billion, as in February
2009, could only work if all countries agree to follow some set of monitoring and
surveillance measures. The assistance of the IMF on Asian countries in the 1997-
1998 crisis are accompanied by pressures to adopt transparency measures. At the
other extreme, failures of an institution to properly regulate the monitoring and
surveillance measures could lead to a crisis, such as the 2007 global nancial cri-
sis. Hence, institution is a way of exchanging information that helps coordination,
where a failure of exchanging information could be detrimental. An institutional-
ized Asian regional nancial arrangement is needed for the ASEAN+3 countries to
coordinate better in the economic sector while an institutionalized Asian Commu-
nity is crucial for the Asian countries to coordinate better in both their economic
and non-economic sectors.
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Moreover, a regional institution could also better collect information and solve
asymmetric information issues because of the close proximity of member countries.
Despite the urgency for better coordination among East Asian countries especially
after the 1997-1998 Asian nancial crisis and during the 2007 global nancial
crisis, there has not been any economic institution o¢ cially established. Economic
explanations, however, seem to be limited and unsatisfying. This is a case in which
we witness how economic institutions and politics intertwine. This paper also
highlights the importance of an institution as a place of information exchange, and
just like a public good, it faces collective action or free-riding problems.
This paper consists of two main parts: theory and empirical study (part 1),
and application (part 2). In the rst part of the paper, we analyze the op-
timal publicity of private information among partially informed agents, such as
central banks, ministries of nance, or other countriesrepresentatives (call them
"countries"), when they sit down together to discuss regional policy issues. Each
country knows its own true fundamentals but not the othersfundamentals, and
hence incompleteness of information is asymmetric. We assume that each country
makes an investment decision given random private and public information about
the true economic fundamentals of these countries. A concrete example of this
model may be seen with countries that invest through the Sovereign Wealth Funds.
Investments are strategic complements. The contribution of this paper in the lit-
erature of social value of public information is to introduce a K-dimensional true
fundamental corresponding to the K countries and an asymmetry of incomplete-
ness of information among partially informed agents. Assuming the precision of
public signals is exogenously given and does not convey any information about the
fundamentals, we show that for some intermediate values of the fundamentals, in
which a multiplicity of equilibria exists in the complete information game, a mul-
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tiplicity of equilibria recovers in the incomplete information game if the relative
precision of private to public information is su¢ ciently low. Hence, lower precision
of public information might be preferable in order to avoid coordination failure if
there is a high probability of low-investment or Pareto-dominated equilibrium be-
ing played because of some non-fundamental volatilities or sunspots. Moreover,
if there are some bad reputation e¤ects from revealing bad fundamental on the
countriespayo¤s that are not captured in the payo¤s from investment, then there
are countries with low and intermediate fundamentals that are better o¤ with a
lower level of transparency than full revelation. We conduct an empirical study
to test the hypothesis that economic fundamentals, controlling for non-economic
fundamentals, a¤ect the level of transparency of central banks.
In the second part of the paper, we apply our theory to the policy issues sur-
rounding the Asian regional nancial arrangement and regional integration. We
argue that there are three main barriers to institutionalizing regional nancial
arrangements and moving towards regional integration. First, we argue that dis-
trust that is prolonged by US military presence in Japan after the Sino-Japan
war, religious shrines honoring Japanese war-time heroes, and Japanese textbooks
that do not expose the true history of the Sino-Japan war could be a barrier to
integration in the asymmetric information environment. An accidental distrust
could create a vicious cycle of distrust and non-cooperation. The policy ques-
tion here is how we could break this vicious cycle. We argue that greater strides
towards economic integration in the midst of recovery from the Asian nancial
crisis and the current global nancial crisis are positive shocks that could break
the cycle of distrust and non-cooperation. Second, we argue that asymmetric bar-
gaining power of powerful countries, particularly China could create a barrier to
regional nancial integration because distribution of power might be problematic.
182
China has a disproportionately gigantic population, geography, amount of strate-
gic commodities, international reserves, and trade surplus. Moreover, Chinas
nuclear weapons escalate its power and could create security disagreements with
its ASEAN neighborhood who signed the Bangkok Treaty of Nuclear Weapons
Free Trade Zone in 1995. This could create a disincentive for China and other
countries to move towards greater integration. We briey discuss how the threat
points of the ASEAN+3 countries with asymmetric bargaining power, coalitional
analysis, and a consensus-based decision-making process could a¤ect the outcomes
of bargaining. Third, we argue that transparency-aversion that is predicted by
the theoretical model and worldwide empirical study could have been a barrier
to institutionalizing a regional nancial arrangement and move towards greater
integration. As an institution is established, member countries have to comply
to some transparency measures. However, this transparency-aversion e¤ect is
eroded by reputation e¤ects and adverse selection biases as well as international
pressures to adopt transparency measures. Thus, eventually, all countries, except
countries with the lowest fundamentals, become transparency-seeking and adopt
transparency measures. Hence, transparency-aversion related to low economic
fundamentals does not seem to be the salient issue in regional integration among
ASEAN+3 countries. One of non-fundamental issues that could a¤ect prefer-
ences towards transparency is the degree of democracy, which a¤ects attitudes
towards regional openness. This seems to be a more compelling explanation of
non-cooperative attitudes because we nd that less democratic countries are more
opaque. Other issues surrounding the establishment of an institutionalized re-
gional nancial arrangement are social and cultural factors, as well as the lack
of international support, such as the IMF in fears of double standards and moral
hazard.
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3.2 Literature Review
Morris and Shin (2002) show that, with a Keynesian Beauty Contest utility
function, more transparency of public information increases welfare only if the
precision of the public information is relatively high, as compared to the precision
of the private information. Given a slightly di¤erent model than that of Morris
and Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2004) show that when investorsstrategies
are complementary and social value also takes into account externality of aggre-
gate investment, then transparency of public information is necessarily good for
welfare. Such is not the case, however, when investorsstrategies are strongly com-
plementary, such that a multiplicity of equilibria exists for high precision of public
information. They show that in the strong-complementary model, high precision
of public information might be detrimental if there is a high probability of the low-
investment equilibrium being played in the case in which a multiplicity of equilibria
arises. Svensson (2005) however shows that the anti-transparency contention of
Morris and Shins (2002) result is often misinterpreted and in fact, the result is
actually pro-transparency. He shows that given the highest possible critical point
(i.e. the worst possible scenario) as a function of the share of the beauty contest
term in the utility function, the area of sets of parameters of the relative preci-
sion of public information to private information, in which transparency decreases
welfare is relatively small. The main di¤erence between Morris and Shins (2002)
results and those of Angeletos and Pavan (2004) is the uniqueness of equilibrium
in Morris and Shins (2002) model as compared to the multiplicity of equilibria
in Angeletos and Pavans Model (2004). Tong (2006) endogenizes the precision
of private information in Morris and Shins (2002) model, and shows that higher
precision of public information lowers (or "crowds out") the precision of private
information, and the overall e¤ect on dispersion of information is ambiguous.
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Cooper (1999) argues that the main factor of coordination failures at the macro-
economic level is the "risk-dominant" factor. He provides experimental results
that show failure to achieve the Pareto-Dominant Equilibrium in the case of coor-
dination games. Vives (1990) shows that a Bayesian game with a parameterized
family of supermodular games is itself a supermodular. Hence, the existence of an
equilibrium theorem for a supermodular game applies directly to the incomplete
information Bayesian game. Topkis (1998) proves the existence of a greatest and
lowest Nash equilibria in a supermodular game. Milgrom and Roberts (1990)
introduce an adaptive learning solution concept for dynamic stability in super-
modular games with nite strategies.
In Geraats (2006), transparency of central banks is studied across and within
di¤erent monetary policy regimes. Geraats (2008) shows that transparency among
central banks has been increasing in the past decade. Countries that show sig-
nicant increases in transparency tend to have with high initial levels of ination
and higher economic development. Transparency is therefore positively correlated
with initial level of ination and GDP per capita. Transparency is also negatively
correlated with subsequent level of ination and positively correlated with GDP
per capita in the same year. Ination targeters are associated with high trans-
parency, low ination and high GDP per capita. Dincer and Eichengreen (2007)
show that central banks in advanced countries are more transparent than central
banks in emerging markets, which are dened as middle-income countries with
signicant links to international nancial markets. They also show that GDP per
capita signicantly a¤ects the level of transparency. Transparency index, however,
a¤ects ination persistence, ination variability, and output variability, suggest-
ing that transparency and economic indicators are co-determined or endogenous.
Crowe and Meade (2008) show that reforms of central bank independence is pos-
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itively correlated with initial level of central bank independence, initial ination,
and democracy. They further show a negative correlation with exibility of ex-
change rate regime. Transparency increase, albeit only signicant in developed
countries, is positively correlated with overall governance quality measures, central
bank independence, and exchange rate exibility.
Bernanke (2004) argues that transparency helps the public to better predict
the central banks monetary objectives, thereby increasing welfare by aligning the
publics expectation with the central banks objectives. Azis (2008) argues that
one of the criteria that determines how successful Regional Financial Arrangement
can be is the issue of macro-coordination and coordination failure as the benet and
cost, respectively. Soesastro (2008) argues that East Asian regional cooperation is
indispensable in the midst of the 2007 global nancial crisis, and gives a chronology
of actions and policy meetings that have occurred in attempts to achieve East Asian
regional nancial integration.
3.3 Theoretical Model: Exogenous Precision of Public In-
formation
3.3.1 Examples
The following are real-life examples that motivate our model and of how our model
may apply.
1. Public information sharing and macroeconomic coordination: Peoples Bank
of China agreed in 2004-2005 to inform other Asian central bankers should they
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de-peg the Yuan and move to the managed oating exchange rate. On July 20,
2005, Peoples Bank of China announced their intention to de-peg the Yuan to the
Asian central bankers and move to the managed oating exchange rate, and on July
21, 2005, they did so. Immediately after that, Bank Negara Malaysia, the central
bank of Malaysia followed Chinas decision, de-pegged the Ringgit and moved to
the managed oating exchange rate. This kind of information sharing among the
central banks is never known to the public nor other nancial institutions such
as the Asian Development Bank, nor is sensitive information on macroeconomic
policies leaked to the public.
2. Sovereign Wealth Funds are state-owned investments funds. Some SWFs
are controlled by central banks who invest in nancial assets. The most tra-
ditional investment instruments for SWFs are government bonds of industrialized
nations, although some invest in riskier assets. Some SWFs have economic and s-
cal importance, while some are state savings coming from excess foreign exchange
reserves or revenues from oil and other commodities. Unlike foreign exchange
reserves, whose purpose is to safeguard sovereign countries against liquidity crisis,
the main objective of SWFs is to maximize long-term return. Sovereign Wealth
Funds have been attracting the attention of investors and regulators because of
their growing size and number, and their potential to inuence nancial markets.
Another growing issue is security, as investments are made not because of eco-
nomic reasons but political reasons. The inadequate transparency of SWFs is
also a growing concern. Assets under management of SWFs reached US$3.3 tril-
lion in 2007, born mostly from the Asian countries with massive foreign exchange
reserves and the Middle Eastern countries with rising revenues from oil exports.
The seven SWFs with assets over US$100 billion are the Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority, the Government Pension Fund of Norway, the Government of Singapore
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Investment Corporation, the Kuwait Investment Authority, the China Investment
Corporation, the Singapores Temasek Holdings, and the Stabilization Fund of the
Russian Federation.
3.3.2 Model
Suppose there are K "countries" (for central banks, ministries of nance, or
countriesrepresentatives) that meet regularly to discuss regional policies at the
Asian Regional Financial Arrangements Economic Review and Policy Dialogue
meetings. In the case of Asian Regional Financial Arrangement, K=13, corre-
sponding to the 10 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, and South Korea. Each
country knows its own fundamental but does not know the fundamental of the
other countries. Each country however receives two types of information, namely
private and public information, about the other countries. Given this informa-
tion, the country makes investment decisions in all of the countries, including its
own. For example, central banks who have excess reserves and hold Sovereign
Wealth Fund (SWF) make foreign investments in stocks, bonds, property, precious
metals and other nancial instruments. Another example is the inter-ministrial
coordination as part of an inter-regional development strategy by investing in en-
vironment, transport, communication infrastructures, or energy in the region in
which decisions over spending priorities are made by ministries of nances1. Or,
if central banksinformation is fully shared with the private sector who then make
1An example of this is the case of mainstreaming trade policies in national development strate-
gies among African countries by providing trade nancing, building trade capacities, improving
trade facilitation, and addressing negative impacts of trade liberalization (UNECA, 2004). Inter-
ministrial coordination, in particular across ministries of nance is needed in achieving these goals
through their roles in approving spending priorities as well as their roles in regulating complemen-
tary policies. Investments as parts of these goals include investments on environment, transport,
communication infrastructures, and energy.
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a foreign investment, then we may assume that the central banks make invest-
ment decisions as if they are the private investors. We are interested in how the
precision of public information, given the precision of private information, a¤ects
individual countries investment strategies to invest in their own countries (do-
mestic investments) and in other countries (foreign investments) when there are
K fundamentals and incompleteness of information about the K fundamentals is
asymmetric.
We assume that the precision of public information is exogenously given and
does not convey any information about the fundamentals of the countries. For
example, member countries are requested to reveal some specic information at
the regional meetings rather than choosing information to reveal. Basel II is an
example of disclosure requirement for banks globally. IMFs Article IV publication
and IMFs public data dissemination, albeit voluntary, could set standard disclo-
sures of macroeconomic data. This will enable us to derive how the precision of
public information a¤ects the equilibrium level of investments, assuming sources
come only from private and public information. We assume that domestic in-
vestment strategy is monotonic in the true fundamental, while foreign investment
is monotonic in private information about those foreign countries. Monotonicity
of strategies allows us to derive critical values of domestic and foreign investment
that depend on public signals. For any true fundamental above a critical value
that depends on the private signal, a country will invest in its own country. For
any private information about another country that is above a critical value that
depends on the public signal, a country will invest in that country. Public informa-
tion is therefore used as a public signalling device to coordinate strategies among
countries. An equilibrium concept therefore resembles that of the correlated equi-
librium. At equilibrium, no country will deviate from the prescribed strategy. We
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also show that multiple equilibria recover in the incomplete information game for
some interval of the fundamentals in which a multiplicity of equilibria exists in the
complete information game.
Notation
There are K countries denoted by i=1, ..K. Each country i has private infor-
mation about its type denoted by i. The type of each country is the fundamental
of that country. High fundamental means the economy is in good condition, while
low fundamental means that economy is in bad condition. The distribution of the
type is uniform in the unit interval [0,1]2. Each country has two sources of infor-
mation, namely private and public information. The precision of private signal is
equal across all countries. The private information can be written as:
xi =  + "i;8i 2 N;
where xi=(xii,x
i
 i)=K1, "i=("ii,"i i)=K1, "ij is i.i.d. across and within coun-
try is information,8i; j 2 N , "ii=0, "ij 6=i N(0,2x), "i N(0,
2xi), and 
2xi =
2x 0 0 0
0 2x 0 0
0 0 (i; i) = 0 0
0 0 0 2x
.
The public information can be written as:
2Without a loss of generality, we may assume that  is uniformly distributed in real line
(improper distribution). We choose this proper distribution that allows us to take conditional
probability with respect to  when precisions of public information are endogenous. In var-
ious places in this paper, we will assume  to be uniformly distributed in real line (improper
distribution).
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z =  + ;
where z=K1, =K1, j is i.i.d, j N(0, 1Pj ), Pj is the level of precision of public
information of country j, Pj=<;8j 2 N ,  N(0,
2z), and 
2z =
1
P1
0 0 0
0 1
P2
0 0
0 0 ::: 0
0 0 0 1
P K
.
The strategy of each country is to make decisions on where to invest denoted by
ki=K x 1, where ki is the investment of country i on country 1 to K, kij is the j-th
row of ki, kij is the investment of country i on country j, k
i
j=[0,1], 8j,i=1,...K. A
strategy ki is a mapping: ki : <4K ! <K , that is an investment strategy of country
i is a mapping from the private signals of K countries (K dimensions), the public
signals of K countries (K dimensions), the precision of the private signals of K
countries (K dimensions), and the precision of the public signals of the K countries
(K dimensions). Note: because the utility from an investment in one country is
additively separable from the utilities from investments in other countries, we can
write the investment strategy in a country: kij : <4 ! <;8j = 1; :::K:
The utility function of each country exhibits a strong strategic complementarity
of investment (Angeletos and Pavan, 2004):
ui = ( + iK>1   1)0ki;
where  is a K x 1 vector with k in its k-th row, ki is a K x 1 vector with its
k-th row equal to kik, iK>1 is a K x 1 indicator function, iKk>1 is the k-th row of
iK>1, iKk>1=1 if Kk > 1, iKk>1=0 if Kk 0, and Kk=
PK
j=1 k
j
k. Note: the utility
from investing in country k alone is equal to (k+iKk>1-1)kk and the utility is the
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sum of the utilities from investing in country 1 to K. Without uncertainty, there
exists a multiplicity of equilibria for i=[0,1] that is either k
j
i = 1 for all j=1,...K
(all countries invest in country i), or kji=0 for all j=1,...K (all countries do not
invest in country i). This utility function exhibits increasing rst di¤erences in
the players actions, but exhibits only weak supermodularity in a players own
actions, i.e. @
2fi(si;sj)
@sim@sik
= 0, for all m6=k3. In the incomplete information game, the
utility is taken at the expectation: Eui=E[(+iK>1-1)0ki].
The Nash equilibrium strategy for country i is denoted by:
ki=argmax.Eui(k
ijk i,,xi,z,P,2x),8i=1,....K.
Given (xi,z,P,2x), k
i is the Nash Equilibrium investment strategy of country i and
k is the Nash Equilibrium. Note: for simplicity, we assume there is no budget
constraint. In other words, the available funds to invest are high enough to allow
countries to invest the maximum amounts of investment in all countries. This
allows us to focus only on informational issues.
Lemma 3.1 Country is expected fundamental of country j6=i conditional on pri-
vate and public information is given by: (jjxij; zj)  N(
1
2x
Pj+
1
2x
xij+
Pj
Pj+
1
2x
zj, 1Pj+ 1
2x
):
Proof. (See Appendix 1)
Corollary 3.1 Let j be uniformly distributed in the real line (improper distri-
bution). Analogous to the uniform distribution in the unit interval, country is
3A supermodular game (Cooper, 1999) must satisfy the following properties: 1. the strategy
set (ki) is a lattice, 2. the payo¤ function increases in the rst di¤erence in the playersactions
(in ki and k i), 3. the payo¤ function is supermodular in a players actions (in ki given k i).
Hence, this game is a supermodular game.
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expected fundamental of country j6=i conditional on private and public information
is given by: (jjxij; zj)  N(
1
2x
Pj+
1
2x
xij +
Pj
Pj+
1
2x
zj, 1Pj+ 1
2x
):
Proof. (See Appendix 2)
We can write in matrix form:
E(j(xi,z))=(
2z) 1((
2xi) 1+(
2z) 1) 1z+(
2xi) 1((
2xi) 1+(
2z) 1) 1xi:
E(j(xi; z))= 
1
2x
P1+
1
2x
xi1 +
P1
P1+
1
2x
z1
1
2x
P2+
1
2x
xi2 +
P2
P2+
1
2x
z2
:::
xii
:::
1
2x
PK+
1
2x
xiK +
PK
PK+
1
2x
zK

; where 1
2x
is the absolute precision of
private information and Pi is the absolute precision of public information of country
i.
Strong Strategic Complementary Investments
The following example with strong strategic complementary investments will show
the e¤ect of public information on coordination among the countries, in particular
when a multiplicity of equilibria arises.
Lemma 3.2 For each of the element in ki={kik}, and i,k=1,...K:
kik=1 if k + iKk>1   1  0;
kik=0 if k + iKk>1   1 < 0;
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Investment strategy is therefore a corner solution.
By the above lemma, we know that the investment strategies are going to
be corner solutions that is investment strategies in a country by another country
or by its own country are equal to either zero or one. Denote the precision of
public information of country i by Pi. Country i "fully reveals" its fundamental
if Pi=1, and "babbles" if Pi<1. First, let us suppose there are three countries.
Following Angeletos and Pavan (2004), we assume that strategies are monotonic.
That is the investment strategy of each country is to invest in its own country if the
true economic fundamental is higher than some critical value that depends on the
public signal, while each country is to invest in other countries if the private signals
about those countries are higher than some critical values that depend on the
public signal. Public information is therefore used as a public signalling device for
countries to coordinate their strategies and predict other countriesactions. The
equilibrium concept for the investment strategies thus resembles the correlated
equilibrium concept. We are particularly interested in determining the optimal
level of precision of public information on coordination given the true fundamental
is between zero and one. This is the "critical" values in which a multiplicity of
equilibria exists in the complete information game (Angeletos and Werning, 2006).
Given that precision of public information is exogenous and does not signal any
information about fundamentals, we derive the equilibrium levels of investments
given the relative precision of private to public information (Proposition 1 and 2).
Proposition 3.1 1. The investment strategy of country i, for i=1,2,3, is given by
the following:
(i) kii=1 if i  (zi); kii=0, otherwise,
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where (zi) solves:
i+(1-
R x(zi ) i
 1
1
x
p
2
exp.( u
2
22x
)du)(1+
R x(zi ) i
 1
1
x
p
2
exp.( u
2
22x
)du)-1=0.
(ii) for j6= i;kij=1 if xij x(zj); kij=0, otherwise,
where x(zj) solves:
(wxijx
i
j+wzjzj)+(1-
R (zj )
 1
1

p
2
exp.(-
(u E(j jxij ;zj)2
22
)du)+
(
R (zj )
 1
1

p
2
exp.(-
(u E(j jxij ;zj)2
22
)du)
(1-
R x(zj)
 1
1
x
p
2
exp.(-
(u E(x j 6=ij jxijzj))2
22x
)du)-1=0,
(jjxij.zj) is distributed with mean E(jjxij,zj)=(wxijxij+wzjzj) and
variance 2=
1
1
2x
+P
;
x j 6=ij = (j + "
 j 6=i
j jxij.zj) is distributed mean E(wxijxij + wzjzj) and
variance 2x =
1
1
2x
+P
+ 2x;
2. Local solutions (zi) and x(zi) exist for some values of P and 2x:
jDx;F(x(zi),(zi); zi)j 6= 0:
Proof. (See Appendix 3)
Proposition 3.2 1. The investment strategy of country i, for i=1,...K is given by
the following:
(i) kii=1 if i  (zi);
kii=0, otherwise,
195
where (zi) solves: i +
PK 1
j=1
(K 1)!
(K 1 j)!j!(1 
R x(zi ) i
 1
1
x
p
2
exp :( u
2
22x
)du)j
(
R x(zi ) i
 1
1
x
p
2
exp :( u
2
22x
)du)K 1 j   1 = 0:
(ii) kij=1 if x
i
j  x(zj);
kij=0, otherwise,
where x(zj) solves:
(wxijx
i
j+wzjzj)+(1-
R (zj )
 1
1

p
2
exp :(  (u E(j jxij ;zj))2
22
du)
PK 2
j=0
(K 2)!
(K 2 j)!j!(1 
R x(zj )
 1
1
x
p
2
exp :(
 (u E(x j 6=ij jxij ;zj)
22x
)du)j
(
R x(zj )
 1
1
x
p
2
exp :(
 (u E(x j 6=ij jxij ;zj)
22x
)du)K 2 j+
(
R (zj )
 1
1

p
2
exp :(  (u E(j jxij ;zj))2
22
du)
PK 2
j=1
(K 2)!
(K 2 j)!j!(1 
R x(zj )
 1
1
x
p
2
exp :(
 (u E(x j 6=ij jxij ;zj)
22x
)du)j
(
R x(zj )
 1
1
x
p
2
exp :(
 (u E(x j 6=ij jxij ;zj)
22x
)du)K 2 j   1 = 0;
(jjxij.zj) is distributed with mean E(jjxij,zj)=(wxijxij+wzjzj) and
variance 2=
1
1
2x
+P
:
x j 6=ij = (j + "
 j 6=i
j jxij.zj) is distributed mean E(x j 6=ij jxij.zj)=(wxijxij + wzjzj)
and
variance of 2x=(
1
1
2x
+P
+2x):
2. Local solutions (zi) and x(zj) exist for some values of P and 2x :
jDx;F(x(zi),(zi); zi)j 6= 0:
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Proof. (See Appendix 4)
Corollary 3.2 For a two-country case, x(zi) is given by x(zi)=A- P1
2x
zi, and 
(zi)
solves: i+(1-
R x(zi ) i
 1
1
x
p
2
exp.( u
2
22x
)du)-1=0., for i=1,2 (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Critical Values for a 2-country Case
P P1
2x
z (z) x(z)
1 1 1 .12-.13 -1
10 10 1 0-.01 -10
.5 .5 1 .7-.8 -.5
1 1 2 .02-.03 -2
10 10 2 0-.01 -20
.5 .5 2 .1-.2 -1
3.3.3 Numerical Examples and Observations
Solving for the implicit functions, x(zi) and 
(zi), can be very complex. We
resort to numerical examples. In the following numerical examples, we show the
critical values of (zi) and x(zi) that solve the non-linear equations system above:
F((zi);x(zi);zi)=0 for a wide range of parameters. This enables us to get an
idea of what kinds of functions (zi) and x(zi) are. The following table (Table
3.2) summarizes the initial parameters to get ((zi);x(zi)), including the absolute
precision of private and public information, the relative precision of private and
public information, and the public signals zi:We x the number of countries equal
to 3. We vary the relative precision of private to public information by either
varying the precision of public signal while keeping the precision of private signal
xed, or vice versa. We vary the public signal in the range of [-1000 to 1000], and
rst set K=3.
The following properties of x(zi) and (zi) are observed for K=3. We use at
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Table 3.2: Initial Parameters
K=3, 1
2x
=1(or Pi=1)
1
2x
Pi
=[.0001-10000]
zi=[-1000-1000] (
(zi),x(zi)jzi,Pi, 12x )
least six-decimal working precision (see Appendix 5). First, we observe that (zi)
and x(zi) co-move. This is not surprising since strategies are complements. If
domestic investment of a country is higher, other countries will best-respond by
investing more in that country. Second, we observe that xing the precision of
private information and increasing the precision of public information, or decreas-
ing the relative precision of private to public information, increases the level of
investment or decreases the values of (zi) and x(zi) if the realization of pub-
lic information, zi, is su¢ ciently large, zi>.25. It further decreases the level of
investment or increases the values of (zi) and x(zi) if the realization of public
information, zi, is su¢ ciently low, zi < :25. At zi=.25, 
(zi) and x(zi) do not
change in the relative precision of private to public information.
Claim 3.1 Given the precision of public information is exogenous and does not
signal any information about the fundamentals of the countries, in the case of
K=3, for high relative precision of private to public information, increasing the
precision of public information while keeping the precision of private information
xed, weakly decreases (z) and x(z) for z.25 while increasing (zi) and x(zi)
for z<.25.
This second observation suggests that if public signal is su¢ ciently low, with
high precision of public information, other countries will expect the true economic
fundamental of that country to be approximately close to the public signal, which
is low, reducing the incentive to invest. The reverse is true for high public signals.
198
The following table (Table 3.34) shows examples of this observation for zi .25
and zi<.25.
Table 3.3: Example of Claim 3.1
K=3, 1
2x
= 1
1
2x
P
= :0001
1
2x
P
= 1
1
2x
P
= 10000
z=-.5 (1,14796) (.622147,1.42428) (.250025,.250088)
z=.4 (0,-4000),(1,5796.53)* (.189758,.0276531) (.249995,.249982)
We can show that the critical values of (zi) and x(zi) do not change if
we change the absolute precision of public information or the absolute precision
of private information while keeping the relative precision of private to public
information constant. In other words, what matters is not the absolute precision
but the relative precision. Similar results are shown in Svensson (2005) in response
to Morris and Shins Keynesian Beauty Contests model (2002) in which the optimal
precision of public information depends on the relative precision rather than the
absolute precision.
Claim 3.2 Given the precision of public information is exogenous and does not
signal any information about the fundamentals of the countries, in the case of
K=3, it is the relative precision of private information to public information that
a¤ects the investment level, and not the absolute precision of private nor public
information.
We also observe that both (zi) and x(zi) decrease in zi for any relative
precision of private to public information (see Appendix 6).
Claim 3.3 The higher the public signal, the lower (zi) and x(zi) are, for any
relative precision of private to public information.
4*=Multiplicity of equilibria
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Moreover, we observe that (zi) is more sensitive to changes in zi as the pre-
cision of public information increases while xing the precision of private informa-
tion, or if the relative precision of private to public information decreases. This
suggests that the lower the relative precision of private to public information, the
more sensitive investment strategies are to changes in public signals. For suf-
ciently low precision of public information for some given precision of private
information, the slope of (zi) with respect to zi is at at 
(zi)=.25. Similarly,
x(zi) is more sensitive to changes in zi as the precision of public information in-
creases while xing the precision of private information, or if the relative precision
of private to public information decreases. As the relative precision of private to
public information increases, the slope of x(zi) with respect to zi becomes at at
x(zi)=.25. The critical values of 
(zi) is bounded above by 1, in which countries
will not invest for any fundamental, and bounded below by 0, in which countries
will invest for any fundamental.
Claim 3.4 The lower the relative precision of private to public information, the
more sensitive (zi) and x(zi) are to changes in public signal.
One of the main results of this study is that a multiplicity of equilibria can
be shown to exist in the incomplete information game with a critical fundamental
and high precision of public information (see Figure 1 and 2). We show that a
multiplicity of equilibria exists for zi = [0; 1) as the precision of public information
increases while xing the precision of private information, or if the relative preci-
sion of private to public information decreases. Except at zi=.25, there are two
equilibria, the high and the low equilibria. At zi=.25, there are three equilibria,
the high, the intermediate, and the low equilibria. For very low relative precision
of private to public information, the two critical points for theta are (zi)=0 and
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Figure 3.1: Multiplicity of Equilibria, (z):
(zi)=1. Hence, either countries invest domestically for all values of the funda-
mental, or do not invest domestically for all values of the fundamental, similar to
the case of complete information. For both the critical values, (zi) and x(zi), in
the case of multiple equilibria, the low-investment equilibrium is lower than some
equilibrium investment level at lower transparency with a unique equilibrium and
the high-investment equilibrium is higher than some equilibrium investment level
at lower transparency with a unique equilibrium. Multiple equilibria arise at a
relative precision of private to public information as low as one fourth.
Claim 3.5 Given the precision of public information is exogenous and does not
signal any information about the fundamentals of the countries, the critical values,
(zi) and x(zi), are unique for zi=[0,1), for high relative precision of private to
public information, but are multiple for low relative precision of private to public
information. In the case when a multiplicity of critical values arises, there are
high and low critical values, (zi) and x(zi), for zi=[0,1), and there are high,
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Figure 3.2: Multiplicity of Equilibria, x(z).
intermediate, and low critical values, (zi) and x(zi), at zi=.25 given K=3.
Proposition 3.3 Given the precision of public information is exogenous and does
not signal any information about the fundamentals of the countries, in the case
of K=3, lower precision of public information might be preferable for intermediate
fundamentals, i = [0; 1), in which a multiplicity of equilibria arises at high preci-
sion of public information and there are non-fundamental volatilities or sunspots
that dictate the low-investment equilibrium to be played with a high probability.
Proof. If the level of investment is higher under high relative precision of
private to public information, in which equilibrium is unique, than that of under
low relative precision of private and public information, in which equilibrium is not
unique and the low equilibrium is played, then choosing su¢ ciently high relative
precision of private to public information to avoid a multiplicity of equilibria is
optimal.
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This proposition says that a country with an intermediate fundamental might
choose lower precision of public signal if the multiplicity of equilibria that arises
as information becomes more complete will be more likely to create coordination
failures than coordination. Hence, if the precision of public information is exoge-
nous and the low equilibrium is played when a multiplicity of equilibria arises, then
a country will choose su¢ ciently low precision of public information to eliminate
the multiplicity of equilibria. This result is analogous to the result of the model
with one-dimensional fundamental and symmetric incompleteness of information
(Angeletos and Pavan, 2004).
High precision of public information allows countries to coordinate better on
multiple levels of investment, as is argued by Angeletos and Werning (2006). In-
tuitively, with low precision of public information, partially-informed agents are
informatively constrained to coordinate among themselves resulting in a unique
equilibrium. Conversely, with high precision of public information, partially
informed-agents are better able to coordinate among themselves if the underly-
ing complete-information game has a multiplicity of equilibria. Morris and Shin
(2002) and Amato, Morris and Shin (2002) also suggest that high precision of
public information might be detrimental if the precision of private information is
high enough relative to the precision of private information. In this case, people
overreact to the public information that is relatively imprecise compared to the
private information. Although both Angeletos and Wernings model and Morris
and Shins model suggest that high transparency may not always be good, they
o¤er slightly di¤erent insights as to why high transparency is not always good for
welfare.
Now, assume that the fundamental is uniformly distributed in the real number
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(improper distribution). We can show that the utilities of countries with   1
are maximized at the highest level of transparency or full revelation, while the
utilities of countries with  < 0 are unchanged with respect to the level of trans-
parency, because these countries will not invest in their own countries regardless
of the investments of the other countries. Suppose now there are informational
externalities from revealing bad fundamentals such as bad reputation, and hence,
countries with  < 0 will be strictly better o¤ without transparency.
Proposition 3.4 For K=3, suppose there are negative informational externali-
ties from revealing low fundamentals. The utilities of countries with  1 are
maximized at P=1 (full revelation) and the utilities of countries with <0 are
maximized at P=0 (no revelation). The utilities of countries with critical fun-
damentals, 0 <1, are maximized at 1 P0 depending on the fundamental
and the non-fundamental volatilities or sunspots in the case of a multiplicity of
equilibria.
Proof. (1) It is trivial to prove that the utilities of countries with   1 are
maximized at full revelation. (2) From Proposition 3, intermediate-fundamental
countries might choose a low level of transparency depending on which of the equi-
libria is played in the case of multiple equilibria. In both cases of low and high
equilibrium, whether a country will be better o¤ with more or less transparency
depends on the fundamentals of the countries. For both the low and high equilib-
rium, as the relative precision of private to public information changes, the graphs
of (z) and x(z) also change, in which the level of investments of countries with
dissimilar fundamentals will be a¤ected di¤erently. Take x(z): for any equilibria,
the graph x(z) is downward sloping and intersects the x-axis at some value of
public signal. It rotates clockwise as the relative precision of private to public in-
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formation decreases (see Claim 3.4). As the relative precision of private to public
information approaches zero, every country will invest in countries with fundamen-
tals above the intersection point, because x(z) will approach negative innity at
z=. Conversely, no country will invest in countries with fundamentals below the
intersection point because x(z) will approach positive innity at z=. Note that
we only consider the low and high equilibrium, and not the intermediate equilib-
rium, which only occurs at z=.25. In the case of improper distribution, this event
occurs with probability zero. (3) Countries with  < 0; will be indi¤erent be-
tween revealing and babbling because these countries will not invest domestically
regardless whether or not other countries will invest. However, because of negative
externalities, such as bad reputation, they will strictly prefer not to reveal.
Proposition 3.5 (Transparency-aversion) Suppose there are negative informa-
tional externalities from revealing low fundamentals. For K=3, there are some
countries with  < 1 that will be better o¤ at a lower level of transparency than full
revelation.
Proof. For countries with  < 0; non-transparency is always better than
transparency. For countries with 0  < 1; lower transparency might be preferred
depending on the fundamentals and the non-fundamental volatilities or sunspots
in the case of multiple equilibria.
Note that in order to prove the monotonicity of transparency, at which the
utilities of intermediate-fundamental countries are maximized, with respect to the
fundamentals, a more elaborate proof is needed to solve the expected utility max-
imization problem with respect to the precision of public information.
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3.3.4 K-country Case
We show that most of the observations we nd in the 3-country case still hold
in the 13-country case (corresponding to the ASEAN + 3 countries). Increasing
the number of countries from 3 to 13 while keeping the strategic complementarity
of investment the same will increase the level of investment. This observation is
intuitive since the probability that at least one other country invests is higher if
K is higher. All of the above observations for K=3 continue to hold except the
cutting value for a public signal to be considered "su¢ ciently high" or "su¢ ciently
low" is not zi=.25, but zi=0. This is because the higher the number of countries,
the more e¤ective is the public signal in coordinating strategies because there are
more potential countries to invest. Since strategies are strategic complements,
then given a higher number of countries, a lower value of public signals (zi=0)
is the pivoting point above which a lower relative precision of private to public
information will increase the level of investment. Analogous to the 3-country
case, in the 13-country case, a multiplicity of equilibria prevails if zi=[0,1) at high
precision of public information.
Corollary 3.3 Given the precision of public information is exogenous and does
not signal any information about the fundamentals of the countries, in the case of
K=13, lower precision of public information might be preferable for intermediate
fundamentals, i = [0; 1), in which a multiplicity of equilibria arises at high preci-
sion of public information and there are some exogenous factors, such as sunspots,
that dictate the low-investment equilibrium to be played with a high probability.
Corollary 3.4 For K=13, suppose there are negative externalities from revealing
low fundamentals. The utilities of countries with  1 are maximized at P=1
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(full revelation) and the utilities of countries with <0 are maximized at P=0 (no
revelation). The utilities of countries with critical fundamentals, 0 <1, are
maximized at 1 P0 depending on the fundamental and the non-fundamental
volatilities or sunspots in the case of a multiplicity of equilibria.
Corollary 3.5 (Transparency-aversion) Suppose there are negative informational
externalities from revealing low fundamentals. For K=13, there are some coun-
tries with  < 1 that will be better o¤ at a lower level of transparency than full
revelation.
The corollaries above for the K-country case come directly from observations of
our numerical examples for K=13 that show similar patterns as the case for K=3.
Strategic Substitutes
We analyze the robustness of our results regarding the multiplicity of equilibria
under strategic substitutability of investment. The utility of the investing countries
is as follows: ui=(-iK>1-1)0ki, where the indicator variable i is similarly dened
as it is in the previous section and all other elements of the game are unchanged.
With this utility function, investments are strategic substitutes. The complete
information game with this utility function has a unique equilibrium in dominant
strategy for the parameters i  1 (never invest), i > 2 (always invest). There
is a multiplicity of equilibria for the parameters i = (1; 2]: As we can show, in
the incomplete information game, a multiplicity of equilibria for the parameters
i = (1; 2] recovers for low relative precision of private to public information. We
also show that (zi) increases in zi but x(zi) decreases in zi for any relative
precision of private to public information.
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Given the precision of public information is exogenous and does not signal any
information about the fundamentals of the countries and investments are strategic
substitutes, the critical values, (zi) and x(zi), are unique for zi 2 and zi<1,
for any relative precision of private to public information. The critical values,
(zi) and x(zi), are unique for zi=(1,2], for high relative precision of private
to public information, but are not unique for low relative precision of private to
public information. Increasing the precision of public information while xing the
precision of private information changes the sensitivity of (zi) and x(zi) with
respect to changes in zi.
3.3.5 Extensions: Endogenous Precision of Public Infor-
mation
Important information may be shared not only during o¢ cial regional meetings.
Information may be shared while central bankers eat dinners, play golf, or sing in
a Karaoke bar. There is no limit to how much information is revealed. Hence,
the precision of public signal, i.e. how much private information is shared publicly,
is not exogenous. Angeletos and Werning (2004) show how the precision of public
signals, such as prices, can be endogenous, and is a function of private signal.
In the previous section, we consider the case of exogenous public information in
which the precision of public information does not signal the fundamentals. This
is the case, for example, when countries are dictated to reveal specic information.
Now, consider the case in which the precision of public information is endogenous
and hence, signals some information about the fundamentals of the countries. This
is the case when countries have discretions to set the level of precision of public
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information. Suppose the precision of public signal is revealed prior to announce-
ments of public information. The two-stage process of announcements of precision
of public information prior to investment choices constitutes a signalling game in
which announcements of the precision of public information in the rst stage may
convey the fundamentals of the countries that a¤ect investment strategy in the
second stage. What di¤erentiates this model from the previous model is the fact
that the precision of public information in stage one may signal the fundamentals
of the countries, (zijP ) and x(zijP ), when in the two-stage signalling game, the
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is separating.
In a two-stage signalling game, investment strategies may depend on the an-
nouncements of precision of public signal if the equilibrium is separating. In
general, the concept of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is used in this sig-
nalling game, where the following requirements must be satised: the precision of
public information, P*; investment strategies, (zjP) and x(zjP), and the belief
system, , constitute a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium if {P*, (zjP), x(zjP)}
are sequentially rational at each information set given the beliefs, and beliefs are
consistent with the equilibrium strategies. In order to calculate the critical val-
ues of investments, we will need the conditional expectations of the fundamentals
given public information and the precision of public information that may signal
the fundamentals. These conditional expectations given the fundamental in some
interval are given in the Lemma below.
Lemma 3.3 Country is expected fundamental of country j6=i conditional on pri-
vate and public information as well as j being in some intervals = [a; b], (jjxij; zj; j =
[a; b]); has a truncated normal distribution with mean and variance equal to:
E(jjxij; zj; j = [a; b]) = + (
a 

) ( b 

)
( b 

) (a 

)

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where  =
xij
2x
+Pjzj
1
2x
+Pj
, 2 = 1
( 1
2x
+Pj)
,  and  are the CDF and PDF of a standard
normal distribution respectively.
Proof. (See Appendix 7):
This model is limited to the extent that in reality, agents or countries do not
reveal the precision of their public announcements. Even if public information is
given in terms of the quantity of information an agent reveals, it is still unclear
whether there is some more important information kept hidden by an agent that
could reduce the precision of the shared information. Take, for instance, the trans-
parency of the nancial market in the United States. It might seem that banks
and funds were transparent in revealing their performance, but in reality, there
had been a lot of o¤-balance-sheet transactions that were unknown to potential
investors. In other words, the precision of public information is a relative measure
and not an absolute measure that does not have a clear-cut standard. However,
without knowing the precision of their public announcements, expectations over
their fundamentals given private and public information are di¢ cult to derive.
For simplicity, suppose there are only two possible levels of precision of public
information, namely F for full revelation and B for babbling. Each country may
choose either to reveal their information or stay quiet and not reveal their infor-
mation. Assume that the fundamental is uniformly distributed in the real number
(improper distribution). From our previous result, we show that countries with
high fundamentals ( 1) will choose to reveal their information, while countries
with low fundamentals (<0) will choose not to reveal their information. Coun-
tries with intermediate fundamentals (0 <1) may or may not choose to reveal
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their information. In the case of intermediate fundamentals, there is a critical
point above which a country will choose transparency over non-transparency and
below which a country will choose non-transparency over transparency. This is
because for both the low and high equilibrium in the case of multiple equilibria and
for the case of the unique equilibrium, there are some values of the public signal at
which the graphs of (z) and x(z) touch or intersect the x-axis. There is a pivot-
ing point about each of these intersection points (some of these pivoting points are
the intersection points themselves), around which the downward-sloping graphs of
(z) and x(z) rotate clockwise as the precision of public information increases for
some xed precision of private information (see Claim 3.4). Note: we only con-
sider the high and low equilibrium, and not the intermediate equilibrium that only
occurs at a point in z. In the case of improper distribution, the probability of z or
 equal to this point is zero. Countries with fundamentals above a pivoting point
will prefer transparency over non-transparency while countries with fundamentals
below this pivoting point will prefer non-transparency over transparency.
Lemma 3.4 Suppose transparency of a country does not reveal the fundamental of
this country and there are only two possible levels of precision of public information:
full revelation (F) and babbling (B). In the case of K countries, there is a critical
value at which a country with a fundamental above this critical value will be better
o¤ at F and a country with a fundamental below this critical value will be better
o¤ at B.
Proof. At zero precision of public information, or B, given non-zero xed
precision of private information, both (z) and x(z) are at at some positive
value below innity. At innite precision of public information, or F, given non-
zero xed precision of private information, the slope of x(z) approaches negative
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innity and x(z) intersects the x-axis at some z (see Claim 3.4). At innite
precision of public information, or F, given non-zero xed precision of private
information, the graph (z) approaches one for all values below some z and zero
for all values above this value of z. This holds for the low and high equilibria
in the case of multiple equilibria, and the unique equilibrium. The intermediate
equilibrium may occur only at a point in z, which occurs with probability zero.
When the level of precision is endogenous, there are reputation e¤ects that
associate revealing information with high fundamentals and staying quiet with low
fundamentals. Let the fundamentals associated with revealing information be in
the interval of [aF ,bF ] and the fundamentals associated with staying quiet be in
the interval of [aB,bB), where aF=bB. Taking the derivatives of the conditional
mean with respect to both a and b, the above lemma shows that the expected
fundamental given the interval a and b that is associated with either revealing or
staying quiet increases in both a and b. This means that if only those countries
with fundamentals in [aF ,bF ] will reveal and countries in [aB,bB) will stay quiet,
then E(jjxij; zj; F )>E(jjxij; zj; B). Since investment strategy is non-decreasing
in fundamental, it is always better for a country, except the countries with the
lowest fundamental, to reveal than not to reveal. In the most extreme case, we
may observe the lemon car issue, in which all countries will choose to reveal except
countries with the lowest level of fundamental (Economics Review, RIETI, 2009).
Geraats (2002) shows that in a simple model of endogenous transparency of central
banks, the unique pure-strategy perfect equilibrium is transparency for all types,
i.e. the lemon car problem does occur.
Proposition 3.6 Suppose the level of transparency of a country could partly reveal
212
the fundamental of this country and there are only two possible levels of precision
of public information: full revelation (F) and babbling (B). All countries, except
countries with the lowest fundamentals, will choose F.
Proof. Starting from the countries at the high end of [aB,bB), i.e. countries
whose fundamentals are close to bB, these countries will choose revealing over
babbling because the other countriesexpectation of their fundamentals given their
fundamentals are in [aB,bB) is lower than their true fundamentals. The expected
fundamental of the countries who choose babbling is even lower. More countries
will choose revealing. Using this induction, only the countries with the lowest
fundamentals will choose B.
What makes the endogenous transparency model powerful is that it could drive
countries to adopt transparency measures without mandates. More work on this
endogenous model is needed. In real life, transparency of a country or a cen-
tral bank is partly exogenous and partly endogenous. Sovereign countries have
sovereign rights to choose the level of transparency, but there are transparency
standards by which they are obliged to comply, such as the IMFs Article IV Pub-
lication or the Basel II Accord.
3.3.6 Further Remarks: Critiques and Applications
We have assumed that central bankers, ministries of nance, and other countrys
representatives make investment decisions. It is true that it is atypical, except in
the case of Sovereign Wealth Funds. In other words, central bankers, ministries of
nance, and other countrys representatives are not investors. Moreover, assuming
that policy coordination depends on information about the fundamentals alone
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is too simplistic. Diplomatic, strategic, and political factors may matter more
than just economic factors. For example, despite a bad economic fundamental, a
country might invest in another country because of strategic commodities, such as
oil, gas, uranium, or nuclear technologies.
Another criticism of the model in this paper is that some public o¢ cials do
have access to other countriesinformation that is not publicly available. All IMF
Country Reports are distributed to the Executive Directors of the IMF member
countries. We may argue, however, that in this case the precision of private
information about the other countries can be made very high. Analogously, a
public o¢ cial who could have prevented the country from falling into crisis may
not know the fundamental of the country, and hence, fails to save the country.
Private investors, for example, might know more than public o¢ cials from their
daily business activities.
Optimal transparency is not a matter of being pro- nor anti - transparency.
But to answer the question whether pro- or anti-transparency is optimal might
simplify a lot of important issues. Hiding bad information over a collapsing bank
for example, might be preferable in order to provide a blanket guarantee5 and
prevent a bank run. Once the blanket guarantee is provided, the bank can be
publicly announced as being under supervision. However, for the same situation,
hiding bad information over a collapsing bank while having a third party nd out
about the situation might damage the central banks credibility.
In response to the critiques above that might arise, we leave it to the readers
to judge when our model is appropriate to apply. It is true that the issue of
transparency on macroeconomic fundamentals is very broad that any model would
5A blanket guarantee is a declaration by the government that all deposits and perhaps other
nancial instruments will be guaranteed (Refence: Banking Glossary).
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seem to oversimplify the situation. However, what we attempt in this paper is
to focus on one dimension of it, namely the issue of information on coordination
in a case when strategic decisions can be categorized as being complements or
substitutes. Multiple equilibria in both the complete and incomplete information
games that we have shown are not uncommon. In fact, in many real-life cases, it is
more likely that a multiplicity of equilibria rather than a unique equilibrium arises.
Hence, our theoretical result above is not surprising. What we hope to determine
is whether coordination can be better achieved in the case of a multiplicity of
equilibria by constraining the level of public information that can serve as public
signals.
The role of institution to regulate transparency measures is important. The
Basel II Accord, for example, is the second version of the Basel Accord that reg-
ulates minimum capital requirements, supervisory review process, and disclosure
requirements. Disclosure requirements are transparency measures in which banks
are supposed to release relevant nancial data in a timely fashion to the public, for
example, through their websites. Proper regulation on transparency measures is
indispensable, as is evident in the global nancial crisis that started in 2007. One
of the reasons for the global nancial crisis is the lax regulation on transparency
among mortgage banks, hedge funds, and investment banks.
The above investment model with public-private information and partially in-
formed agents ts the real-life examples of countries with Sovereign Wealth Funds
that invest in other countries. This situation become more relevant since the total
assets and number of Sovereign Wealth Funds have been growing rapidly (Azis,
2009). This is partly because of excess foreign exchange reserves of the Asian
countries and petrodollars of the Middle-Eastern countries. East Asian interna-
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tional reserves amounted to US$4 trillion in 2008. In 2007, Asian and Middle
Eastern countries had invested 43 billion Euro in European and American coun-
tries through their Sovereign Wealth Funds. The IMF had estimated that there
were more than 20 Sovereign Wealth Funds nanced by petrodollars and foreign
exchange reserves with total assets of between US$1.9 trillion and US$2.9 trillion
around the world. Another study shows that the total asset under management
of SWF reached US$3.3 trillion (Wikepedia). It is expected to grow by US$1
trillion per year. Among the concerns about Sovereign Wealth Funds are security
issues, that a country might "buy" other countries and might therefore control do-
mestic issues, including tax regulations on companies whose assets partly belong
to foreign governments. What this paper shows is that the role of information
among these partially informed agents is indispensable, and a¤ects the investment
strategies among these countries.
3.4 Empirical Study
In this empirical study, we are going to test the above theoretical propositions
by testing how transparency of central banks could be a¤ected by the economic
fundamentals. Our theoretical propositions suggest that central banks with low
and intermediate economic indicators can be associated with a lower level of trans-
parency than full revelation. Empirical studies on transparency of an economic
institution and economic fundamentals are di¢ cult because most of the e¤ects of
transparency come not only from economic incentives but also political, social, and
other incentives, and even a third variable that may a¤ect both transparency and
fundamentals, such as the level of development or the GDP per capita. Thus,
it is hard to separate between the two factors and to determine the direction of
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the cause and causality. The second obstacle is that there is no clear-cut criteria
of having a good or bad economic fundamental. The third obstacle is that some
of economic indicators experience sudden shocks, such as hyperination or rapid
exchange rate appreciation, or consistent anomalies, such as the extremely high
ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves of the United States of America
and Australia. We will address these obstacles in the next section. The fourth
obstacle is that some of the variables of interest might be correlated.
In order to address the rst obstacle, endogeneity of the variables, we will take a
panel data that run between 1998 to 2005 across 83 countries. We use multilevel
mixed-e¤ect linear regression that combines both xed-e¤ect and random-e¤ect
models. This could identify the persistency of e¤ects of the independent variables
on the dependent variables over time. In order to address the second obstacle, we
will show how certain economic indicators may a¤ect transparency. It is not only
a question of whether good economic fundamentals increase transparency, but also
the intuition behind how certain economic indicators may a¤ect transparency. For
example, high ratio of current account decit to nominal GDP could be associated
with a low fundamental because it could speculate an attack on the exchange rate
if there is a sudden capital inow reversal and the foreign exchange reserve is low.
However, countries with high capital account surpluses might boast upon their
investment booms. In order to address the third obstacles we eliminate observa-
tions that we identify as outliers or anomalies that could distort the regression.
In order to address the fourth obstacle, we check the robustness of our results by
orthogonalizing the independent variables.
There are at least a few variables that past literature has suggested could af-
fect transparency of a central bank. These include: the level of development or
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the GDP per capita (Geraats, 2008; Dincer and Eichengreen, 2007), the indepen-
dence of central banks (Crowe and Meade, 2008), the level of ination (Geraats,
2008), the exchange arrangement and monetary regime (Geraats, 2008; Dincer
and Eichengreen, 2007; Crowe and Meade, 2008), and the rule of law (Dincer
and Eichengreen, 2007). We will show how economic fundamentals of a coun-
try namely unemployment rate, ination, real exchange rate appreciation, ratio of
broad money to foreign exchange reserves, and ratio of current account balance to
nominal GDP a¤ect the transparency of the central bank, controlling for the level
of development, exchange rate arrangements, polity, region, crisis, and year.
3.4.1 Data
Dependent Variable: Transparency Index of Central Banks
We use the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) transparency index data for central
banks in 100 countries over ve continents. This transparency index is based on
Eij¢ nger-Geraats transparency measures for central banks (Eij¢ nger and Geraats,
2006) that consist of ve pillars: political transparency, economic transparency,
procedural transparency, policy transparency, and operational transparency. Pol-
icy transparency focuses on the openness of policy objectives, economic trans-
parency focuses on the openness of economic information that is used to formulate
monetary policy, procedural transparency focuses on the openness of the proce-
dures that are used to formulate monetary policy, policy transparency focuses on
the disclosure of policies taken, and operational transparency focuses on the open-
ness of the implementation of policy actions. The questionnaires for this survey
are given in Appendix 8. This is the largest data for transparency of central banks
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that was collected over the period of 1998 to 2005 for 100 central banks, gathered
from the central banks websites, statues, annual reports, and other published
documents.
Out of these 100 central banks, we drop fourteen countries because there is no
data on one or more variable(s) of interest. These countries are: European central
bank because of the di¢ culty in measuring an aggregate economic fundamental
of the European Monetary Union; The Bermuda, Cuba, East Caribbean because
there is no data on most of the variables of interests; (if unemployment rate is
included as a regressor) Aruba, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leon,
Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia because there is no system-
atic measurement on unemployment rate. Since there are other countries in our
observations that are in the same regions as these eliminated countries, we avoid
selection bias.
Independent Variable 1: Economic Fundamentals
There are four main economic indicators that we consider: ination, the ratio of
broad money to foreign exchange reserves (the inverse reserve ratio), the ratio of
current account balance to nominal GDP, and the real exchange rate apprecia-
tion/depreciation. The data is taken annually from the International Financial
Statistics and CEIC Data. Data on the ratio of broad money to foreign exchange
reserves for some countries that are missing from the IFS and CEIC are taken
from the ratio of broad money to total reserve from indexmundi.com, which upon
investigation, does not deviate signicantly much from the ratio of broad money
to foreign exchange reserves from the IFS and CEIC. Accounting for ination
and the ratio of current account balance to nominal GDP, there are two economic
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indicators used in Sachs, et.al. (1996) to measure liquidity assets (the ratio of
broad money to foreign exchange reserves) and the overvaluation of exchange rate
(real exchange rate appreciation6). Ination could indicate a decreasing purchas-
ing power, overheating economy, and/or distortion to terms-of-trade caused by
appreciation of exchange rate.
We observe outliers and anomalies in our observations of these economic funda-
mentals. In our data, Bulgaria was recorded as having a 1000% ination in 1998.
There were four other outliers of more than 200% ination that we eliminate.
We dropped the ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves of the United
States and Australia that were much higher than other countries (more than 100
for the USA and more than 40 for Australia, while the average was 6). In order
to predict the e¤ects, we plotted the graphs of these variables alone against the
transparency index (see Figure 3-6). Because of the indications of quadratic re-
lationships, we take both the linear and quadratic terms of these variables, except
for ination.
Independent Variable 2: Socioeconomic Fundamentals
The quality of economic institution could depend not only on economic funda-
mentals but also on social and political fundamentals. In order to account for
the e¤ect of social conditions, we take data on a socioeconomic variable, namely
the unemployment rate. Data on unemployment rate is particularly di¢ cult be-
cause most of the African countries do not collect such data. There are four
6Sachs, et.al. (1996) use trade-weighted real exchange rate.
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countries in East Africa, two countries in West Africa, one country in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean, two countries in the Melanesia, one country in Central
Asia, and one country in Western Asia, whose unemployment rates are not sys-
tematically collected. The unemployment data is collected from the IFS, CEIC,
indexmundi.com, and other websites. High unemployment rate might weaken the
economic fundamental of a country. Because of the indication of quadratic rela-
tionship of unemployment rate, we take both the linear and quadratic relationships
(see Figure 7).
Independent Variable 3: Political Fundamentals
We take an index on the level of democracy from the Polity IV Project conducted
by the Center for Systemic Peace7. The index is equal to the democratic index mi-
7The data is available at:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
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nus the autocratic index. The democratic index measures three main pillars: the
presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express e¤ective
preferences about alternative policies and leaders, the existence of institutionalized
constraints on the exercise of power by the executive, and the guarantee of civil
liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participants (Mar-
shall and Jaggers, 2009). The autocratic index measures the competitiveness of
political participation, the regulation of participation, the openness and compet-
itiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executives. Each
of the democratic and autocratic index ranges from 0 to 10, and the polity index
ranges from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic). A two-variable scatter
plot of polity index and transparency is given in Figure 8. Because the index is
categorical, from -10 to 10, we run xed-e¤ect dummy variables on polity instead
of assuming a continuous linear relationship.
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Independent Variables 4: The Level of Development
The level of development may capture other eliminated biases that are specic
to development of a region. These include institutional di¤erences, development
priorities, technology, social indicators and so on. Because of the prediction of a
quadratic relationship between GDP per capita and transparency index (see Figure
9), we take both linear and quadratic terms in our regression. The data on GDP
per capita is taken mostly from indexmundi.com.
Controlling Variables: Exchange Arrangement, Crisis, Year, Region
We control our regression by the exchange rate arrangement that is shown to
be strongly correlated with transparency index, the occurrence of nancial cri-
sis in the late 1990s/early 2000s possibly because of international pressures on
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countries in crisis to adopt transparency measures, the year or time-e¤ect that
might pick up the worldwide trend on transparency, and the region to control for
region-specic biases that could be cultural or geographic. The exchange arrange-
ments are categorized into eight arrangements as they are dened by the IMF:
exchange arrangements with no separate legal tender (1), currency board arrange-
ments (2), other conventional xed peg arrangements (3), pegged exchange rates
within horizontal bands (4), crawling pegs (5), exchange rates within crawling
bands (6), managed oating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate
(7), and independently oating (8). The source of this data is the IMFs De Facto
Classication of Exchange Rate Arrangement and Monetary Policy Frameworks8.
The e¤ect of exchange arrangement on transparency is given in Figure 10. We
do not control for monetary policy framework because of the lack of early data,
which would have reduced the size of our original panel data. We argue that
the e¤ects on monetary policy framework could be picked up by other variables
that underlie the establishment of a particular monetary policy framework, such
as the GDP per capita of the country. The countries that are considered to be in
crisis or experience spillover e¤ects from countries in crisis are: Argentina, Brazil,
Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Venezuala (Mexi-
can crisis); Argentina, Brazil, Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Singapore, South Africa,
Taiwan Province of China, Vietnam (Asian crisis); Argentina, Belarus, Bolivia,
Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Georgia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ko-
rea, Mexico, Moldova, Pakistan, Paraguay, Poland, South Africa, Tajikistan, Thai-
land, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Russian
8These reports are available from 2003-current year at:
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/index.asp. The earlier reports are available in
the IMFs Annual Reports of Exchange Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions.
226
0
5
10
15
D
E
 T
I 2
00
5
0 2 4 6 8
Exchange Rate Arrangement 2004
1-yr Lagged Exchange Rate Arrangement vs. DE TI 2005
Figure 3.10: Exchange Rate Arrangement 2004 vs. DE TI 2005
crisis)9. The region dummy variables total to 19. We categorize each country
into one of the following regions: (Africa) 1=E. Africa, 2=N. Africa, 3=S. Africa,
4=W. Africa; (Americas) 5=Latin America and Caribbean, 6=C. America, 7=S.
America, 8=N. America; (Oceania) 9=Australia and New Zealand, 10=Melanesia;
(Asia) 11=C. Asia, 12=E. Asia, 13.S. Asia, 14=S-E Asia, 15=W. Asia; (Europe)
16=E. Europe, 17=N. Europe, 18=S. Europe, 19=W. Europe. Based on the avail-
able data, the regression is run in the years of 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005.
3.4.2 Regression
The regression on the panel data is run using a multilevel mixed-e¤ects linear
regression. The xed-e¤ect is captured by specifying the xed-e¤ect dummies
9This list is taken from NBA595, Economics of Financial Crisis, Cornell University, Spring
2008.
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controlling for the year, region, and crisis as well as polity. The random-e¤ect
model is captured by specifying the grouping structures of the observations, which
in this case is the country. We run a regression based on our hypothesis above (see
Appendix 9). We test for robustness by running the regression with orthogonal-
ized variables (using the Gram-Schmidt method10) and show that unemployment
becomes insignicant while the results for the other variables remain robust. We
drop the unemployment variable because of possible collinearity, and run a an-
other regression without unemployment and the quadratic term on the ratio of
current account balance to nominal GDP that we nd is insignicant in the rst
regression. We test for robustness by running the regression with orthogonalized
variables and nd the results are robust. The following regression is the regression
that we use:
DETIi;t = + 1GDPPERCAPi;t 1 + 2(GDPPERCAPi;t 1)
2 +
3EXREGIMEi;t 1 + 4INFLATIONi;t 1 +
5RESERV Ei;t 1 + 6(RESERV Ei;t 1)
2
7RERi;t 1 + 8(RERi;t 1)
2
9DCAGDPi;t 1 +
+I(POLITYi;t 1) + I(REGIONi) + I(CRISIS) + I(Y EARt)
where:
GDPPERCAP=GDP per capita
EXREGIME=exchange rate arrangement
INFLATION=ination
10State command: orthog.
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RESERVE=the ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves
RER=Real Exchange Rate appreciation (-)/ depreciation (+)
DCAGDP= the ratio of current account balance to nominal GDP
I(POLITY)=indicator variable on polity (-10=most autocratic, +10=most de-
mocratic)
I(REGION)=indicator variable on region (1-19)
I(CRISIS)=1 if country is in crisis in the last 8 years (1998-2005), =0 otherwise
I(YEAR)=indicator variable on year (1998-2005)
We expect the coe¢ cient 1 to be positive while 2 to be negative to be con-
sistent with the argument that a country with a higher level of development has
more advanced communication technology and a human-capital advantage to sup-
port high quality economic institutions such as public data dissemination. This
e¤ect is expected to be diminishing. The e¤ect of the exchange rate arrangement
on transparency, 3, is expected to be positive. That is, countries with a more
independent or exible exchange rate arrangement tend to be more transparent.
The coe¢ cient on ination, 4, is expected to be negative. Ination could decrease
the purchasing power of the citizens. It could be a sign of an overheating econ-
omy, and it could distort the terms of trade by causing the real exchange rate to
appreciate. The linear and quadratic coe¢ cients on the ratio of broad money
to foreign exchange reserve, 5 and 6, are expected to be negative and positive
respectively. Countries with higher foreign exchange reserves are more liquid with
respect to their liquid assets and can better protect its exchange rate against de-
valuation should there be a capital inow reversal, thus rendering them less prone
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to a speculative attack. The quadratic term is evident from the graphs of the
ratio against the transparency index.
The linear and quadratic coe¢ cients on the real exchange rate appreciation
(-)/depreciation (+), 7 and 8, are expected to be positive and negative respec-
tively. Real exchange rate appreciation might indicate an overvalued exchange rate
that is prone to a speculative attack. The linear coe¢ cient of the ratio of current
account balance to nominal GDP, 9, is expected to be positive. Countries with
high ratios of current account decits to nominal GDP are more prone to capital
inow reversal and to speculative attack if foreign exchange reserves are low, real
exchange rate is overvalued and/or the banking system is weak, which would imply
low fundamentals. The question of whether this coe¢ cient should be positive or
negative is, however, subtle. Current account decits do not necessarily mean low
fundamentals because they might, for example, mirror capital account surpluses
and reect an investment boom. Some studies have also been done to show that
current account decit is not necessarily a sign of low fundamental (Ghosh and
Ramakrishnan, 2006). We conjecture that the coe¢ cient of polity is positive for
high polity indexes. We expect the crisis indicator to be positive and signicant
to capture the pressures from the lending countries on crisis-hit countries to adopt
transparency measures. We also expect the year-e¤ect to be positive and sig-
nicant to capture the increasing general trend of transparency across countries.
Some region e¤ects are signicant to capture regional biases that might include
climate, geography, biology, or culture.
The discussion of what constitutes a good economic fundamental is subtle.
There are two types of fundamentals: macroeconomic fundamentals that uctuate
considerably over time, and structural fundamentals that do not uctuate much
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over time. Countries with high structural fundamentals could still experience cri-
sis because of poor macroeconomic fundamentals. Macroeconomic fundamentals
constitute variables including changes in real exchange rate, while structural fun-
damentals constitute variables such as exchange rate regime and hyperination.
We use both macroeconomic fundamentals and structural fundamentals.
Another concern about the regression that one might address is that the change
in real exchange rate might not be completely independent from the ratio of current
account balance to GDP. As studied in Lee, Milesi-Ferretti, and Ricci (2006), the
change in real exchange rate might be an adjustment from the current account
balance to reach equilibrium. This collinearity is resolved by a robustness check
running a regression with orthogonalized variables.
3.4.3 Result
The regression result is in Appendix 10, after dropping four observations that have
very high residuals (outliers). We nd that both the linear and quadratic terms
of GDP per capita are positive and negative respectively with ve and ten percent
condence interval. This is consistent with our prediction that countries with
higher level of GDP per capita are associated with higher level of transparency.
The coe¢ cient of the exchange rate arrangement is positive and signicant
at one percent condence interval. Countries with more exible exchange rate
arrangements tend to have more transparent central banks. The coe¢ cient of
ination is negative and signicant at one percent condence interval. Countries
with higher ination tend to have less transparent central banks. The linear and
quadratic coe¢ cients of the ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves
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are negative and positive respectively with one percent condence interval, con-
sistent with our hypothesis. Countries that are more liquid with respect to their
assets tend to have more transparent central banks. The linear and quadratic
coe¢ cients of the changes of real exchange rate are negative and positive respec-
tively with ve percent condence interval. This means that countries with real
exchange rate appreciation tend to have higher levels of transparency, which is
inconsistent with our hypothesis. One argument for the inconsistency is that it
is not the changes in real exchange rate that a¤ect transparency, but rather the
exchange rate regime. Hence, changes in real exchange rate after we control for
exchange rate regime are not good indicators of fundamentals that could a¤ect
transparency. We argue that there is no macroeconomic theory that explains this
negative relationship. Changes in real exchange rate uctuate considerably and
can be considered as macroeconomic fundamentals while exchange rate regime can
be considered a structural fundamental. What seems to be more relevant in our
study are structural fundamentals rather than macroeconomic fundamentals.
The coe¢ cient of the ratio of current account balance to the nominal GDP is
negative and signicant at ve percent condence interval, which is inconsistent
with our hypothesis. We argue that this is because high current account decits
mirror high capital account surpluses, and countries with capital account surpluses,
which might reect an investment boom, are more condent in revealing their
fundamentals.
The polity index is positive and signicant only for the highest level of polity,
or the most democratic regime. Region e¤ects are signicant and positive: (one
percent condence interval for the following regions) North America, Australia
and New Zealand , Northern Europe; and (ve percent condence interval for the
232
following regions) Southern Africa. After controlling for the level of development,
developed countries still show tendencies for higher transparency. Southern Africa
has a signicantly higher transparency than that of the controlled region, Eastern
Africa, albeit with a lower coe¢ cient than those of North America, Australia
and New Zealand, and Northern Europe. Possible explanations include culture,
biology, geography, and even weather or environment. The year or time-e¤ect is
signicant at one percent condence interval and positive for all years, except 1999,
which means that countries worldwide in general experience an increasing trend in
transparency. Transparency in 1999 did not change signicantly from transparency
in 1998. The crisis index is signicant at one percent condence interval and
positive, which suggests that countries under crisis, particularly because of the four
crises between 1998-2005 including the Asian, Russian, and Mexican crises, tend to
have higher transparency indexes. This suggests possible international pressures
in particular from the IMF, which helped those countries and required them to
adopt transparency measures. These non-economic e¤ects on transparency are
consistent with our hypothesis.
To check for robustness because of the possible collinearity of variables, we run
the regression with orthogonalized independent variables and the result remains
robust. Some existing literature including Geraats (2008) and Crowe and Meade
(2007) show that certain monetary policy frameworks could a¤ect the level of
transparency. However, we did not control for the monetary policy framework in
our model because it is only available from 2001 onwards, and hence, we would
have to drop our observations from 1998 to 2001, which would have reduced the
explanatory power of most of the variables of interest11.
11We receive data on monetary policy framework prior to 2001 (1997-2005) from the IMF.
However, due to inconsistencies in identifying monetary policy framework throughout this period,
we do not use this data for the purpose of this paper.
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3.4.4 Policy Implications: Endogeneity of Institution and
Convergence Bias
The policy implications of this study lay in that the results from the empirical
study, which suggest that some economic fundamentals of a country could a¤ect the
level of transparency of central banks, which in turn could be a proxy to the quality
of economic institution. These economic fundamentals include GDP per capita
(the level of development), ination, the ratio of broad money to foreign exchange
reserves, the ratio of current account balance to nominal GDP and the exchange
rate regime. However, these are not the only factors that a¤ect the quality of
economic institution. The polity, unobserved region-e¤ect, international pressure
from lenders, and year-e¤ect also a¤ect the quality of economic institution.
This result gives a more fundamental explanation of the determinants of the
quality of economic institution than what has been done in previous literature. In
this case, the primary determinant is transparency. Controlling for the level of de-
velopment and the exchange rate regime, countries with lower ination, lower ratio
of broad money to foreign exchange reserves, and lower ratio of current account
balance to nominal GDP tend to have higher transparency. Moreover, countries
in crisis tend to have higher transparency. Countries located in Southern Africa,
North America, Australia and New Zealand, and Northern Europe tend to have
signicantly higher transparency than those of the controlled region of Eastern
Africa after controlling for the other variables. In general, all countries tend to
have higher transparency over time.
We distinguish between macroeconomic fundamentals and structural funda-
mentals. Macroeconomic fundamentals include the changes in real exchange rate
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and structural fundamentals include the level of development, the exchange rate
regime, (hyper)ination, the ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves,
and the ratio of current account balance to nominal GDP. We argue that the
structural fundamental is a more relevant variable to study quality of institution
than macroeconomic fundamental is. Of course, we cannot completely eliminate
the fact that the level of transparency might a¤ect the quality of the fundamentals,
but the panel data of this study allows us to detect the persistency of the e¤ects
of these indicators on transparency over time.
A more meaningful implication of this empirical study is that the quality of
economic institution is endogenous. Economic fundamentals may a¤ect the quality
of economic institution, which in turn a¤ect the fundamentals. There is also a
more general time-trend, as all countries generally experience an increasing level
of transparency. In other words, even countries with low economic fundamentals
and transparency will tend to experience an increase in their level of transparency
over time. We can also show that the growth of DE TI from 1998 to 2005 is
higher for countries with lower initial transparency index in 1998. This suggests
the convergence or catching-up bias (see Figure 11).
Another interesting observation, although not directly related to this study, is
the evidence of reversal of fortune (see Figure 12-14). In these gures, over time,
we can show that GDP per capita could have a negative e¤ect on the quality of
political institution, such as the Rule of Index from the Worldwide Governance
Indicators. Countries with very high values of GDP per capita with relatively low
Rule of Law Index include Qatar, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirate. These are
countries that are rich in oil, petroleum, and natural gas. These countries tend
to be reluctant to improve their institutions because, even without high quality of
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institution, they could still enjoy high standards of living.
3.5 The Role of Information In The Process Towards East
Asian Integration
3.5.1 History of Asian Regional Financial Arrangement
After the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, East Asian economists, some of whom
were disappointed with the management of the crisis under the IMF, realized the
need to establish an economic institution to safeguard the East Asian countries
from another nancial crisis and to facilitate regional economic cooperation. Since
August 1997, Japan had already proposed an "Asian Monetary Fund". Thirteen
countries consisting of the ten ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, and Korea,
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now termed the ASEAN+3 countries, gathered together in December 1997 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, to discuss the establishment of a regional economic institution.
This was the rst summit to begin the Asian regional economic cooperation after
the 1997-1998 nancial crisis. On May 6, 2000, Chiang Mai Initiatives Bilateral
Swap was initiated to facilitate bilateral swap arrangements and protect member
countries from short-term liquidity crisis as well as to supplement the existing bor-
rowing support facilities. By May 15, 2004, sixteen Bilateral Swap Agreements
were already made totalling to US$36.5 billion, and on the same day, nance min-
isters initiated the Asian Bond Market Initiatives, ASEAN+3 Research Groups,
and regional monitoring of short-term capital ows. They also agreed to adopt the
new Basel Capital Accord regulating banking laws. By this time, the ASEAN+3
countries had managed to agree on ve main pillars of regional nancial arrange-
ments, namely the Chiang Mai Initiatives, the Asian Bond Market Initiatives, the
regional surveillance and regional monitoring (which was consolidated in regular
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policy meetings known as the Economic Review and Policy Dialogue or ERPD),
and the ASEAN+3 Research Groups. On May 5, 2007, a self-managed reserve
pooling arrangement was envisaged. On May 4, 2008, the Chiang Mai Initiatives
were transformed into a much stronger Chiang Mai Initiatives Multilaterization.
On October 25, 2008, a self-managed reserve pool amounting to US$80 billion based
on the Chiang Mai Initiatives Multilaterization was created. The three countries,
China, Japan and Korea, committed to provide 80 percent of the total fund of
US$80 billion while the rests of the ASEAN countries contributed the remainder.
On December 13, 2008, a trilateral summit among China, Japan, and Korea was
held. In this meeting, the three countries reiterated their commitments to the
Chiang Mai Initiatives Multilaterization and most importantly, this meeting was
a development in their long-time reservation. On December 15, 2008, this foreign
exchange reserve pool was envisaged to expand to US$120 billion from US$80 bil-
lion. On November 20 and 28, 2008, a technical-group meeting and deputy nance
ministerial meeting were held to work out the technical details of the self-managed
reserve pool. This self-managed reserve pool was expected to take e¤ect in May
2009. On February 18, 2009, the Asian Development Bank kicked o¤ studies to
better facilitate cross-border, regional investment through the local Asian bond
markets by aligning regulations, laws and policies on various local Asian bond
markets. On February 19, 2009, ASEAN+3 countries met in Phuket, Thailand,
to advance the agreement on expanding the reserve pool to US$120 billion in order
to better safeguard member countries against liquidity crisis. Commitment for
more integration was reiterated as Asian exports slumped. They envisaged an
Asian economic community by 2015. Free ows of trade and tolerance for cul-
ture di¤erences were among the projected means of achieving regional integration.
East Asian countriesinternational reserve currently totalled close to US$4 trillion
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(Soesastro, 2008). Asian currency and Asian Monetary Union have also been
envisioned. The chronology of the ASEAN+3 regional nancial arrangement is
given in Appendix 11.
3.5.2 Economic Factors: Distrust, Asymmetric Power, and
Transparency Aversion
Despite this seemingly accelerating regional cooperation e¤ort among East Asian
countries after the 1997-1998 nancial crisis and the rst time a regional nancial
arrangement was envisaged by the thirteen East Asian countries in 1997, this re-
gional nancial arrangement was never o¢ cially institutionalized, unlike for exam-
ple, the EuropeanMonetary Union. No secretariat o¢ ce of Asian regional nancial
arrangement was ever built. We argue using our theoretical propositions above and
other game theoretical analysis that it is extremely di¢ cult to institutionalize the
existing regional nancial arrangement in East Asia given its distinctive history,
economic, and political background. We argue that economic fundamentals alone
are not enough to fully explain the failure to institutionalize a regional nancial
arrangement. We further argue that political, security, military and sociocultural
factors could be more serious in having slowed the progress towards an institu-
tionalized Asian regional nancial arrangement. A study shows that variations
in the qualities of economic institutions, namely transparency of central banks,
cannot be explained by economic fundamentals, but can be explained by polity.
Institutionalizing an Asian regional nancial arrangement could only take e¤ect
gradually because of these non-economic factors. Economic incentives, in fact,
are more likely to bring East Asian countries toward greater integration during
troubled times to counter the political, security, military and sociocultural factors.
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We will begin with three economic arguments based on game theoretical analysis
to explain why it is di¢ cult to institutionalize a regional nancial arrangement.
These three arguments are the values of trust, symmetry, and information.
The Value of Trust: Positive Economic Shocks vs. Security, Military,
Political Issues
One of the reasons for miscoordination lays in institutionalized beliefs that discour-
age cooperative behavior. Consider a simple two-player coordination game where
two equilibria exist, with the cooperative equilibrium Pareto-dominating the non-
cooperative equilibrium. The playerss beliefs of how other players behave will
determine their strategies. Beliefs are formed by initial beliefs and observable
actions afterwards if the games are repeated. Players can be "trapped" in the
Pareto-dominated equilibrium in each period if initial beliefs dictate that they
begin by playing the Pareto-dominated equilibrium and the next periods beliefs
will dictate the players to play the Pareto-dominated equilibrium with an even
stronger belief that the others will play the Pareto-dominated equilibrium. In the
long-run, this institutionalized belief becomes social norms. Initial belief is thus
a vital factor in determining future trajectories. On one extreme, an accidental
distrust can create a vicious cycle, while on the other extreme, an accidental trust
can create a virtuous cycle. History can therefore create a feeling of distrust for
a long period of time. Given the history of the Sino-Japan war, it is not unrea-
sonable to believe that in the case of East Asian countries, particularly China and
Japan, the feeling of distrust dictates non-cooperation despite economic outcomes
that Pareto-dominate this non-cooperative outcome. A stronger case of trust is
the PrisonersDilemma game. In this case, the rational outcome is not an equi-
librium. Hence, in order to achieve the rational, Pareto-Dominant outcome, a
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stronger sense of trust is needed. Experimental studies, however, show that the
predicted non-cooperative equilibrium does not necessarily prevail if the games are
repeated. Thus, people do have an intrinsic desire to achieve cooperation. The
question is how to initiate it.
Schelling (2007) introduces a solution to resolve the multiplicity of equilib-
ria, such as in the case of the coordination game, that is a focal point. Basus
Taxi-Driver (2003) example or Myersons (2004) justice, truthful equilibrium, and
institution arguments illustrate Schellings concept of a focal point to explain real-
life phenomena that are subject to a multiplicity of equilibria. Myerson (2004)
provides an argument that explains why, even in the case of a multiplicity of equi-
libria, our everyday lives are far from facing conicts. Myerson explains more
explicitly Schellings idea of a focal point. He argues that a lot of situations we
face and the self-enforcing actions we take are the result of an arbitrator,such
as an institution in a multiple-equilibria setting. In the Taxi-Driver example, Basu
(2003) argues that we observe particular equilibria being played and not the other
possible outcomes because of the existence of a set rulesthat set a focal point
of actions. Self-interested individuals can expect an equilibrium to be played
through this focal point,and it is out of their selsh interest that they behave in
this manner. To some extent, the role of an arbitrator or a focal point resembles
the role of a coordination device in a correlated equilibrium. Suppose there were
two possible economic outcomes in the case of East Asian regional economic co-
operation context, and one of the outcomes Pareto-dominates the other outcome.
We might argue that there could be a focal point that dictates these East Asian
countries to behave non-cooperatively or choose the Pareto-dominated equilibrium.
It could indeed be that past observations of non-cooperative behaviors during the
war became institutionalized into implicit rules of social norms. Greif (2006) ar-
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gues that, "even marginal changes in the rules of the game are not likely to cause
behavioral changes, because past behavior constitutes a focal point." The Sino-
Japan war, hence, could create not only an accidental distrust, but also a focal
point for behaving non-cooperatively in the case of multiple outcomes. Moreover,
the lack of institutions could be the cause of miscoordination because there is no
focal point. The idea of the focal point becomes the basis of Myersons concept
of cooperative game theory (Myerson, 1991).
The feeling of distrust could have died away because the two countries must
have intrinsic values to cooperate, especially in repeated interactions. However,
in the case of Japan and China, it seems that this feeling of distrust is prolonged
by some of the elements from the war that are still carried on today. An example
of these is the presence of the U.S. military base in Japan that might worsen the
relationship between Japan and China12. Economic incentives to integrate, similar
to the European Union, might not work in East Asia because of the military power
of the US in Japan, which creates a prolonged feeling of distrust between Japan
and China. Another issue surrounding the prolonged distrust from the Sino-Japan
lays in the education and communication sectors, as the history of the Sino-Japan
war is never completely and truly disclosed in Japan. Most teenagers who have
been educated in Japan never truly know the history of the Sino-Japan war. It has
been recorded by many people that Japanese colonization was very cruel. The
fact that the Japanese government does not fully reveal this history might create
hatred among the war victims. Moreover, religious shrines to honor those who
fought during the Sino-Japan have raised opposition from people who come from
the formerly colonized countries.
The threat of a nuclear war could also prolong the feeling of distrust. China is
12Private conversation with M. Fujita (RIETI, Japan) in August 2008.
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the only country in East Asia that owns nuclear weapons and produces signicant
amounts of uranium. While the ASEAN countries had signed the treaty of South
East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) in Bangkok, Thailand, in
1995, none of the ve nuclear weapon facilitators, including China, signed the
SEANWFZ13. This threat could exacerbate the feeling of distrust against China.
Nash Bargaining solution predicts that if China could threaten other countries
with nuclear war in the case of a failure from bargaining, then this could reduce
the expected payo¤s of the less powerful countries from a negotiation. If the threat
point is a nuclear war, then bargaining with China could be undesirable for the
other countries.
To address the di¢ culty of cooperation that game theory already predicts, we
begin our discussion of how to untangle the vicious cycle of distrust and non-
cooperative behavior or to change the focal point that reinforces non-cooperative
outcomes. An important policy question in the case of the self-reinforcing, en-
dogenous, evolutionary system is how we can break the cycle. History suggests
that this cycle could be broken or the process to reformation could be sped up by
exogenous shocks that may come from outside or within the cycle. European coun-
tries, for example, are able to integrate both politically and economically through
the European Union and the European Monetary Union despite the Second World
War. In the case of the European countries, economic incentives had overpowered
the non-cooperative inclinations from the past. The European Coal and Steel
Community in 1950 had been able to integrate the European communities both
economically and politically starting from six founding countries, including Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, and the Netherlands. In 1957, the
European Economic Community was established. In 1032, Venice was able to
13China is also the only country among the ve countries that own nuclear weapons that is
not a member country nor a partner member country of NATO.
244
restore economic cooperation because the elected monarchy was changed into a
republican magistracy (Greif, 2006). This is an example of how a central rule that
changed political structures could end economic disintegration. The Tsunami in
Aceh, Indonesia, had brought a silver lining to the region by ending the long-time
civil war. Mt. Geumgang, a recreational park located in the demilitarized zone
between North and South Korea, could be a beginning of peace resolution between
the two countries. This recreational park was initiated by two sides: a South
Korean business elite (Hyundai) who had a personal longing to visit his native
land in the North and the North Korean government, who was probably more
economically motivated. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack had brought
the American people closer together. These exogenous shocks had changed the
social, economic, or political condition of a region, state or country. Factors that
break the vicious cycle of distrust and non-cooperative behaviors, however, do not
necessarily come from elements outside the system. They may also come from
elements inside the system, namely through "voice" or demand for a change of
the constituents (Hirschman, 1970). Hence, breaking a cycle of an endogenous
system can come both from elements outside or within the system and can come
gradually (e.g. the establishment of the European Union) or it can come in an
instant (e.g. the peace resolution in Aceh).
In 1997-1998, some of the East Asian countries experienced a severe nancial
crisis, and currently are su¤ering from 2007 global nancial crisis. The 1997-1998
Asian nancial crisis and the 2007 global nancial crisis can be exogenous shocks
that call for a regional nancial integration. The initiation of the regional nan-
cial arrangement was a sign that East Asian countries realized the need to break
the cycle of non-cooperative behaviors and move towards regional economic inte-
gration. Looking to the future, the 2007 global nancial crisis that was triggered
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by global economic imbalance, credit bubbles, and deregulation triggered an even
greater regional economic integration to provide a rewall against nancial crisis
as economies slumped. The tendency to integrate in the presence of a threat
is recorded by Greif among Genoese clan in 1155. Opposing Genoese clans in
1155 mobilized their resources to begin building walls around the city to protect
themselves against the external threat from a new German emperor who intended
to gain control over the northern Italian cities (Greif, 2006). These positive eco-
nomic shocks could therefore counter the prolonged distrust and non-cooperative
behavior since the Sino-Japan war. However, as East Asian countries regain their
prosperity in the future, it might be that incentives to integrate will disappear
and trigger non-cooperative behaviors, such was the case in Genoa in 1189-1194,
when the external threat from the German emperor disappeared and economic
prosperity and past investments in military ability made Genoese clans seek po-
litical dominance and engage in an arms race (Greif, 2006). This is probably
why establishing a regional nancial institution could be important in sustaining
cooperative behaviors for the long-run.
The Value of Symmetry: Asymmetric Bargaining Power and Hetero-
geneity
We have partly explained why it can be very di¢ cult to make countries commit
to cooperation under institutionalized beliefs of distrust, although we argue it
could be facilitated by positive economic shocks that call for regional nancial
integration. What we will discuss in this section is the asymmetric bargaining
power, particularly that of China (see Tables 3.4-3.6).
Economically and population-wise, China could overpower all other countries
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Table 3.4: Population, Area, Nuclear Weapon (Source: UNData)
Country Population(est.07)(000) Area(km2) Nuclear Weapon
Brunei Darussalam 390 5,765 x
Cambodia 14,444 181,035 x
Laos 5,859 236,800 x
Malaysia 26,572 329,847 x
Myanmar 48,798 676,578 x
Philippines 87,960 300,000 x
Singapore 4,436 699 x
Thailand 63,884 513,120 x
Vietnam 87,375 331,689 x
China 1,328,630 9,596,961 v
Japan 127,967 377,873 x
Korea 48,224 99,538 x
Indonesia 231,627 1,904,569 x
in the region. Chinas population is more than the total population of the rest
of the ASEAN+3 countries. Its area is approximately ve times bigger than the
second biggest country in terms of its area among the ASEAN+3 countries, namely
Indonesia. China is nancially dominant with the worlds highest international
reserve and trade balance. Not only economically, geographically, and demograph-
ically does China dominate the other countries in the region, but it is one of the
ve countries in the world that owns a nuclear weapon and is the only country in
the region that has enough uranium production to produce uranium weapons.
Asymmetric power could make the decision-making process more complicated.
At the moment, general policy decisions are based on consensus. Only in the case
of disagreement or no consensus, will China or Japan dominate the decision-making
process. Population-based decision-making could mean that China overpowers all
other countries, which is undesirable for smaller countries. The consensus-based
decision-making process results in a more equal division of power. Instead of
China and Japan dominating in the case of no consensus, one voice from the less
dominant countries could be included, for example.
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Table 3.5: Strategic Commodities of ASEAN+3 (Source: CIA, WorldFact Book)
Country Strategic Commodities
Brunei Darussalam Petroleum, gas, timber
Cambodia oil, gas, timber, gemstones, iron, ores, manganese
phosphates, hydropower
Laos timber, hydropower, gypsum, tin, gold, gemstones
Malaysia tin, petroleum, timber, copper, iron, ore, natural gas,
bauxite
Myanmar petroleum, timber, tin, antimony, zinc, copper, tungsten,
coal, marble, gemstones, precious stones, natural gas,
lead, hydropower
Philippines timber, petroleum, nickel, cobalt, silver, gold, salt, copper
Singapore sh, deepwater ports
Thailand tin, rubber, natural gas, tungsten, tantalum, lignite, timber
lead, sh, gypsum, uorite
Vietnam phosphate, coal, manganese, bauxite, chromate,
o¤shore oil, gas, forests, hydropower
China coal, uranium, iron ore, petroleum, magnetite, natural gas,
tin, tungsten, antimony, manganese, molybdenum,
aluminium, lead, zinc, uranium,
mercury, vanadium, hydropower (worlds largest)
Japan negligible natural resources, sh
Korea coal, tungsten, graphite, molybdenum, lead, hydropower
Indonesia petroleum, tin, natural gas, nickel, timber, bauxite, copper
coal, gold, silver
USA
.% &-
!
ASEAN+2  China
 ;-;%=Surplus; !;.;&=Decit
One way to measure the relative bargaining power among the ASEAN+3 coun-
tries is their trade surplus relative to other ASEAN+3 countries and to the U.S.A..
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Table 3.6: Total Reserves, Trade Balance, Financial Account (Source: IFS)
Countryn(in mil.US$) Total Reserve-Gold Trade balance Financial Account
Brunei Darussalam 513570 6041 575
Cambodia 1157 -1056 324
Laos 328 -178 230
Malaysia 82132 36698 -11894
Myanmar 1235 2211 253
Philippines 20024 -6732 1351
Singapore 136260 43432 -18580
Thailand 65291 13844 5649
Vietnam 13384 -2776 3088
China 1068490 217746 2642
Japan 879682 81303 -102343
Korea 210317 32683 7104
Indonesia 41103 29660 2594
Consider the trade triangleabove. China will have the most bargaining power
given the size of its trade surplus. Non-symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution for
cooperative games show that the unique solution in a bargaining game that satisfy
the strong e¢ ciency, individual rationality, scale covariance, and independence of
irrelevant alternatives axioms is the solution to the maximization problem of the
generalized Nash product. In a two-player game, for example, the degree of bar-
gaining power, the power coe¢ cient, will increase the expected utility of the player.
Given the extremely strong bargaining power of China compared to the rest of the
ASEAN+3 countries, China could overpower other countries and secure a signi-
cant amount of the surplus. One way to solve this asymmetric bargaining power
in the case of China is to change the threat points. Decreasing the opponents
payo¤ or increasing his/her payo¤ at the threat point will increase the payo¤ of a
player from bargaining.
There are three ways in which threat points can be constructed depending
on the communication structures among the countries (Myerson, 1991). The
three kinds of threat points from di¤erent communication structures are called the
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equilibrium threat points, the minimax-value threat points, and the rational threat
points. Let us consider the rational-threat theory. The rational threat points are
useful to apply in situations where players could commit to a planned strategy at
the threat point. This theory suggests that lowering the opponents payo¤ at the
threat point by, for example, acting antagonistically at the pre-play communication
stage to create a more favorable disagreement payo¤, could increase the negotiation
payo¤ of the player. This is also called the chilling e¤ect. ASEAN+2 countries
could have credibly threatened to act aggressively against China should there be
any disagreement among the ASEAN+3 countries in order to lower the size of
the surplus that China would receive from the negotiation. For example, the
ASEAN+2 countries could have committed to impose economic sanctions should
they not end up in negotiation with China. In other words, in order to decrease
the power of China, the ASEAN+2 countries could have committed to decrease
the payo¤ of China at the threat point. However, there might not be any threat
that is realistic because the power of China is so omnipresent that no country will
rationally commit to ending their relationship with China.
Recently the ASEAN+3 countries expanded its coalition to ASEAN+6 adding
India, Australia, and New Zealand. Some people speculate that this was done in
order to reduce the power of China. Coalitional analysis could be done to nd
the optimal membership of the regional nancial arrangement. It could also be
that any bargaining process between China and ASEAN+2 countries will always
render China better o¤ as independent because of the omnipresent power. During
the times of crisis, there are more incentives for countries to integrate. This could
probably be modeled as a Nash bargaining problem in which the payo¤ for each
country at the threat point is very low, such that the game is feasible even for a
set of low feasible payo¤s.
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Another factor that might impede the progress of an institutionalized regional
nancial arrangement is the number of the potential member countries. Intuitively,
the higher the number of players, the more complex it is to regulate and hence,
to institutionalize. This is exacerbated by the asymmetries and heterogeneity
among the countries. Heterogeneity among the ASEAN +3 countries, particularly
in terms of their level of development, might create di¤erent goals for setting up
a regional integration (see Table 3.7). While the main interests of low-income
countries such as Myanmar, Laos, or Cambodia are to eliminate poverty and other
social issues, the main interests of high-income countries like Japan, Korea, and
Singapore are to increase resilience to nancial crisis by accumulating large foreign
reserves. Heterogeneity among ASEAN+3 countries makes setting up common
goals more di¢ cult.
Table 3.7: GDP per Capita and Poverty of ASEAN+3 (Source: The WorldFact
Book, IndexMundi)
Country GDP per Capita (US$)(Jan.08) Pop.below poverty line (%)
Brunei Darussalam 50,756 N.A.
Singapore 48,900 N.A.
China (Hongkong) 42,000 N.A.
Japan 33,800 N.A.
South Korea 24,600 15 (2003)
Malaysia 14,400 5.1 (2002)
Thailand 8,000 10 (2002)
China (Mainland) 5,300 8 (2006)
Indonesia 3,400 17.6 (2006)
Philippines 3,300 30 (2003)
Vietnam 2,900 14.75 (2007)
Laos 2,224 30.7 (2005)
Cambodia 1,942 35 (2004)
Myanmar 1,027 32.7 (2007)
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The Value of Information: Pro- or Anti-Transparency
The role of information is indispensable in any strategic interaction, including
strategies to cooperate. Under incompleteness of information, cooperation is even
harder to achieve because it has to be supported by beliefs about the type of
the other players and that the other players are also going to cooperate. More-
over, beliefs are di¢ cult to change because it takes a series of observable actions.
Transparency can resolve asymmetric information. By being transparent, there
is no agency problem, including moral hazard and adverse selection (or the hy-
brid of moral hazard and adverse selection). Establishing an institution, in fact,
can resolve the issue of uncertainty by putting forth a stable structure for human
interactions and information exchange (North, 1990). Hence, establishing an insti-
tution can resolve at least some uncertainty entailed in cooperation. It has so far
been evident that establishing an institution, such as the IMF, promotes greater
transparency that may resolve not only uncertainty but also risks, perhaps by a
countrys publication of the IMFs Article IV that contains the countrys macro-
economic data and a sta¤ report, which reduces imprecision of information.
However, as we argue earlier, heterogenous countries with di¤erent fundamen-
tals, might prefer di¤erent levels of transparency. Hence, transparency-aversion
(see Transparency-Aversion proposition above) by some low- and intermediate-
fundamental countries might discourage these countries from seeking the estab-
lishment of an institution in the rst place. What we are going to discuss here
is that although aversions to transparency could certainly impede the establish-
ment of an institutionalized regional nancial arrangement, their ill e¤ects may
be eroded or completely eliminated by the reputation e¤ects and adverse selection
biases. While aversions to transparency by some types of countries, in addition to
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distrust and asymmetric bargaining power, could have slowed the progress toward
institutionalizing an Asian regional nancial arrangement, reputation e¤ects and
adverse selection biases might instead promote institution-seeking behaviors and
institutionalization.
Economists and policy makers may already know that transparency, or symme-
try of information, could facilitate more cooperation. Transparency in monetary
policies is often stated as being necessary to align peoples expectations to the
targeted policies. Studies have also been done to show that not only does the
level of development of a country increase the level of transparency of its central
bank, but further that the level of transparency increases the GDP per capita
in the same year or decreases the subsequent ination of that country (Geraats,
2008, and Dincer and Eichengreen, 2007). Hence, pro-transparency rather than
anti-transparency should have been favored by all regional countries who perceive
cooperation as benecial to their economies. Furthermore, all regional countries
should have had the incentives to seek the establishment of an institutionalized re-
gional nancial arrangement that promotes transparency. The question becomes,
why has the progress towards an institutionalized regional nancial arrangement
been slow?
Since transparency could facilitate more cooperation, it may seem self - con-
tradictory that potential member countries may not favor the institutionalization
of the current regional nancial arrangement. Despite this, it is not clear whether
individual countries will indeed self-interestedly seek transparency. In other words,
one could say that transparency is indeed necessary for regional cooperation that is
benecial to the region and eventually ones own country, but it is unclear whether
individual countries will seek transparency based on their own self-interests. The
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problem resembles that of a public good, namely a collective action problem, a
free-rider problem, or a problem in a PrisonersDilemma game. Each country
will benet from increased transparency by other countries, but may or may not
prefer to be transparent itself. In the end, no institution is built.
What we show in the theoretical model in this paper is that countries with
critical fundamentals may be better o¤ under low transparency if there is a high
probability of the Pareto-dominated equilibrium being played in the case of multi-
ple equilibria. This is because a multiplicity of equilibria arises with a high level
of transparency under incompleteness of information if a multiplicity of equilibria
exists under completeness of information. Moreover, we can expect that low-
fundamental countries will always choose non-transparency if there are negative
externalities from revealing bad fundamentals, such as bad reputation. Hence,
both the intermediate- and low-fundamental countries are better o¤under low-level
of transparency or no transparency.
Now, suppose that under an institutionalized regional nancial arrangement,
member countries will have to oblige to a high level of transparency, for example
by having to comply to regional surveillance and monitoring measures. Therefore,
it may not be in the best interests of countries with either an intermediate or low
fundamental to seek the establishment of an institutionalized regional nancial
arrangement, because under a high level of transparency these countries will be
worse o¤.
However, in this case, transparency is endogenous as the choice exists of whether
to select ones own level of transparency or be subject to regulation by seeking an
institutionalized regional nancial arrangement. In other words, each country can
choose its own level of transparency by joining or not joining the institutionalized
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regional nancial arrangement. Under such a situation, the choice of transparency
or transparency-seeking behavior could signal the fundamentals. Not seeking the
establishment of an institutionalized regional nancial arrangement may signal a
low fundamental, while seeking the establishment of an institutionalized regional
nancial arrangement may signal a high fundamental. Under this endogenous
transparency model, we might see all countries, except countries with the lowest
fundamental (the lemon car), choosing to seek the establishment of an institution-
alized regional nancial arrangement because of the reputation e¤ects and adverse
selection biases.
Based on our theoretical study, therefore, we predict that although some coun-
tries may be more averse to transparency than others and hence less inclined to
seek the establishment of an institutionalized regional nancial arrangement, the
degree of transparency-aversion is eroded by the reputation e¤ects and adverse
selection biases. Only the worst-fundamental countries could be expected to re-
main opaque. These reputation e¤ects are exacerbated if these happen in a close
community, such as the ASEAN+3 community, since there is a localization of in-
formation in a smaller community (Dixit, 2004). Moreover, in a small community,
anonymity diminishes (Greif, 2006). Thus, the endogenous rather than exogenous
transparency model is the more appropriate model for the case of ASEAN+3.
In order to show these reputation e¤ects and adverse selection biases, we look
at the transparency level of the ASEAN+3 countries through the publication of
Article IV and participation in the IMFs Special Data Dissemination Standard
(SDDS) and the IMFs General Data Dissemination Standard (GDDS) (see Figure
8). We do not use the DE Transparency Index because not all thirteen countries
are studied. However, this binary data, i.e. publish or not publish and join or not
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join, is probably preferable given the strategies of the players in the endogenous
transparency model is binary. IMFs Article IV publication is voluntary14. GDDS
and SDDS are the IMFs public data dissemination facilities to promote, among
other objectives, transparency of macroeconomic and nancial data. SDDS por-
trays a countrys access to international capital market by providing data in the
economic and nancial sectors15. GDDS is less prescriptive than the SDDS and
focuses on the improvement in data quality by identifying plans for improvements
as well as associated needs for assistance in implementing these needs. This is
in contrast with SDDS, in which the focus is on data dissemination by countries,
which in general already meet high standards of data quality (IMF.org).
Table 3.8: Publication of Article IV, SDDS, GDDS of ASEAN+3 (Source:
IMF.org)
Country Article IV Publication SDDS GDDS
Brunei Darussalam Yes x v
Cambodia Yes x v
Laos Yes x x
Malaysia Yes v x
Myanmar No x x
Philippines Yes v x
Singapore Yes v x
Thailand Yes v x
Vietnam Yes x v
China Yes x v
Japan Yes v x
Korea Yes v x
Indonesia Yes v x
We observe what might have been the lemon car phenomenon. Among the
thirteen ASEAN+3 countries, only one country, Myanmar, does not publish the
14Most of published documents by Executive Board, including IMFs Article IV, are "voluntary
but presumed." This means that it needs member countrys consent to published. Documents
are not consulted with countrys authorities, and once published, only limited changes can be
made. (IMF Seeks View of Its Transparency Policy, March 25, 2009)
15We assume that participation in SDDS is a measure of transparency in which public data
is disseminated in order to get access ot the international capital market. It might be that
countries will not participate in SDDS for other reasons than to remain opaque.
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IMFs Article IV, despite the fact that it had been encouraged among East Asian
countries after the 1997-1998 Asian nancial crisis. Not only does Myanmar not
publish Article IV, but it also does not participate in the IMF data dissemination
standards. Laos is the only country who publishes IMFs Article IV, but does
not participate in any of the public data dissemination. Four countries partic-
ipate in the IMFs GDDS instead of SDDS, which means that these countries,
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Vietnam, and China, do not seek access to the
international capital market and/or have low data quality standards and they are
currently being assisted by the IMF.
In order to check whether this observation is consistent with the lemon car phe-
nomenon, we take six indicators of macroeconomic fundamental from 1997-2008.
The macroeconomic fundamentals include: real GDP growth, the ratio of current
account decit to nominal GDP, the ratio of M2 to total reserve minus gold, the
growth of private sector lending, ination, and real exchange rate appreciation.
Following Sachs, et.al. (1996), we use real exchange rate appreciation and private
sector lending boom to measure the vulnerability of the fundamentals to specula-
tive attacks and the ratio of M2 to total reserves minus gold to measure the reserve
availability to protect the exchange rate from devaluation. Real GDP growth is a
sign of productivity, recession or boom, and high or low unemployment rate. The
ratio of current account decit to nominal GDP measures how large capital inows
are, in which a high current account decit with a low international reserve can
trigger speculation. Ination is a sign of overheating economy and might distort
the term-of-trade. Figure 15 shows six indicators of fundamentals for ASEAN+3
countries in 2003 (the complete data is in the Appendix 12)16.
16The use of the year (2003) is debatable. We would like to measure how fundamentals
a¤ect transparency, and hence data to measure fundamentals should be before the transparecy
measures, which is in 2009. More recent data on fundamental might be desirable. A lack of
data for Mynmar impedes us to use a later data. Despite this issue, the result that Mynmar is
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2003 %Real GDP DCA/GDP M2/Reserve, M2=Broad MoneyLending Boom Inflation %RER Expert Ranking
Mynmar 0.0578835 0.121424 2.55857979 0.067191737 0.01 0.0126 13
Cambodia 0.087 -0.05018 1.02749899 0.262260249 0.0121 0.024 12
Laos 0.058 -0.032 1.94106075 -0.001954166 0.1549 -0.132 11
Philippines 0.0491542 0.003708 2.26876205 0.029153346 0.0345 0.0346 10
Vietnam 0.073 -0.04925 4.22248034 0.324 0.0322 0.0064 9
Indonesia 0.0477993 0.034079 3.22917063 0.192213629 0.0659 -0.091 8
Korea 0.031 0.019665 3.263 0.087 0.035 -0.007 7
Thailand 0.07 0.032 3.46920469 0.064020855 0.018 -0.078 6
Brunei 0.039222 0.46949 10.257 0.034153412 0.003 -0.002 5
China 0.1 0.027837 6.54865632 0.194983345 0.0116 0.011 4
Malaysia 0.0578835 0.121424 2.55857979 0.067191737 0.01 0.0126 3
Japan 0.015 0.029755 9.609 -0.039256361 -0.0025 -0.084 2
Singapore 0.035 0.226 1.19005999 0.028265763 0.0051 -0.003 1
Figure 3.15: ASEAN+3: Fundamental (2003) and Expert Ranking
What we observe here is that Myanmar is indeed ranked the lowest in terms of
its fundamentals relative to its neighbors by an expert17. From the 2003 data, we
see that although Myanmars real GDP growth is accelerating, they have an ex-
tremely low foreign exchange reserve with respect to their broad money, extremely
high ination, and extremely high real exchange rate appreciation. With the ex-
ception of 2003, Myanmar also had a very high private lending. Although the year
in which the fundamental measures are taken is lagged by six years because of the
lack of complete, more recent data, the fact that Myanmar has the lowest funda-
mental among the countries seems to be robust. What is less obvious is whether
Myanmar remains opaque because of its low fundamental or because of the fact
that Myanmar is a military-regime country. If we are to consider rules of law
the country with the lowest fundamental is robust.
17Hadi Soesastro is the Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) in Indonesia. He is currently a Member of the National Team for International Trade
Negotiations and is the Chairman of the Expert Team to assist the Minister of Finance of the
Republic of Indonesia on international economic issues. He is also Adjunct Professor at the
Australian National University (ANU) in Canberra (Australia) and has lectured at a number
of universities in Indonesia and in the United States, including Columbia University in New
York. He is also the Chairman of the International Steering Committee of the Pacic Trade and
Development (PAFTAD).
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Figure 3.16: Rule of Law Index, 1996-2007, ASEAN+3
as important non-economic factors, then Myanmars Rule of Law Index18 (from
the Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996-2007) is also ranked lowest among
neighboring countries (see Figure 16).
We also observe that the next least transparent country that does not partic-
ipate in either of the IMFs public data dissemination standards, Laos, is ranked
the third lowest by the expert in terms of its fundamental. Since Laos if not a
military-regime country, this might strengthen our hypothesis that economic fun-
damentals could have a¤ected transparency. Countries that participate in GDDS
instead of SDDS are Brunei Darussalam, China, Vietnam and Cambodia. This
means that these countries have a low quality of data dissemination and/or may
not seek access to international capital market. The fact that Brunei Darussalam
and China have relatively high fundamentals will contradict our hypothesis that
these countries should have participated more actively in public data dissemina-
18Rule of Law Index measures the "justness" and political freedom of a society that may a¤ect
the economic fundamental of a country.
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tion. According to expert opinion, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam are two
anomalies in the region, that despite their relatively high fundamentals, remain
opaque in terms of its nancial issues. In the case of Singapore, it may be related
to the strong stance on an authoritarian leadership19. Brunei Darussalam remains
opaque because it is a monarchial country and it does not seek international capital
market because of a rich oil supply.
These anomalies, therefore, cannot be explained by economic-fundamental rea-
sons, but can be explained by political reasons. Our study in the next section shows
that these anomalies could be best explained by the level of democracy. This study
suggests that the level of democracy is highly positively correlated with the level of
transparency. Brunei Darussalam is a monarchial country. Myanmar, Vietnam
and China are considered non-democratic countries, and Singapore and Cambodia
are considered semi-democratic countries. Laos is ranked 141 out of 150 (second
lowest behind Myanmar) in terms of its democracy in 2008 by the World Audit
Democracy. This might explain why Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, Vietnam,
China, Laos and Cambodia remain opaque or do not actively participate in pub-
lic data dissemination, while Singapore, despite being ranked rst in terms of its
fundamental, remains relatively opaque.
A compelling argument to draw here is that economic fundamentals, political
and economic institutions are endogenous. This is probably why we see that coun-
tries such as Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, with no or low level of democracy and
low Rule of Law (see Figure 16 and Figure 17) tend to be less transparent and have
low fundamentals. Suppose we could start from no democracy, which causes less
transparency, which then combined with low rule of law causes low fundamental,
19In an economic forum in 2008, Lee Kwan Yew, reiterated Singaporean stance on authoritarian
leadership without corruption.
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causing even less democracy, and so on. In the case of ASEAN+3, variations in
the level of transparency could not be explained by economic fundamentals alone,
but also political fundamentals.
3.5.3 Polity, Social-Cultural Factors, and International Pres-
sures
Polity
ASEAN+3 countries are heterogenous in terms of the level of democracy. Dif-
ferences in the level of democracy among ASEAN+3 countries could a¤ect the
level of transparency and the level of political openness as well as attitudes to-
wards regional integration of individual countries. Some countries that are less
democratic such as China and Myanmar might be less willing to open up to the
regional community. The rank of the central bank transparency of the countries
studied in Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) (see Figure 17) correlates positively to
the level of democracy (Table 3.9). China being the least democratic country has
the lowest level of DE Transparency Index while the semi-democratic countries,
namely Singapore and Malaysia, are ranked the second and third least transpar-
ent countries after China. Liberal Democratic countries, namely Japan and South
Korea, are ranked the second and third most transparent countries. Hence, we see
a strong correlation between the level of democracy and the central banks trans-
parency. Table 3.10 below shows the rank of democracy as indexed by the World
Audit Democracy. Except for Thailand and Philippines, the rank of democracy
in 2008 by the World Audit Democracy matches the rank of 2005 DE TI index.
We show the polity index (democracy minus autocracy index) of the ASEAN+3,
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except Brunei Darussalam, in Figure 1820, which could explain the anomalies of
transparency among the ASEAN+3 countries. In particular, countries with the
lowest polity indexes namely Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, and China are also the
least transparent with regards to their public data dissemination (i.e. IMFs Arti-
cle IV, SDDS/GDDS). Countries with the highest polity indexes in 2005, namely
Japan, Philippines, Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, are also the most transparent
countries according to the DE TI 2005.
Table 3.9: Level of Democracy of ASEAN+3, Rule of Law of East Asia, Peeren-
boom
Level of Democracy Countries
Non-Democratic China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Myanmar
Semi-Democratic Singapore, Malaysia, Cambodia
(soft authoritarian, non-liberal, or electoral democracy)
Liberal Democratic Japan, Taiwan, South Korea
Table 3.10: WADs Democracy Index of ASEAN+3 (Source: World Audit Democ-
racy, 2008)
Country Democracy 2008 (out of 150) DE TI 2005 Rank
Japan 30 2
South Korea 33 3
Indonesia 70 5
Singapore 74 6
Malaysia 82 7
Thailand 86 4
Philippines 88 1
Cambodia 112 -
China 120 8
Vietnam 126 -
Laos 141 -
Myanmar 150 -
Brunei Darussalam (Monarchial) -
20In the gure, China and Laos do not show because they overlap Vietnam.
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Figure 3.17: DE TI, 1998-2005, for eight ASEAN+3 countries
Figure 3.18: Polity of ASEAN+3 (exc.Brunei) (Source: Systemic Peace, Polity IV)
Social and Cultural Factors: Integration and Collectivist Countries
Social and cultural factors cannot be neglected in explaining the incentives of coun-
tries to seek to regional integration. The fact that most of East Asian countries
can be considered as collectivist rather than individualistic countries can impede
regional integration. This argument relies on historical, social, cultural, and theo-
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retical analysis by Greif (2006). He argues that in collectivist countries, the social
structure is segregated, while in individualistic countries, the social structure is
integrated. In a segregated social structure, members of a group interact socially
and economically only with members of their own group. In an individualistic
social structure, members of a group interact socially and economically with mem-
bers from di¤erent groups. Informal institutions are more likely to arise in a
collectivist society while formal institutions are more likely to arise in an individ-
ualistic society. This di¤erence a¤ects agency relationship, and eventually, the
likelihood of a social and economic integration because of the di¤erent cultural
beliefs institutionalized in these types of societies. The cultural beliefs in a col-
lectivist society mobilize collective punishments, in which an agent is re-hired if
he does not cheat and is not hired by any other member in the society if he does
cheat. Members of the group are more likely to be honest in an intra-agency
relationship. Collective punishment may not extend to inter-agency relationships,
and hence, in order to keep agents from other groups honest, wages must be higher.
Hiring a member from the same group is therefore cheaper than hiring a member
from a di¤erent group. As a result of this, the joint economy among collectivist
societies is segregated. The cultural beliefs in an individualistic society do not
mobilize collective punishments, while the joint economy among individualistic so-
cieties is integrated. In this case, hiring a member from the same group costs
the same as hiring a member from a di¤erent group. Among collectivist societies,
the joint economy is integrated only if collective punishments essentially extend
to inter-agency relationships. Moreover, a collectivist society never initiates an
inter-agency relationship with an individualistic society.
Di¤erent types of societies can therefore a¤ect the likelihood of an integration.
The Genoese and Maghribis are constrained by the same technology, environment,
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and organizational problems, but the Maghribiscollectivist society leads to social
and economic segregation while Genoese individualistic society leads to social and
economic integration. With this evidence, we argue that it is easier for an individ-
ualistic society of the European countries to integrate than it is for a collectivist
society of the East Asian countries. Furthermore, Greif argues that collectivist
societies might be ine¢ cient in the long-run because a collectivist system creates
a gap between protability and e¢ ciency of an inter-agency relationship while an
individualistic system does not. Formal institutions, which may spur growth,
are also more likely to be established under an individualistic system than under a
collectivist system. This is supported by the fact that most under-developed coun-
tries are collectivist while most developed countries are individualistic. However,
this argument may not take into account the fact that the level of development of a
country might change the type of society, as people tend to be more individualistic
as they move from low-technology to high-technology societies. Video games, for
example, could replace playgrounds where children play together. Hence, social
institution is endogenous to the level of development. There are also cases in which
a collectivist society is better than an individualistic society. This is, for example,
the case in times of war. Moreover, individuals could behave di¤erently under
di¤erent circumstances. For example, some societies might be very collectivist
with respect to family matters, but might be very individualistic with respect to
work matters. The issue of identity is also important to consider. If individu-
als could consider themselves as citizens of the world rather than citizens of their
home countries, global integration would be more likely to take place. Social and
cultural heritages could therefore a¤ect the tendencies to integrate.
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International Pressures
Another barrier could be the oppositions from other international organizations,
including the IMF, WTO, and the World Bank. The main reasons for their oppo-
sitions are the double standard that it may create and moral hazard, as countries
may become more lenient towards their neighbors (Jeon, 2002).
3.5.4 Some Facts about Transparency and Development
Level in ASEAN+3
There has been evidence that transparency and development level, dened by the
GDP per capita, are endogenous. Geraats (2008) shows that transparency de-
pends on the monetary regime. Moreover, transparency is positively correlated
with the level of past ination, the level of development and the GDP per capita
in the same year but is negatively correlated with the level of subsequent ina-
tion. Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) show that transparency is determined by
the exchange rate regime and GDP per capita, but transparency index also a¤ects
ination persistence, output variability, ination variability, which might in turn
a¤ect the level of GDP per capita. Our study shows that economic fundamentals
and the level of development could a¤ect qualities of economic institutions. If
transparency and the level of development are co-deterrmined, it may mean that
the emerging country region of East Asia will never be successful in establishing an
institutionalized regional nancial arrangement. East Asian emerging countries
with low GDP per capita might not choose transparency, though it also depends
on other economic and non-economic factors, such as polity. While a country is
trapped under no regional economic cooperation, development could become worse,
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creating a vicious cycle between non-transparency and low level of development.
Figure 3.19: GDP Per Capita vs. DE TI (2000) for eight ASEAN+3 countries
Figure 3.20: DE TI 1999 vs. GDP Per Capita Growth 00-06 for eight ASEAN+3
countries
In order to test the relationship between transparency and the level of devel-
opment, we take Dincer and Eichengreens Transparency Index that includes eight
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ASEAN+3 countries. To test for the endogeneity, we plot the relationship in both
directions. We show a strong positive correlation between GDP per capita in 2000
and DE Transparency Index in 2000, although this correlation disappears as we for-
ward the dependent variables, which means that GDP per capita in some specic
year does not a¤ect the level of transparency a few years later (see Figure 19). This
suggests that the level of development does tend to increase transparency, which
is consistent with our empirical study. We are also interested to know whether
transparency has a positive impact on real GDP per capita growth in these coun-
tries. The data suggests that transparency is negatively correlated with GDP per
capita growth from 2000 to 2006 (see Figure 20). This is counterfactual to what
might have been predicted. One possible explanation is the convergence argument,
that high-GDP-per-capita countries tend to grow less rapidly than low-GDP-per-
capita countries. Hence, this observation might just signal that high levels of
transparency are associated with more developed countries. Another explanation
could be that the time lag is longer for transparency to bring positive impact. A
more comprehensive study on this could explain the phenomenon.
3.6 Policy Issues
This paper has shown both theoretically and empirically that fundamentals could
a¤ect the level of transparency of partially informed agents including, the ASEAN+
3 countries. Countries with higher levels of fundamentals are more closely associ-
ated with higher levels of transparency than countries with lower or intermediate
levels of fundamentals. The evidence is, however, weak in the eight-RFA-country
study, which includes China, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, South Korea, Philip-
pines, and Indonesia. We compare the DE transparency index of these countries
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and their economic fundamentals, and nd many anomalies. China, Brunei Darus-
salam, Malaysia and Singapore, which have relatively high fundamentals have rel-
atively low levels of transparency with respect to their ASEAN+3 neighbors. Nei-
ther the exogenous nor the endogenous transparency model could explain this. A
more convincing explanation is the level of democracy of these countries. China
is considered to be one of the least democratic countries among its ASEAN+3
neighbors along with Myanmar. Malaysia and Singapore are semi-democratic.
Korea and Japan, democratic countries, have high levels of transparency. Hence,
economic fundamentals do not always explain variations in the quality of eco-
nomic institutions. In the case of ASEAN+3, political biases, such as the level of
democracy, seem to explain a lot of the variation in the level of transparency. The
empirical study of this paper has also shown that regional bias, worldwide time
bias and occurence-of-crisis bias play signicant roles in determining the qualities
of economic institutions. The policy implication of this is that non-economic fun-
damentals could a¤ect the quality of economic institutions. Politics, for example,
inuence economic outcomes because economic policy decisions are made not only
by economists (if at all), but also by politicians. Regional integration requires not
only compatible economic fundamentals, but political fundamentals. Social and
cultural heritages could also play a role.
What we are called to do now is determine how to resolve the non-economic fac-
tors that impede regional nancial integration while strengthening the economic
factors, and recognize the need for greater integration in the midst of the 2007
global nancial crisis and the recovery from the 1997-1998 Asian nancial crisis.
Immediate calls for action include changing how the Sino-Japan war is portrayed in
textbooks in Japan, to hold dialogues to discuss issues on Chinas nuclear weapons,
and to have open discussions regarding the U.S. military presence in Japan when-
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ever it is appropriate. In December 2008, 32 Asian countries, including Australia,
held the Bali Democracy Forum, at the initiative of Indonesia, which recently
underwent a political reform towards democracy, to discuss issues on democracy
in Asia (Soesastro, 2008). As our eight-RFA-country study suggests, the level
of democracy seems to be very much connected to the level of transparency of
their central banks. Hence, open discussions on democracy are ways to increase
openness and could encourage regional integration among Asian countries. Mak-
ing di¤erent political systems of the ASEAN+3 countries more compatible with
each other could also be important for regional integration. For example, how
democratic countries of the ASEAN+3 could work with a military-regime country
of Myanmar must be well-understood, otherwise dialogues with Myanmar might
not work.
Another explanation for the slow progress towards institutionalizing the re-
gional nancial arrangement is asymmetric bargaining power, in particular the
gigantic and disproportionately large power of China. Chinas population, ge-
ography, natural resources, international reserves and trade surplus have made it
enormously powerful compared to its neighbors. Decision-making processes and
the bargaining process must be resolved before we can expect China and other
powerful countries, as well as less dominant countries to seek to institutionalize re-
gional nancial arrangement and other regional integration measures. One policy
action to resolve asymmetric bargaining power is to decrease the payo¤ for China
at the threat point by acting more antagonistically in the bargaining stage, thus
making cooperation with China more benecial for other less powerful ASEAN+2
countries. Higher levels of GDP per capita of the less powerful countries could
have increased their payo¤s at the threat point, thus increasing their payo¤s from
bargaining. However, none of these threats seem to be rational. The power of
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China is so omnipresent that none of the smaller countries will rationally commit
to end their relationship with China. Increasing the levels of GDP per capita of
the smaller countries cannot take place in an instant. In other words, changing
the threat points is not a simple solution. Financial crisis, however, could decrease
the payo¤s at the threat point of all of the ASEAN+3 countries, which could make
a game feasible for a set of lower feasible payo¤s. A more compelling solution
is a coalitional analysis. Currently, ASEAN+3 is being expanded to ASEAN+6
to include Australia, New Zealand and India, which some speculate is an e¤ort to
reduce the power of China. Some economists argue that including India in the
ASEAN+3 is salient. Consensus-based decision-making rather than population- or
size-based voting rights could also help to avoid Chinas domination of the process.
A more representative voice from the smaller countries, and not only Japan and
China, should be considered in the case of a disagreement or no consensus.
On a more positive note, positive shocks such as the nancial crisis should bring
East Asian countries towards greater regional cooperation, ending the period of
reservation among some of the East Asian countries. This is evident in the grow-
ing bilateral and multilateral swap agreements among ASEAN+3 countries even
beyond the Chiang Mais Initiatives. China and Indonesia made an agreement on
three-year bilateral currency swap amounting to CNY100 billion - IDR175 trillion
at the end of March, 2009, which allows Indonesia to import Yuan-denominated
Chinese goods and avoid a bilateral trade transacted in U.S. dollar. Other coun-
tries that made a bilateral currency swap agreement with China include South
Korea, Malaysia, Hongkong, Belarus and Argentina. The lack of international
support for an institutionalized regional nancial arrangement or even an Asian
Monetary Fund because of the moral hazard and double standard arguments is
not really well-founded. The issue of moral hazard is less likely to arise. In
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fact, because reputation e¤ects are more salient in a smaller community, which
could be referred to as the localization of information (Dixit, 2004) or diminishing
anonymity (Greif, 2006), countries have more incentives to behave well. Also,
trust-based or reputation- or relation-based institution with collective punishment
system that is better sustained in a small community might be cheaper than formal,
rule-based institution without collective punishment system that is more likely to
erect in a large community.
An institution is needed to resolve asymmetric informational issues by provid-
ing ways to write contracts between borrowing and lending countries, to initiate
concerted e¤orts for better economic outcomes, and to provide checks and balances
for more healthy economies. A regional institution could better resolve the issue
of asymmetric information because countries are closer together. A regional in-
stitution could also be more prompt in helping countries in trouble. Some studies
also suggest that a punishment system is more e¤ective in a smaller group because
of localization of information and diminishing anonymity.
One of the prominent issues of institutions is that often, an institution dened
more broadly as a set of rules, organizations, beliefs, norms, and implied behaviors,
has multiple equilibria (Greif, 2006) or is indeterminate. In the case of a weak
nancial and economic institution, one of the multiple outcomes is crisis. This
highlights the importance of a good nancial and economic institution, which can
be achieved by establishing a strong regional nancial arrangement. A regional
institution is also needed to enable the East Asian region to come out strongly as a
rising star in a new global nancial system. Moreover, we can expect that greater
nancial integration among ASEAN+3 countries in the midst of the recovery from
the Asian nancial crisis and the 2007 global nancial crisis, which would be likely
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improve the fundamentals of these countries, will lead to greater transparency.
Greater transparency might arise not because of reputation e¤ects, but because of
improved fundamentals.
Because of the endogeneity of economic institutions, political institutions, social
institutions, and other non-economic factors, the issue of establishing an institution
such as an Asian regional nancial arrangement must be approached from many
angles. A lot of times, policies can not be generalized across countries or cases. It
might be, for example, that in response to external threats or troubled times, people
behave more adversely towards one another, instead of behaving cooperatively.
Hence, each case may be unique. The case of the 2007 global nancial crisis
that could be explained by the absence of proper regulation on data disclosure is
a special case of the endogenous transparency model with reputation e¤ects, in
which pressures to be transparent may make investment banks and credit rating
agencies disclose information, but at poor quality.
This study also highlights the importance of a two-way academic study: how
economic incentives could help to break the entrenched reservation and introduce
new ways to establish a political relationship among East Asian countries and how
political factors inuence economic decisions.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper seeks an explanation for the slow progress of institutionalizing the re-
gional nancial arrangement that started right after the Asian Financial Crisis
in order to safeguard countries against another crisis. We start with a theoreti-
cal analysis on information and coordination. We have shown that for strategic
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complementary investments, given asymmetric common knowledge in which each
country knows its own fundamental but not the others and the precision of public
information is exogenous, high transparency about a countrys fundamental can be
detrimental to the level of investment of that country if the fundamental is interme-
diate and if there is a high probability that the low-level investment equilibrium is
played in the case of multiple equilibria. Low precision of public information may
therefore be preferable in order to avoid a multiplicity of equilibria, in which the
low-level investment equilibrium is played. Hence, not only might countries with
low fundamental be averse to transparency, but also countries with intermediate
fundamentals.
We also present a model as an extension to this paper, namely a model with
endogenous precision of public information. The di¢ culty of endogenizing the
precision of public information lays in the fact that agents often do not reveal
the precision of public information, thus making it di¢ cult to derive expectations
of the fundamentals given private and public information. In a simple model
of endogenous transparency, in which there are two possible levels, transparent
and non-transparent, the only countries that adopt non-transparency are those
countries with the lowest fundamentals or the lemon cars. The endogenous trans-
parency model is hence more powerful than the exogenous transparency model be-
cause without any regulation on the adoption of transparency, countries will choose
transparency because of the reputation e¤ects and adverse selection biases.
We conduct an empirical study to test the theoretical hypothesis above that
economic fundamentals could a¤ect the level of transparency of central banks con-
trolling for non-economic fundamentals. We show that higher ination, higher ra-
tio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves, and higher ratio of current account
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balance to nominal GDP could decrease the level of transparency of central banks.
Structural fundamentals rather than macroeconomic fundamentals could explain
more variation in transparency of central banks. Moreover, higher GDP per capita
(or higher level of development), more exible exchange rate arrangement and
full democracy relative to full autocracy could increase the level of transparency.
Countries located in Southern Africa, North America, Australia and New Zealand,
and Northern Europe tend to have signicantly higher levels of transparency than
Eastern Africa to di¤erent degrees. Countries a¤ected by the Asian, Mexican and
Russian crises in the late 1990s and early 2000s have relatively higher levels of
transparency, most probably because of international pressures. In general, all
countries experience an upward trend in transparency over time. This empirical
study shows us that transparency of central banks and economic fundamental are
co-determined, and thus, fundamentals and institutions are endogenous.
We apply our theoretical analysis to determine whether aversion to trans-
parency because of low fundamentals could cause failures to integrate. What
we nd is that the level of democracy seems to explain more variations of trans-
parency among ASEAN+3 countries than do the economic fundamentals. An
interesting observation is that in the case of worldwide study, polity is not the
main factor in explaining variations in the transparency of central banks, while in
the ASEAN+3 study, it is. This shows that after controlling for regional-specic
biases, the political factor becomes prevalent, at least in the case of ASEAN+3.
Singapore, Malaysia, and China, who have relatively strong fundamentals, have low
transparency, which can be explained by their semi-democratic or non-democratic
governments. Hence, we argue that economic factors only play a small role in
the non-cooperation among East Asian countries. Rather it is the non-economic
factors, including political issues of democracy, security issues surrounding Chinas
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nuclear weapons, military issues, including US presence in Japan, and the reluc-
tance of the Japanese government in educating its citizens about the Sino-Japan
war that are more dominant in explaining the non-cooperation among East Asian
countries. In fact, we argue that economic incentives should bring countries to-
wards greater integration and o¤set non-economic disincentives towards integra-
tion.
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Appendix 2: Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. A uniform distribution in < is proxied by a normal distribution with
mean 0 and precision 2 as 
2
 !1.
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Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Denote:
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F2(x(zi),
(zi); zi) =
280
(wxixi+wzizi)+(1-
R (zi )
 1
1

p
2
exp.(- (u E( ijxi;zi)
2
22
du)+
(
R (zi )
 1
1

p
2
exp.(- (u E(ijxi;zi)
2
22
du)(1-
R x(zi)
 1
1
x
p
2
exp.(- (u E(x
; i
i jxizi))2
22x
)du)-1=0
F(x(zi),zi)=[F1(x(zi),zi),F2(x(zi),zi)]
0
Transform the distributions of i and x ii into standard normal distributions:
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jxi.zi) is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1,
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jxi.zi) is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1.
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(zi); zi) are continuously di¤erentiable with
respect to x(zi), (zi); and zi.
Using the Implicit Function Theorem, the determinant of the Jacobian of
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Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Denote:
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Using the Implicit Function Theorem, the determinant of the Jacobian of
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Appendix 5: Strategic Complements. Numerical Example.
We use Excel as rst approximations that give us critical values at three-decimal
working precision. Then, we use Mathematica to compute these critical values
using the results we have from the rst approximations to at least six-decimal
working precision. The function used in Mathematica is "FindRoot" to solve
simultaneous non-linear equations:F(x(zi),(zi); zi) = 0. (Proofs are omitted).
Example of Mathematica Programming: z=-1, P=.0001, 1
x
=1
F1 = theta - (CDF[NormalDistribution[], (xstar - theta)/((1/1)^(1/2))])^(2)
F2 = ((1/(.0001 + 1))*xstar + (.0001/(.0001 + 1))*-1) +
(1 - CDF[NormalDistribution[], (theta - ((1/(.0001 + 1))*
xstar + (.0001/(.0001 + 1))*-1))/((1/(.0001 + 1))^(1/2))]) +
(CDF[NormalDistribution[], (theta - ((1/(.0001 + 1))*
xstar + (.0001/(.0001 + 1))*-1))/((1/(.0001 + 1))^(1/2))])*
(1 - CDF[NormalDistribution[], ((xstar + 1)*
(.0001/(.0001 + 1)))/(((1/(.0001 + 1)) + (1/1))^(1/ 2))]) - 1
FindRoot[{F1 == 0, F2 == 0}, {{theta, .25}, {xstar, .25}}]
{theta -> 0.250042, xstar -> 0.250147}
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Appendix 6: Consistency of Numerical Examples with Proposition 1
For K=3, we evaluate the derivatives of the critical values with respect to the
public signal, ( d
dzi
(zi), ddzix
(zi)), using the formulae we derive in Proposition 1 to
prove the local existence of x(zi) and 
(zi) at the simulated critical values x and
. We show that these derivatives are negative and at these simulated critical
values, these derivatives are consistent with the graphs we plot on the simulated
critical values against public signals. (Proofs are omitted).
Appendix 7: Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Note: xN(; 2); f(x;x=[a;b])
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, for x=[a,b].
0; everywhere else.
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We can write the conditional distribution
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This random variable (jjxij; zj; j = [a; b]) has a doubly truncated normal
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distribution with the probability density function taking the form of:
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and axb (Johnson, Kotz, and Balakrishan, 1994),
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Rewriting the conditional probability density function:
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:
This conditional probability density function is the probability function of a
truncated normal distribution of
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:
The expectation and variance of a random variable with a truncated normal
distribution is given by:
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Appendix 8: Eij¢ nger-Geraats Transparency Questionnaire (Eij¢ nger-
Geraats, 2006)
(1) Political Transparency: refers to openness about policy objectives. This
comprises a statement of the formal objectives of monetary policy, including an
explicit prioritization in case of potentially conicting goals, and quantitative tar-
gets. Political transparency is enhanced by institutional arrangements, like central
bank independence and central bank contracts, because they ensure that there is
no undue inuence or political pressure to deviate from states objectives.
(a) Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with an
explicit prioritization in case of multiple objectives?
No formal objective(s)=0.
Multiple objectives without prioritization=1/2.
One primary objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority=1.
(b) Is there a quantication of the primary objective(s)?
No=0.
Yes=1.
(c) Are there explicit institutional arrangements or contracts between the mon-
etary authorities and the government?
No central bank, contract or other institutional arrangements=0.
Central bank without explicit instrument independence or contract=1/2.
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Central bank with explicit instrument independence of central bank contract
(although possibly subject to an explicit override procedure)=1.
(2) Economic transparency: focuses on the economic information that is used
for monetary policy. This includes the economic data the central bank uses, the
policy models it employs to construct economic forecasts or evaluate the impact of
its decisions, and the internal forecasts the central bank relies on. The latter are
particularly important since monetary policy actions are known to take e¤ect only
after substantial lags. So, the central banks action are likely to reect anticipated
developments.
(a) Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy pub-
licly available? The focus is on the release of data for the following ve variables:
money supply, ination, GDP, unemployment rate and capacity utilization.
Quarterly time series for at most two out of the ve variables=0.
Quarterly time series for three or four out of the ve variables=1/2.
Quarterly time series for all ve variables=1.
(b) Does the central bank disclose the formal macroeconomic model(s) it uses
for policy analysis?
No=0.
Yes=1.
(c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecast?
No numerical central bank forecasts for ination and output=0.
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Numerical central bank forecasts for ination and/or output published at less
than quarterly frequency=1/2.
Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for ination and output for the
medium term (one to two years ahead),specifying the assumption about the policy
instrument (condition or unconditional forecasts)=1.
(3) Procedural transparency: is about the way monetary policy decisions are
taken. It involves an explicit monetary policy rule or strategy that describes the
monetary policy framework, and an account of the actual policy deliberations and
how the policy decision was reached, which is achieved by the release of minutes
and voting records.
(a) Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that de-
scribes its monetary policy framework?
No=0.
Yes=1.
(b) Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliberation
(or explanation in case of a single central banker) within a reasonable amount of
time?
No, or only after a substantial lag (more than 3 weeks)=0.
Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or attributed)
or explanation (in case of a single central banker), including a discussion of back-
ward and forward-looking argument=1.
(c) Does central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main oper-
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ating instrument or target was reached?
No voting record, or only after substantial lag (more than eight weeks)=0.
Non-attributed voting records=1/2.
Individual voting records, or decision by single central banker=1.
(4) Policy transparency: means a prompt announcement of policy decisions.
In addition, it includes an explanation of the decision and a policy inclination or
indication of likely future policy actions. The latter is relevant because monetary
policy actions are typically made in discrete steps; a central bank may be inclined
to change the policy instrument, but decide to wait until further evidence warrants
moving a full step.
(a) Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target
promptly announced?
No, or after a signicant lag=0.
Yes, at the latest on the day of implementation=1.
(b) Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy
decision?
No=0.
Yes, when policy decisions change, or only supercially=1/2.
Yes, always and including forward-looking assessment=1.
(c) Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every
292
policy meeting or an explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least
quarterly)?
No=0.
Yes=1.
(5) Operational Transparency: concerns the implementation of the central
banks policy actions. It involves a discussion of control errors in achieving
the operating instrument or target set in the policy decision, and (unanticipated)
macroeconomic disturbances that a¤ect the transmission of monetary policy from
instrument to outcome.
(a) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its policy operating
targets (if any) have been achieved?
No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency)=0.
Yes, but without providing explanation for signicant deviations=1/2.
Yes, accounting for signicant deviations from target (if any); or (nearly) per-
fect control over main operating instrument/target=1.
(b) Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated)
macroeconomic disturbances that a¤ect the policy transmission process?
No, not very often=0.
Yes, but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current macroeconomic
development (at least quarterly)=1/2.
Yes, including a discussion of past forecast error (at least annually)=1.
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(c) Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy outcome
in light of its macroeconomic objective?
No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency)=0.
Yes, but supercially=1/2.
Yes, with an explicit account of the contribution of monetary policy in meeting
the objectives=1.
Figure 3.21: Eij¢ nger-Geraats Transparency Index Framework (Eij¢ nger, Ger-
aats, 2006)
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Appendix 9:
Regression 1: (original)
DETIi;t = + 1GDPPERCAPi;t 1 + 2(GDPPERCAPi;t 1)
2 +
5EXREGIMEi;t 1 + 6INFLATIONi;t 1
3UNEMPLOYMENTi;t 1 + 4(UNEMPLOYMENTi;t 1)
2 +
7RESERV Ei;t 1 + 8(RESERV Ei;t 1)
2
9RERi;t 1 + 10(RERi;t 1)
2
11DCAGDPi;t 1 + 12(DCAGDPi;t 1)
2
+I(POLITYi;t 1) + I(REGIONi) + I(CRISIS) + I(Y EARt)
where:
GDPPERCAP=GDP Per Capita
UNEMPLOYMENT=unemployment rate
EXREGIME=exchange rate arrangement
INFLATION=ination
RESERVE=the ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves
RER=Real Exchange Rate appreciation (-)/ depreciation (+)
DCAGDP= the ratio of current account balance to nominal GDP
I(POLITY)=indicator variable on polity (-10=most autocratic, +10=most de-
mocratic)
I(REGION)=indicator variable on region (1-19)
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I(CRISIS)=1 if country is in crisis in the last 8 years (1998-2005), =0 otherwise
I(YEAR)=indicator variable on year (1998-2005)
Command in STATA
xi: xtmixed deti laggedgdppercapita laggedgdppercapitasq laggedexchanger-
atearrangement laggedination laggedunemployment laggedunemploymentsq lagge-
dreserves laggedreservessq laggeddcagdp laggeddcagdpsq laggedrealexchangerate
laggedrealexchangeratesq i.laggeddemocracy i.region i.crisis i.year jjcountryid:
Output
Mixed-e¤ects REML regression Number of obs = 584
Group variable: countryid Number of groups = 75
Obs per group: min = 4
avg = 7.8 max = 8
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Table 3.11: Regression 1
DETIt Coe¤. z P>jzj
GDPPERCAPITAt 1 .0000951 2.13 .033
GDPPERCAPITASQUAREDt 1 -1.21e-09 -1.92 .055
EXREGIMEt 1 .1472609 3.31 .001
INFLATIONt 1 -1.770036 -3.81 .000
UNEMPLOYMENTt 1 -7.828995 -1.96 .050
UNEMPLOYMENTSQt 1 31.99875 2.82 .005
RESERVES -.1904879 -3.27 .001
RESERVESSQUARED -.0074515 3.43 .001
DCAGDP -1.618754 -2.04 .041
DCAGDPSQUARED -2.547012 -.87 .384
RER -.9492929 -2.67 .008
RERSQUARED .5864727 1.72 .085
.
Table 3.12: Regression 1, cont.
I(POLITY2) 1.81039 1.24 .213
I(POLITY3) .6309463 .42 .673
I(POLITY4) .5742103 .42 .672
I(POLITY5) 1.135863 .82 .412
I(POLITY6) 1.598662 1.14 .254
I(POLITY7) 2.049721 1.37 .17
I(POLITY8) 2.157456 1.35 .176
I(POLITY9) -.8091402 -.54 .587
I(POLITY11) -.4876156 -.33 .742
I(POLITY12) .4857216 .34 .738
I(POLITY13) .3988954 .16 .876
I(POLITY14) 3.008728 2.01 .044
I(POLITY15) .90332224 .67 .503
I(POLITY16) 1.17243 .87 .382
I(POLITY17) 1.43272 1.07 .285
I(POLITY18) 1.291813 .96 .336
I(POLITY19) 1.069359 .79 .428
I(POLITY20) 1.86272 1.37 .172
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.Table 3.13: Regression 1, cont.
I(REGION2) -.0291694 -.02 .985
I(REGION3) 1.173495 .69 .489
I(REGION4) 2.729856 1.17 .241
I(REGION5) 2.044812 1.1 .272
I(REGION6) .1462903 .09 .931
I(REGION7) 1.582003 1.04 .297
I(REGION8) 6.991754 2.91 .004
I(REGION9) 9.479348 4.04 .000
I(REGION10) .9970283 .54 .588
I(REGION11) .8201153 .44 .663
I(REGION12) 2.481032 1.57 .116
I(REGION13) .6670308 .44 .658
I(REGION14) 2.251013 1.29 .196
I(REGION15) 1.110306 .76 .445
I(REGION16) 1.50119 1.04 .297
I(REGION17) 4.024274 2.69 .007
I(REGION18) 1.660637 .99 .322
I(REGION19) 4.242221 1.77 .077
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.Table 3.14: Regression 1, cont.
I(CRISIS) 1.84758 2.67 .008
I(YEAR1999) .1863427 1.13 .191
I(YEAR2000) .5014312 3.49 .000
I(YEAR2001) .8610037 5.7 .000
I(YEAR2002) 1.245093 8.03 .000
I(YEAR2003) 1.355135 8.18 .000
I(YEAR2004) 1.608896 9.25 .000
I(YEAR2005) 1.777133 9.85 .000
CONSTANT -.4946193 -.27 .786
Note: the coe¢ cients on unemployment become insignicant when we run the
regression with orthogonalized independent variables.
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Appendix 10:
Regression 2: (without unemployment)
DETIi;t = + 1GDPPERCAPi;t 1 + 2(GDPPERCAPi;t 1)
2 +
3EXREGIMEi;t 1 + 4INFLATIONi;t 1 +
5RESERV Ei;t 1 + 6(RESERV Ei;t 1)
2
7RERi;t 1 + 8(RERi;t 1)
2
9DCAGDPi;t 1 +
+I(POLITYi;t 1) + I(REGIONi) + I(CRISIS) + I(Y EARt)
where:
GDPPERCAP=GDP Per Capita
EXREGIME=exchange rate arrangement
INFLATION=ination
RESERVE=the ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves
RER=Real Exchange Rate appreciation (-)/ depreciation (+)
DCAGDP= the ratio of current account balance to nominal GDP
I(POLITY)=indicator variable on polity (-10=most autocratic, +10=most de-
mocratic)
I(REGION)=indicator variable on region (1-19)
I(CRISIS)=1 if country is in crisis in the last 8 years (1998-2005), =0 otherwise
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I(YEAR)=indicator variable on year (1998-2005)
Command in STATA
xi: xtmixed deti laggedgdppercapita laggedgdppercapitasq laggedexchanger-
atearrangement laggedination laggedreserves laggedreservessq laggeddcagdp i.democracy
i.region i.crisis i.year jjcountryid:
Output
Mixed-e¤ects REML regression Number of obs = 649
Group variable: countryid Number of groups = 84
Obs per group: min = 3
avg = 7.7 max = 8
Table 3.15: Regression 2
DETIt Coe¤. z P>jzj
GDPPERCAPITA .0000927 2.28 .022
GDPPERCAPITASQUAREDt 1 -1.13e-09 -1.89 .058
EXREGIMEt 1 .135508 3.18 .001
INFLATIONt 1 -1.109903 -2.8 .005
RESERVESt 1 -.1280636 -2.62 .009
RESERVESSQt 1 .0057443 2.95 .003
RERt 1 -.5990215 -2.25 .025
RERSQt 1 .2293227 1.81 .071
DCAGDP -1.412857 -2.03 .043
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.Table 3.16: Regression 2, cont.
I(POLITY2) 1.746504 1.32 .188
I(POLITY3) .6491689 .47 .636
I(POLITY4) .6046694 .5 .620
I(POLITY5) .7552114 .62 .536
I(POLITY6) 1.649546 1.31 .189
I(POLITY7) .5422832 .42 .672
I(POLITY8) -.015514 -.01 .991
I(POLITY9) .8847709 .70 .487
I(POLITY10) .059738 .04 .966
I(POLITY11) .7273669 .58 .561
I(POLITY12) .3430782 .26 .795
I(POLITY13) .9518903 .42 .677
I(POLITY14) 1.54668 1.23 .217
I(POLITY15) .4281239 .36 .722
I(POLITY16) 1.039057 .87 .386
I(POLITY17) 1.081071 .90 .367
I(POLITY18) 1.33227 1.11 .267
I(POLITY19) 1.374387 1.14 .253
I(POLITY20) 2.190003 1.80 .072
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.Table 3.17: Regression 2, cont.
I(REGION2) .1182925 .1 .918
I(REGION3) 2.146925 1.71 .087
I(REGION4) .7293044 .59 .554
I(REGION5) .9859309 .68 .494
I(REGION6) -.2552168 -.2 .839
I(REGION7) 1.085502 1.02 .305
I(REGION8) 5.63735 2.81 .005
I(REGION9) 8.449721 4.33 .00
I(REGION10) .1538443 .14 .891
I(REGION11) .7773641 .60 .546
I(REGION12) 1.678207 1.45 .147
I(REGION13) .4677368 .44 .662
I(REGION14) 1.520336 1.18 .239
I(REGION15) .3537219 .36 .720
I(REGION16) .9762814 1 .318
I(REGION17) 3.135058 2.91 .004
I(REGION18) 1.100708 .88 .377
I(REGION19) 3.180414 1.58 .113
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.Table 3.18: Regression 2, cont.
I(CRISIS) 1.436086 2.42 .016
I(YEAR1999) .1742855 1.29 .196
I(YEAR2000) .4526542 3.32 .001
I(YEAR2001) .8289379 5.87 .000
I(YEAR2002) 1.20015 8.26 .000
I(YEAR2003) 1.319378 8.8 .000
I(YEAR2004) 1.575402 10.09 .000
I(YEAR2005) 1.698822 10.48 .000
CONSTANT -.2845945 -.21 .837
Note: all the results of this regression remain robust when we run the regression
with orthogonalized independent variables.
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Appendix 11: Chronology of Asian Regional Financial Arrangement
(1997-2009) (Source: Minister of Finance, Japan; Soesastro, 2008; Jeon,
2002)
1997-1998: Asian nancial crisis
August - September 1997: Asian Monetary Fund was proposed by Japan.
December 1997: The 1st ASEAN+3 Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
April 1999: The 1st ASEAN+3 Finance Ministerial meeting was held in Manila,
Philippines.
November 28, 1999: The 3rd ASEAN+3 Summit was held in Manila, Philip-
pines. Leaders agreed to enhance "self-help and support mechanism in East Asia".
May 6, 2000: The 2nd ASEAN+3 Finance Ministerial meeting was held in
Chiang Mai, Thailand. Finance ministers agreed to promote the Chiang Mai
Initiatives Bilateral Swap.
May 15, 2004: The 4th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministerial meeting was held in
Jeju, Korea. Finance ministers agreed to explore the ways of enhancing its e¤ec-
tiveness of the Chiang Mai Initiatives. Sixteen BSA were already made totalling
to US$36.5 billion. Asian Bond Market Initiatives were initiated. Based Capital
Accord was agreed.
May 4, 2005: The 8th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministerial meeting was held in
Istambul, Turkey. Finance ministers agreed to take the following measures to
enhance the e¤ectiveness of the Chiang Mai Initiatives: 1. integration and en-
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hancement of ASEAN+3 economic surveillance into the Chiang Mai framework;
2. clear denition of the swap activation process and the adoption of a collective
decision-making mechanism; 3. signicant increase on the size of swaps from 1 to
2 billion; 4. improvement of the drawdown mechanism.
May 4, 2006: The 9th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministerial meeting was held in
Hyderabad, India. A more advanced framework of regional liquidity support was
envisaged (that was later called the Chiang Mai Initiatives Multilateralization).
May 5, 2007: The 10th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministerial meeting was held in
Kyoto, Japan. Finance ministers unanimously agreed that a self-managed re-
serve pooling arrangement was an appropriate way to implement the Chiang Mai
Initiative Multilateralization.
May 4, 2008: The 11th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministerial meeting was held in
Madrid, Spain. Finance ministers agreed to transform Chiang Mai Initiatives into
a much stronger Chiang Mai Initiatives Multilateralization. China-Japan-Korea
would be responsible to 80% of the fund while the rest of the ASEAN countries
would be responsible to the rest of the fund.
October 25, 2008: The 7th Asia-Europe meeting was held in Beijing. A US$80
billion regional, multilateral fund based on the Chiang Mai Initiatives Multilater-
alization was created and expected to become active in May 2009.
November 20, 2008: A technical-group meeting was held in Manila, Philippines,
to discuss the details of the new self-managed reserve pooling arrangement.
November 28, 2008: A Deputy Finance Ministerial meeting was held in Hakone,
Japan, to discuss the details of the new self-managed reserve pooling arrangement.
306
December 10, 2008: Bali Democracy Forum was held in Bali to discuss issues
on democratization in Asia. Thirty two countries, including Australia, attended
the forum.
December 13, 2008: A Trilateral Summit of China, Japan, and Korea was held
in Fukuoka. The three countries reiterated their commitment to strengthening the
Chiang Mai Initiatives Multilateralization. The summit was seen as a development
to the long-time reservation among these countries.
December 15, 2008: ASEAN+3 may expand the reserve pool to US$120 billion
from US$80 billion.
February 18, 2008: ADBI kicked o¤ studies to expand Asian Bond Market.
February 19, 2008: ASEAN+3 Finance Ministerial meeting was held in Phuket,
Thailand. Ministries of Finance advanced in expanding the reserve pool to US$120
billion from US$80 billion.
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Appendix 12: Vulnerability Data 2003
Brunei %Real GDP DCA/GDP M2/Reserve, M2=Broad MoneyPS ank Lending Growth Inflation %RER
1997
1998 -0.1078678 -0.004414 0.01713
1999 0.06612423 7.890 -0.004156 0.04697
2000 0.01286849 13.262 0.108984073 0.015581 0.09481
2001 -0.024246 0.439196564 11.052 0.034404957 0.00596 0.16053
2002 -0.0054092 0.347399855 10.207 0.043436498 -0.023151 -0.0461
2003 0.03922199 0.469490357 10.257 0.034153412 0.003 -0.0024
2004 0.10396216 0.510447945 12.011 0.063831582 0.008142 -0.0399
2005 0.630796496 11.193 0.034521993 0.012445 0.07255
2006 11.879 -0.008906487 0.001223 -0.0936
2007 10.378 0.086383038
2008
2009
*M2="Broad Money" line 59
Source: IFS
Figure 3.22: Vulnerability Data 2003: Brunei Darusallam
Cambodia %Real GDP DCA/GDP M2/Reserve, M2=Broad MoneyPS ank Lending Growth Inflation %RER
1997 -0.07141975
1998 0.05 -0.05583414 0.027978046 0.148066 -0.034
1999 0.126 -0.05286247 0.16594689 0.040077 -0.017
2000 0.084 -0.03773757 0.17717726 -0.00792 0.079
2001 0.077 -0.02191771 0.96525625 0.04190629 -0.00601 0.032
2002 0.068 -0.02514948 0.94815267 0.131183581 0.03225 -0.007
2003 0.087 -0.05017572 1.02749899 0.262260249 0.012105 0.024
2004 0.103 -0.03436136 1.12808953 0.447524352 0.039375 -0.001
2005 0.132 -0.05754868 1.26639165 0.194837683 0.056506 -0.001
2006 0.108 -0.04609108 1.48556008 0.548447936 0.047117 -0.027
2007 0.101 -0.0578459 1.56210362 0.782290957 0.058539 -0.042
2008
2009
Source: IFS
Figure 3.23: Vulnerability Data 2003: Cambodia
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Indonesia %Real GDP DCA/GDP M2/Reserve, M2=Broad MoneyPS ank Lending Growth Inflation %RER
1997 -0.03621799 4.61101023
1998 -0.131262 0.034400294 3.1676362 0.332185702 0.583869 0.1065
1999 0.00791007 0.037256278 3.44894992 -0.554921849 0.204891 -0.2512
2000 0.04919684 0.05517755 2.7316062 0.221741895 0.037184 0.3498
2001 0.03643 0.043593936 2.97872519 0.207327519 0.11504 -0.0005
2002 0.04500063 0.038391216 3.19240899 0.160393597 0.118785 -0.2195
2003 0.04779931 0.034079058 3.22917063 0.192213629 0.06586 -0.0915
2004 0.05031546 0.006324709 3.18402285 0.31115285 0.06243 0.0606
2005 0.05692401 0.000983446 3.69204004 0.210018699 0.104526 -0.0095
2006 0.05510442 0.029267705 3.72890126 0.12066019 0.131101 -0.1626
2007 0.06316534 0.024669478 3.18576216 0.224050659 0.064072 0.0094
2008
2009
Source: IFS
Figure 3.24: Vulnerability Data 2003: Indonesia
Laos %Real GDP DCA/GDP M2/Reserve, M2=Broad MoneyPS ank Lending Growth Inflation %RER
1997 -0.366 1.37377708
1998 0.04 -0.151 1.80551968 0.150071478 0.909802 -0.1373
1999 0.073 -0.089 2.00837862 -0.079705786 1.284195 -0.2045
2000 0.058 -0.005 1.97506473 0.291985264 0.250846 -0.1063
2001 0.058 -0.05 2.0643198 0.070110602 0.07812 0.1014
2002 0.059 0.002 1.72488068 -0.111547183 0.106315 0.0334
2003 0.058 -0.032 1.94106075 -0.001954166 0.154887 -0.1321
2004 0.069 -0.074 2.22525359 0.152225678 0.104626 -0.0785
2005 0.073 -0.068 2.20909608 0.231312955 0.071655 -0.0011
2006 0.083 0.014 2.2125366 0.064954639 0.068023 -0.1276
2007 0.075 0.026 1.96376289 0.336036013 0.045224 -0.0515
2008
2009
*M2="Money" +"Quasi Money", line 34+35
Source: IFS
Figure 3.25: Vulnerability Data 2003: Laos
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Malaysia %Real GDP DCA/GDP M2/Reserve, M2=Broad MoneyPS ank Lending Growth Inflation %RER
1997 -0.08197235 3.61182682
1998 -0.0735934 0.127836769 3.05245614 0.005901582 0.053 -0.0581
1999 0.06137608 0.159241332 2.90048209 -0.00079518 0.027 -0.0054
2000 0.08858822 0.090499134 3.29485671 0.072543792 0.015 0.0181
2001 0.00518 0.078535568 3.23138423 -0.053948842 0.014 0.0139
2002 0.05391074 0.071294586 3.02547924 0.025646771 0.018 -0.0022
2003 0.05788346 0.121423888 2.55857979 0.067191737 0.01 0.0126
2004 0.06783321 0.120877464 2.13368038 0.065052677 0.015 0.0114
2005 0.05332119 0.144558799 2.33344861 0.09122038 0.03 -0.0011
2006 0.05774601 0.156887984 2.47617811 0.068399065 0.036 -0.0692
2007 0.06346611 0.149037295 2.38586795 0.092466003 0.02 -0.0561
2008
2009
Source: IFS
Figure 3.26: Vulnerability Data 2003: Malaysia
Myanmar %Real GDP DCA/GDP M2/Reserve, M2=Broad MoneyPS ank Lending Growth Inflation %RER
1997 -0.00234278 205.00486
1998 0.05773181 -0.0018737 227.81967 0.348513051 0.514876 -0.3576
1999 0.10916152 -0.00080588 341.214777 0.207941705 0.184007 -0.1146
2000 0.06234815 -0.00054168 549.535018 0.416249887 -0.00109 0.0902
2001 0.11344 -0.0002929 424.711599 0.561835281 0.21101 -0.1197
2002 0.12025794 0.000107483 527.147552 0.461883914 0.570747 -0.4022
2003 0.13839851 -1.42923E-05 499.084973 -0.438615321 0.365899 -0.315
2004 6.72969E-05 565.360141 0.255847658 0.045343 -0.0602
2005 577.8042 0.331039258 0.093685 0.0272
2006 482.666656 0.143570773 0.199966 -0.1827
2007 0.21800696 0.350245 -0.2748
2008
2009
*M2="Money Plus Quasi Money", line 35
Source: IFS
Figure 3.27: Vulnerability Data 2003: Myanmar
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Philippines %Real GDP DCA/GDP M2/Reserve, M2=Broad MoneyPS ank Lending Growth Inflation %RER
1997 -0.07167279 3.61291888
1998 -0.0057673 0.022658107 3.14278121 -0.057002687 0.092659 -0.0919
1999 0.03396352 -0.03891953 2.53841815 -0.020223678 0.059471 -0.0045
2000 0.04008271 -0.03316081 2.17452435 0.052963599 0.039501 0.2334
2001 0.034 -0.02468658 2.19572767 -0.006509106 0.068 -0.0101
2002 0.05537718 -0.0037372 2.35441494 0.003500617 0.029963 0.0188
2003 0.04915419 0.00370769 2.26876205 0.029153346 0.034545 0.0346
2004 0.05000437 0.01886135 2.55100557 0.095296574 0.059754 -0.019
2005 0.04831344 0.019339485 2.42740819 -0.000108426 0.076285 -0.094
2006 0.043546456 2.54268079 0.095599438 0.062404 -0.1004
2007 0.039238552 2.21057853 0.058902014 0.028042 -0.157
2008 -1
2009
*M2="Narrow Money" +"Quasi Money", line 59
Source: IFS
Figure 3.28: Vulnerability Data 2003: Philippines
Singapore %Real GDP DCA/GDP M2/Reserve, M2=Broad MoneyPS ank Lending Growth Inflation %RER
1997 0.175660851 1.03170245
1998 -0.014 0.220249742 1.28933309 0.063764396 -0.00268 0.0091
1999 0.072 0.171 1.35925026 -0.033670189 0.000167 0.0251
2000 0.101 0.116 1.23076626 0.054294128 0.013616 0.06
2001 -0.024 0.129 1.29148643 0.125748756 0.00997 0.0884
2002 0.042 0.123 1.26249994 -0.087178553 -0.00391 -0.0432
2003 0.035 0.226 1.19005999 0.028265763 0.005079 -0.0034
2004 0.09 0.162 1.1251612 0.043793919 0.016625 -0.0298
2005 0.073 0.186 1.13702221 0.024044568 0.004251 0.0487
2006 0.082 0.211 1.25522168 0.047530279 0.01021 -0.0584
2007 0.077 0.232 1.26717352 0.173246976 0.02078 -0.0531
2008
2009
Source: IFS
Figure 3.29: Vulnerability Data 2003: Singapore
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Thailand %Real GDP DCA/GDP M2/Reserve, M2=Broad MoneyPS ank Lending Growth Inflation %RER
1997 -0.03 3.50823838
1998 -0.105 0.113 4.49438566 -0.080376496 0.080722 -0.2703
1999 0.044 0.1 3.80367001 -0.151823372 0.003039 0.0404
2000 0.048 0.082 3.63304516 -0.128803879 0.015673 0.1753
2001 0.022 0.044 3.66488516 -0.066503549 0.01637 0.034
2002 0.053 0.037 3.27627062 0.123395497 0.006208 -0.0148
2003 0.07 0.032 3.46920469 0.064020855 0.018002 -0.0783
2004 0.062 0.017 3.12928119 0.112639298 0.027683 -0.0142
2005 0.045 -0.044 3.09588598 0.079796149 0.045415 0.0389
2006 0.052 0.01 2.89957622 0.045368594 0.046419 -0.1334
2007 0.05 0.063 0.047858203 0.022283 -0.0588
2008 0.054726 0.0235
2009
Source: IFS
Figure 3.30: Vulnerability Data 2003: Thailand
Vietnam %Real GDP DCA/GDP M2/Reserve, M2=Broad MoneyPS ank Lending Growth Inflation %RER
1997 -0.05988756 3.34120328
1998 0.058 -0.04132188 3.68194451 0.191 0.072662 0.0698
1999 0.048 0.041283376 3.43769052 0.458 0.04117 -0.0088
2000 0.068 0.036346948 4.49510927 0.342 -0.0171 0.0882
2001 0.069 0.021374184 5.04806178 0.232 -0.00432 0.0733
2002 0.071 -0.01736482 5.18459317 0.255 0.03831 -0.0009
2003 0.073 -0.04925058 4.22248034 0.324 0.032201 0.0064
2004 0.078 -0.02110785 4.79147608 0.394 0.077583 -0.0392
2005 0.084 -0.01062423 4.79490521 0.349 0.082815 -0.0367
2006 0.082 -0.00269815 4.29425756 0.229 0.073863 -0.0304
2007 0.085 -0.09848637 0.49794864 0.088946 -0.052
2008 0.243963 -0.1206
2009
*M2="Money" + "Quasi Money", line 34+35
Source: IFS
Figure 3.31: Vulnerability Data 2003: Vietnam
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China %Real GDP DCA/GDP M2/Reserve, M2=Broad MoneyPS ank Lending Growth Inflation %RER
1997 0.037478799 0.028068
1998 0.078 0.030110069 8.46089095 0.200208943 -0.00845 0.0241
1999 0.076 0.019218751 9.1811912 0.120922355 -0.01408 0.0366
2000 0.084 0.017199059 9.66398039 0.10951006 0.002553 0.0308
2001 0.083 0.013216661 8.87084749 0.135970084 0.004634 0.0235
2002 0.091 0.024362154 7.67742333 0.279879297 -0.00765 0.0237
2003 0.1 0.027836858 6.54865632 0.194983345 0.011568 0.011
2004 0.101 0.035454072 4.97861813 0.08791278 0.03885 -0.0116
2005 0.104 0.068780522 4.50627166 0.106711107 0.018206 -0.01
2006 0.117 0.089419624 4.14187404 0.162545749 0.01464 -0.0155
2007 0.119 0.110133093 3.60885663 0.176357113 0.047543 -0.0815
2008
2009
Source: IFS
Figure 3.32: Vulnerability Data 2003: China
Japan %Real GDP DCA/GDP M2/Reserve, M2=Broad MoneyPS ank Lending Growth Inflation %RER
1997 0.02441728 20.5312585
1998 -0.021 0.027191393 24.5539188 0.020888144 0.006664 -0.103
1999 0 0.023536668 21.409 -0.014058261 -0.00332 -0.094
2000 0.028 0.027334408 15.699 -0.019312013 -0.00712 0.171
2001 0.002 0.023249571 12.698 -0.419255664 -0.00758 0.189
2002 0.003 0.027441616 12.219 -0.077654884 -0.00895 -0.068
2003 0.015 0.029755073 9.609 -0.039256361 -0.00249 -0.084
2004 0.027 0.035949782 8.017 -0.022554409 -8.4E-05 -0.002
2005 0.019 0.03897966 7.204 0.032317457 -0.00274 0.175
2006 0.02 0.03985459 6.822 -0.003283984 0.002415 0.038
2007 0.024 0.04652768 6.707 -0.001660311 0.000582 -0.015
2008 6.70740748
*M2=M2 (Period Average)
Source: IFS
Figure 3.33: Vulnerability Data 2003: Japan
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Korea %Real GDP DCA/GDP M2/Reserve, M2=Broad MoneyPS ank Lending Growth Inflation %RER
1997 -0.028933738 11.106
1998 -0.069 0.100406163 7.26 0.089 0.075 -0.329
1999 0.095 0.052702403 5.82 0.162 0.008 -0.0419
2000 0.085 0.026770474 4.468 0.167 0.023 0.12324
2001 0.038 0.01695938 4.51 0.117 0.041 0.02638
2002 0.07 0.009350563 4.456 0.171 0.028 -0.1073
2003 0.031 0.019665331 3.263 0.087 0.035 -0.0067
2004 0.047 0.037417421 2.985 0.021 0.036 -0.1397
2005 0.042 0.018697569 3.359 0.077 0.028 -0.0166
2006 0.051 0.005904509 3.439 0.022 -0.0716
2007 0.05 0.006184963 3.284 0.025 0.00981
2008 0.047 0.33219
2009
Source: IFS
Figure 3.34: Vulnerability Data 2003: Korea
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CONCLUDING REMARK
Although the three chapters do not explicitly study institutions in the context
of the current global nancial crisis, there are a lot of implications that could be
derived from them. One such implication is how institutions could be improved in
order to yield a better nature of equilibria if indeterminacy of outcomes is unavoid-
able. A nancial crisis is not predictable because there are multiple outcomes that
could have occurred from the initial conditions of the global economy, including
the global imbalance and nancial deregulation. An even stronger demand on
economic theory is how to deal with a multiplicity of equilibria itself.
This study also warns that economic decision is never separate from political
factors. Therefore, a new economic theory should be integrated with other studies
as much as other studies consider economic factors. A new economic theory must
eventually be brought into the context of policy decision that is made by politi-
cians and not social planners. An enlightening economic theory must be able to
inspire politicians to make favorable political decisions, such as designing economic
incentives that could inspire political integration in the midst of conicts.
Institution can be studied only by a non-traditional, social science empirical
method because it highly depends on the culture, norms, beliefs, and historical
accounts. Hence, a new economic theory must challenge the traditional method
of empirical study and be creative in designing a new approach of conducting an
empirical study. Chapters 1 and 3 use deductive methods while Chapter 2 uses
both inductive and deductive methods. A new economic theory is not far from
reality, necessitating the interactive use of both methods.
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